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In this study, I examine the New Institutionalist Economic History (NIEH) of Douglass C. 
North from a historiographical and philosophical perspective. As a point of departure for this 
purpose I take North’s critical engagement with the primitivism-modernism debate in premodern 
economic history, as represented in his early work by the ‘challenge of Karl Polanyi’. This 
challenge, I argue, has given shape to the development of the NIEH in its various stages of 
theoretical elaboration. Therefore, understanding its contextual significance is indispensable for 
making sense of North’s oeuvre as a whole. On my reading, North interpreted the challenge of 
Polanyi to mean combining two methodological conceptions previously not united in one work. 
On the one hand, North’s NIEH extends the scope of economic theory to the study of the longue 
durée of economic history; while on the other hand North seeks to theorize the importance of 
historical variation in sociocultural institutions for understanding why there are rarely complete 
or well-functioning markets in most of economic history. North considers neoclassical 
economics suitable for neither of these purposes. Yet his critique of Polanyi’s substantivist-
primitivist approach is primarily based on the absence of an integration of his project with the 
tools of economic theory. For this purpose, North therefore adopted the theory of transaction cost 
economics, also called New Institutional Economics (NIE), to this new ambitious end. More than 
perhaps any other author North has been responsible for extending the scope and sophistication 
of this economics based approach in the study of economic history.  
In the present work, I discuss to what extent this approach has been successful in its own 
aims, internally consistent, and to what extent it is plausible as a historiographical approach from 
an ‘external’ point of view. I do this by combining a close reading and interpretation of a variety 
of North’s writings, focusing in particular on the most contemporary version of his work - which 
has not been much studied - with a methodological and theoretical discussion of various major 
themes in or aspects of his work from the viewpoints of historiography, anthropology, and 
philosophy of social science. These themes include (among others) North’s understanding of the 
functioning of markets in politics and economics, his approach to choice theory, rationality, and 
game theory, his use or neglect of evolutionary concepts, the meaning of embeddedness in his 
work, and North’s contractarian anthropology. 
As this work shows, North’s NIEH is situated in a difficult intermediate position within 
larger debates in economic thought: between primitivism and modernism, between substantivism 
and formalism (in the anthropological sense), and most significantly, between the ‘new 
mainstream’ of economic theory and the quest for successive endogenisation of the institutional 
context of economic behavior. This certainly speaks for the ambition and sophistication of 
North’s historiographical approach, something which has only increased with the further 
development of his theory. But in his quest to unite the best insights of choice theory with New 
Institutionalist economics as well as incorporating the ‘anthropological’ level of fully socialized 
beliefs, preferences, and how they give rise to institutional variation in history, North frequently 
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seeks to have his cake and eat it. The persistent methodological ambiguities in his work give rise 
to problems of internal consistency and external plausibility, which are present from the very 
inauguration of his NIEH research programme. The subsequent development of his work has not, 
I argue, been able to overcome this fundamental problem. For this reason, while much of North’s 
toolset and his overarching ambitions are valuable developments in economic historical theory, 
he does not achieve his aim of overcoming the challenge of Karl Polanyi. Without a more 
decisive break with his original economic microfoundations, North’s NIEH project cannot 
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Douglass North and the ‘challenge of Karl Polanyi’ 
Section I. The Challenge 
At first sight it may seem strange, but it should come as no surprise that the eminent economic 
historian Douglass North inaugurated his then newly conceived research programme, his New 
Institutionalist Economic History (NIEH), with an appreciation of Karl Polanyi.2 Although often 
overlooked, his 1977 paper on what he called ‘the challenge of Karl Polanyi’ expressed two 
important theoretical steps for the development of North’s ideas in this field.3 Firstly, it is one of 
the earliest and best statements of what he saw as the tasks of the NIEH that he was to give shape 
to over the following decades. Secondly, it is his most explicit discussion of how his conception 
of these tasks, and the differences between his aims and assumptions and those of the 
neoclassical and substantivist traditions, originate in the ‘challenge’ of Karl Polanyi. As I will 
argue in this work, the former cannot be understood without the latter: without Polanyi’s 
challenge, no Northian NIEH. 
“Anthropologists, sociologists and historians”, North argues in this paper, “have long 
challenged the relevance of economic theory to the analysis of past societies”. However, this 
theory, defined in this paper as the “wealth-maximizing behavioural postulate”, has survived 
among neoclassically oriented economic historians nonetheless because they have generally been 
unconcerned by the implications of such theoretical background choices: one cannot directly test 
them anyway, “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”.4 Indeed, for most of his early career up 
to the writing of this paper, North himself had perhaps been a primary example of this 
unconcerned attitude. He was known mainly as one of the leading exponents of Cliometrics (or 
‘New Economic History’): a school defined by the application of quantitative neoclassical 
methods to economic historical analysis, and not generally bothered much by the claims of other 
social sciences.5 But whether or not North had himself been similarly unconcerned before, by 
this point he had come to be haunted by the presence of a ghost (as he describes it): the spirit of 
Karl Polanyi. Polanyi, he argues, “cannot be so lightly dismissed, and if his spirit does not haunt 
the new economic historians, it is because they are probably not even aware the ghost exists”.6 
But he does, and his challenge to such economic historians is straightforward: “Polanyi contends 
                                                          
2 Unfortunately, Douglass C. North (1920-2015) passed away during the revision of this work. Because this thesis 
emphasizes the continued relevance and influence of North’s work and his posthumous debate with Karl Polanyi, I 
have decided to maintain use of the present tense. 
3 North 1977. One previous discussion to which this paper is central is Didry and Vincensini 2011; for other 
contrasts of North and Polanyi, see: Ankarloo 2002; Davis 2008. 
4 North 1977, p. 703-704. 
5 See North 1997 for a reflection on North’s part on his Cliometric period and the achievements and shortcomings 
of that approach. For his original, more negative assessment, see North 1977, op. cit. 
6 North 1977, p. 704. 
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that markets have only dominated resource allocation for a brief span of history centering on the 
nineteenth-century Western world. Before that time… other allocative systems have 
characterized economic organization and these other systems are not grounded in economizing 
behaviour”.7  
North is clearly ambivalent about the value of this viewpoint. He explains Polanyi’s theory 
of ‘transactional modes’, which include – besides market exchange – reciprocity and 
redistribution, and how for Polanyi these latter two were the dominant or characteristic such 
modes of the economies of premodern societies. Markets dominate only in the most recent 
historical period, and even then only outside the Soviet-type societies. In this, he rightly notes, 
Polanyi opposes both the neoclassical and the Marxist approaches. Each of these represents an 
opposed social force within modern market society, a society that has only emerged out of the 
Industrial Revolution. For North, “it is easy to find fault with Polanyi’s analytical framework”. 
Indeed, “there are numerous parts of his analysis that show a failure to grasp elementary 
economic principles”.8 Economic theory, in other words, is not on Polanyi’s side. And yet North 
is deeply impressed by the significance of this challenge. For “the stubborn fact of the matter is 
that Polanyi was correct in his major contention that the nineteenth century was a unique era in 
which markets played a more important role than at any other time in history… To the extent 
that economic theory was confined to the analysis of markets, the tools of the economist were… 
irrelevant to an understanding of the ancient world… Economic historians have not even begun 
to account for such non-market allocative systems, and until they do, they can say very little 
about societies in which markets had very limited allocative effects.”9  
North first considers Polanyi’s own approach to dealing with this problem. Besides 
defining transactional modes, what North calls ‘allocative systems’, Polanyi had one other major 
theoretical tool: a concept that in the subsequent literature would become known as 
embeddedness.10 North here refers to it as ‘embodied’, but is clearly speaking of the same 
concept. He takes as good a definition of embeddedness as one could wish for from Polanyi 
directly: “The key to Polanyi’s system is the view that economic organization is embodied in 
society in the sense of ‘having no separate existence apart from its controlling social 
integument’… Transactional dispositions of natural resources, labor, produce and services are 
expressions of socially defined obligation and relationships.”11 The consequence of this is that 
“the kinship, status, hierarchy and political or religious affiliations which underlie these 
economic structures are not explicable in terms of economizing behaviour – one can only 
                                                          
7 Ibid., p. 703. 
8 Ibid., p. 707. 
9 Ibid., p. 706. 
10 An excellent discussion of Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness and its various subsequent usages is Dale 2011. 
See also chapter 2 for a further elaboration. 
11 North 1977, p. 708. Emphasis added. 
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understand them and therefore the functioning of the economy by ‘in depth’ studies which are 
social, cultural, and psychological in origin”.12 
This brings us to North’s own solution. To answer the challenge of Karl Polanyi means 
two things: it means to shift the emphasis of research to the study of premodern economic history 
– that is to say, the economic history of the period before the Industrial Revolution and the 
dominance of the market as allocation system – and it means to give an explanation of the nature 
and functioning of the alternative allocation systems that Polanyi argued dominated in the 
premodern era. But for such an explanation to answer the challenge, it must be an explanation 
based in ‘economic theory’, as North put it, rather than exclusively in the “social, cultural, and 
psychological” explanations that Polanyi favoured.  
The economic theory in question is no longer to be neoclassical, the concessions to 
Polanyi’s critique of such thought in this 1977 paper make clear. Rather, it is to be the New 
Institutionalist Economics (NIE), in this form also known as transaction cost economics. (As I 
will detail further in the first chapter, North, together with Robert Thomas, had at this point 
already made steps towards substituting this approach for the neoclassical one in his study of 
economic institutions in medieval Europe.13) Explanations in terms of transaction costs would 
challenge the claim of anthropologists - who were Polanyi’s main sources of theoretical and 
empirical inspiration and to whose discipline he arguably belonged at least as much as to 
economic historians – to the domain of the ‘social’: the socio-political structures and cultural 
norms in which these economic structures were embedded. As North puts it in the final sections 
of this paper: “Polanyi conceived the custom, kinship arrangements, status, etc., to be 
fundamentally a result of non-economic forces whereas [North and Thomas’ view is] consistent 
with an explanation that they evolved as ways to reduce transactions costs (sic)… It was Karl 
Polanyi’s intuitive genius that he saw the issues. A transactions-cost approach offers the promise 
of providing refutable explanations for these ‘transactional modes’… We can and should be able 
to predict the direction of institutional change [though] the precise form it will take is still 
beyond the scope of the state of the art.”14  
The significance of this discussion for understanding the nature, development, and 
implications of North’s NIEH should be clarified. North’s engagement of Polanyi spells out a 
number of the themes that are central to his NIEH approach. Its explananda are, as North makes 
clear, those of Polanyi’s challenge: the ability to explain nonmarket allocation systems in 
premodern economies. The NIEH would address the question whether such allocation systems 
are ultimately embedded in sui generis social, political, and cultural (what I would call 
‘anthropological’) causal factors or that they can be causally explained in terms of a general 
economic theory: a transhistorical and transcultural need to reduce transaction costs in economic 
                                                          
12 Ibid., p. 708. 
13 See: North and Thomas 1971; 1976. 
14 North 1977, p. 715-716. 
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behaviour. This transaction cost economics is to be seen as rivalrous with neoclassical economics 
and of Marxism alike, in North’s perception - although the references to transaction costs 
“changing in the margins” show North’s commitment to marginalist methodology is not 
diminished thereby.15  
We also see in embryo some of the central concerns of North’s NIEH in its later 
development, as I will discuss in the next chapter: the shift from the study of markets to the 
institutions underlying markets, one that would over time develop towards a further study of the 
origins of human sociality, normative and ideological structures, and political formations, i.e. the 
‘non-economic’ institutions that co-determine the functioning, embeddedness and extent of 
market exchange. Indeed, ultimately Polanyi’s substantivism represents a greater challenge than 
just the question of nonmarket allocation systems for North: “The point goes much deeper than 
Polanyi realized, and poses a fundamental question to the economist and economic historian. 
How do we account for substitutes for price-making markets of which families, firms, guilds, 
manors, trade unions, cooperatives, etc. are organizing institutions which allocate resources 
instead of markets. Most fundamental of all, how do we explain government?”16 
While one can question whether North is right that Polanyi was unaware of this central 
difficulty for economists, it does show how great for North the stakes of Polanyi’s challenge are. 
What is at stake is not just which approach, the substantivist or the NIE one, is best able to 
explain the economic institutions of premodern societies. More than that, one can observe two 
major interrelated methodological debates in the background that make Polanyi’s approach such 
a ‘challenge’ worthy of answering with a full-fledged new research programme. Firstly, the 
contestation as to whether the methods of mainstream economics or the theories of the 
anthropologists (and perhaps by extension sociologists and historians) will dominate the study of 
premodern economic history.17 This is implicit in the ‘challenge’. Polanyi’s stature among, even 
adoption by, economic anthropologists – a recognition which unlike his influence in other 
disciplines has been continuous since his death – makes him the ideal foil for North’s research 
programme, which is here founded by explicit contrast on a bedrock of ‘economic theory’.  
Less immediately apparent in this text is the older interdisciplinary debate between 
‘primitivism’ and ‘modernism’: i.e. the question whether premodern economic structures can 
only be explained by reference to qualitative historical differentiation in their economic and/or 
social ‘logics’, or whether they are fundamentally of one kind and only variable as a matter of 
(quantitative, organizational, institutional) degree.18 But this debate was of the greatest 
                                                          
15 Ibid., p. 715. 
16 Ibid., p. 709. 
17 This disciplinary rivalry has sometimes been described by the term ‘economics imperialism’: see e.g. Fine and 
Milonakis 2009. 
18 There is a considerable literature on this debate. Classic statements are Finley 1985; Bücher 1893; Meyer 1913; 
Polanyi, Arensberg and Pearson 1957; Rostovtzeff 1957. See for some recent discussions: Scheidel and Von Reden 
(eds.) 2002; Meikle 1996; Bang, Ikeguchi, and Ziche 2006; Jongman 2012; Jongman 2014. 
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importance to Polanyi’s own work and that of his historical and anthropological collaborators. 
North’s opposition to Polanyi mirrors that of ‘modernists’ against the ‘primitivists’ in economic 
history and economic anthropology alike, and, arguably, it is this question more than any other 
that produces two identifiable schools of thought across the disciplinary divides of economic 
thought in general.19 
II. The approach of this work 
I propose to examine Douglass North’s NIEH against the backdrop of his confrontation with 
Polanyi and the deeper methodological debates in economic thought described above, spanning 
the disciplines of economics, economic history, and anthropology. While there is a considerable 
secondary literature on North, his work tends to be discussed in the context of the development 
of the NIE as economic theory, rather than in its significance as a new step in longstanding 
debates on the interpretation of premodern economic history, and the applicability of (certain) 
economic theory thereto.20 While in recent years various other economic thinkers, theorists and 
historians alike, have contributed to the NIEH, I concentrate on North’s work as his is both the 
original and most influential version and because arguably his work makes the best case for the 
NIEH approach. It is radically critical of neoclassical and ‘neoinstitutional’ approaches, its 
theoretical scope and apparatus is sophisticated and spans a great interdisciplinary range of 
problems, and his theoretical work represents within New Institutionalism the most persistent 
attempt at developing a fully-fledged new ‘modernist’ interpretation of history. It thereby has a 
significance far beyond the specific problems it addresses in economic theory-driven 
historiography.21  
However, the emergence of North’s NIEH has been defined not just by its opposition to 
primitivist and/or substantivist theory. It is also defined by a complex relation to the economic 
mainstream. The rise of evolutionary economic thought, part of a more general re-appreciation of 
the potential of Darwinian selection to understand social scientific problems, has emphasized 
that economic behaviour and institutions are as much the unintended effect of various rule-like 
structured responses as that they are the product of design. The emphasis of this research 
programme is therefore on the emergence and change of institutions and behaviours out of 
habits, rule-following and other algorithmic behavioural patterns in varying situations. Not all 
evolutionary approaches to economics have, by any means, followed explicit Darwinian 
principles. Indeed, as discussed in the chapter on North’s use of evolutionary terminology, often 
putatively different evolutionary principles (e.g. the Lamarckian) are invoked. Some 
evolutionary economists have emphasized that what this ‘generalized’ or ‘universal Darwinism’ 
                                                          
19 By ‘economic thought’ I intend a shorthand for the common problems and intellectual traditions of economic 
theory, economic history, economic sociology, economic anthropology, and so forth. 
20 For a brief discussion of this literature, see below. 
21 See e.g. Galiani and Sened 2014. 
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applies whenever the core elements of selection, variety, and inheritance operate on open and 
complex systems, including those of human societies.22  
A classic application of evolutionary thinking to understanding institutional evolution in 
the economic sphere is the work of R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter. This work in turn has had a 
considerable influence on the development of the New Institutional Economics, and encouraged 
the convergence between New Institutionalist and evolutionary approaches.23 This emerging 
synthesis between NIE and certain evolutionary approaches in economics has the potential of 
forming a new paradigm, one that fits very well with – indeed has partially co-determined the 
development of – the new mainstream’s preoccupation with institutions and bounded rationality. 
In North’s NIEH, this evolutionary-institutional paradigm is, however, taken one step further: 
with a deeper quest for the origins of institutions and political order (“how can we explain 
government?”). Ultimately, this culminates a sophisticated combination of game theory, New 
Institutionalism, and contractarian philosophy to complete a process of “successive 
endogenisation” of sociocultural institutions, to borrow a phrase from Thrainn Eggertsson, into a 
single economic historical theory.24  
That is to say, on the basis of these economic and philosophical foundations North erects a 
comparative theory for studying the interaction between markets and other allocation systems, 
formal (politico-legal) and informal (socio-cultural) institutions, and the social-evolutionary 
adaptation of societies to change under conditions of uncertainty. This argument moves across 
several levels of abstraction and scope: from the bedrock of human sociality to the complex 
norms and beliefs that constitute the institutions of social life and therefore shape economic 
behaviour through time to the level of long-term historical evolution and path dependence. In its 
most recent form, it constitutes nothing less than a “conceptual framework for interpreting 
recorded human history”.25  
It is therefore a highly ambitious form of New Institutionalism, extensive in domain of 
application and crossing traditional disciplinary boundaries of the social sciences. Yet this 
ambition is understandable in light of Polanyi’s own attempts at formulating such a comparative 
theory for premodern economic formations, one that equally straddles economic history and 
anthropology: it is perhaps the necessary consequence of answering Polanyi’s challenge.26 In this 
work, I will seek to clarify the steps in North’s approach from his earliest neoinstitutionalism to 
his fully-fledged historical theory by considering it from the viewpoint of his 1977 paper: a 
‘modernist’ rejoinder to Polanyi’s ‘primitivist’ challenge. But I will also examine the fluctuating 
relationship between North’s NIEH and the mainstream of economic theory. This relationship is 
not just something which ultimately plays a major role in defining North’s specific positioning 
                                                          
22 Stoelhorst 2007, p. 233-234; Dennett 1995; e.g. Hodgson 2003, 2004; Hodgson and Knudsen 2008. 
23 Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002. 
24 Eggertsson 1990, p. xiii. 
25 The subtitle of North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009. 
26 For an early discussion of this dual disciplinary role of Polanyi’s work, see: Humphreys 1969. 
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within the primitivism-modernism debate, but it is also one of the main sources of North’s 
influence in a wider sense: as I will discuss in more detail shortly, much of the reception of 
North’s work has read him as a primary exponent of New Institutional Economics and has 
highlighted his contributions to bringing institutions (as rules) and the importance of beliefs back 
into economic theory, even to the extent of an increasing convergence with the ‘Old Institutional 
Economics’.27 
This requires some explication of what is meant by the economic mainstream, to be sure a 
contested category. As David Colander and colleagues argue, the mainstream of economics is 
not simply neoclassical theory; it can be defined more usefully as the modelling approach to 
explaining social phenomena, within which the substance of the models has shifted – at least in 
what they call the “edge of economics” - from general equilibrium analysis to complexity and 
evolutionary models.28 Equally, according to them the content of economic theory has 
increasingly shifted from perfect to imperfect markets and their institutional contexts, and from 
older ‘pure’ rational choice conceptions of individual choice to new approaches informed by 
behavioural economics and psychology, such as models of bounded rationality.29 They therefore 
distinguish orthodoxy, equated with neoclassical economics, from mainstream (for which one 
could adopt the synonym ‘conventional’), which includes the traditional neoclassical approach 
but also the newer interest in institutional, evolutionary, and behavioural economics – that is, 
insofar as those remain within the paradigm of formal modelling and/or based on the 
microfoundations of choice theory.30  
But to understand the context of North’s NIEH within this development of economic 
theory, this set of definitions is not sufficient. For what of approaches that have much in common 
with the new mainstream’s interest in institutions, evolution, and bounded rationality, but that are 
not primarily concerned with formal modelling? North’s NIEH is one of the most prominent 
examples of such an approach, and this would place North’s work (at least in its later stages) 
squarely outside even the new mainstream by Colander et al.’s definitions. And yet, within even 
North’s most developed theory, as we shall see, there are still many elements that hearken back 
                                                          
27 E.g. Hodgson 2007a; Rutherford 1994; Brownlow 2010. 
28 Colander, Holt and Rosser 2004. 
29 Ibid., p. 496. 
30 The meaning and utility of the term ‘neoclassical economics’ is much debated. In the literature it appears often 
pejoratively, and it has as many definitions as there are polemics about it. See e.g. Weintraub 1993; Nadeau 2008; 
Morgan 2016; or the exchange between Mirowski and McCloskey in De Marchi 1992. It has been doubted whether 
it applies to the contemporary mainstream at all, as per Colander 2000. Yet Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2006 argue 
that modern developments have not made the term obsolete, because they are incorporated into its research 
programme’s flexibility. For present purposes, a useful definition may be rational choice utility maximization plus 
equilibrium economics. I elaborate on the implications of these for North’s treatment of efficiency and rationality 
in chapters 1 and 3, where I also discuss North’s own ideas of what neoclassical economics is and what is wrong 
with it. In his interpretation and critique of neoclassical economics, North focuses on the ergodicity of equilibrium 
economics and what he sees as the shortcomings of neoclassical rational choice theory, in particular its (alleged) 
neglect of beliefs other than in probabilistic terms. 
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to the theoretical and methodological foundations that have limited the discipline of economics’ 
move away from orthodoxy despite the development of this ‘new mainstream’: in particular, an 
unwillingness to give up certain assumptions about individual rationality and its significance for 
the method and conclusions of orthodox choice theory. As Geoffrey Hodgson has shown, often 
game theory has come to be the favoured approach of those who seek to have both the 
microfoundational premises of orthodoxy and yet to incorporate the new mainstream’s interest in 
bounded rationality and institutional context.31  
Such ‘having your cake and eating’ it approaches straddle the mainstream/non-mainstream 
divide, joining together two apparently contradictory methodological and theoretical paradigms. 
In this work, I will argue North’s NIEH, in particular in its more contemporary developed form, 
veers between this in-between position and a more thoroughgoing departure from even the ‘new 
mainstream’s theoretical and methodological premises, in a process perhaps best described as 
one step forward, one step back. This is not so much a question of formal modelling in the 
mathematical sense as a question of how far the evolutionary-institutional convergence in 
North’s work can be reconciled with his attachment to more theoretically – if not 
methodologically – ‘orthodox’ preoccupations with individual, boundedly rational choice and 
with the welfare implications of conventional microeconomics. I will explore this through 
examining the consequences of this tension in North’s work on his view of markets, of 
rationality and choice, of evolution, behavioural economics, and cooperation. 
In other words, to borrow an analogy from Mary Morgan’s discussion of theory and 
mechanism in economic models, an examination of the ‘background theory’ to North’s NIEH 
‘model’ allows for a better understanding of how the interpretation of the model’s results is 
determined by these assumptions via the mechanisms in question.32 Initially, the Northian answer 
to Polanyi’s challenge hewed closely to the more neoclassical wing of the NIE. But over time, as 
I will show, his approach has increasingly converged with major elements of the ‘new 
mainstream’ identified by Colander, Holt and Rosser, such as the centrality of the problem of 
cooperation (with reference to its formalisation in game theory) and evolutionary concepts. In 
this sense, North’s NIEH approach has become more and more remote from neoclassical 
orthodoxy, but whether it can escape the limitations of even the ‘new mainstream’ is another 
question, one that this work will seek to answer. 
In this work, I seek therefore to explore what North’s NIEH is, and to what extent it 
constitutes a theoretical approach to economic history that is, by dint of its combination of 
evolutionary and institutional conceptualizations, able to answer Polanyi’s primitivist-
substantivist challenge. This means first clarifying the various theoretical assumptions, levels of 
abstraction, and theoretical development of North’s NIEH from its beginnings to the present. As 
other authors have rightly observed, North’s NIEH has undergone successive transformations 
                                                          
31 Hodgson 2007b. 
32 Morgan 2012; cf. Morrison 1999, p. 51. 
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that one can identify as different stages of his work, and each of these stages represents a 
significant shift in North’s complex borrowing from and rejecting of conventional economic 
theory.33 In each new major work, North’s methodological attitude changes along with his 
further divergence from his neoclassical origins; a process that is however never consistent or 
complete. To elucidate this development of North’s work through a close reading will be the task 
of chapter 1.  
In the next part of this work, I will examine several major theoretical themes in North’s 
NIEH theory, especially in its most recent and sophisticated form, each concerned with a 
different level of abstraction in the whole. Judging to what extent North’s rejoinder to 
substantivist primitivism is successful depends on comprehending the inner relations of his 
complex conceptual apparatus. As mentioned, North’s theory is highly complex and 
sophisticated, and moves frequently in the course of an explanation from the most fundamental 
level of individual rationality and choice to the level of institutions and organizations, and from 
there to adaptation and efficiency at the transhistorical level. This work therefore seeks to clarify 
what these different levels of abstraction in North’s NIEH theory are, how they relate to each 
other, and how consistent and plausible the steps from one to the other are.  
To do this, three chapters will be devoted to exploring major themes in North’s theory, and 
the different levels of scope and abstraction to which they apply. First, in chapter 2, I will inquire 
what North’s concept of markets and their significance for economic behaviour is, and how he 
uses market exchange and market discourse in his theory to understand the relationship between 
individual agency and economic or social institutions. This also touches on the distinction 
between markets and other allocation systems central to his foundational 1977 paper, as well as 
the classic New Institutionalist opposition between markets and hierarchies. Since North posits 
these as solutions to transaction cost problems in the vein of NIE theory, I ask to what extent this 
approach is useful for understanding economic behaviour in premodern economic systems, 
especially given North’s concession that markets played a relatively minor role in such 
formations. I also examine North’s discussion of markets and competition with an eye to the 
significance of rhetoric in economics: North’s frequent invocation of “economic and political 
markets” and the use of language derived from the marginalist theoretical tradition in economics 
provides an intriguing contrast with his more ‘Polanyian’ moments. In particular North’s 
interpretation of politics, the realm of formal institutions, as operating in a ‘market-like’ way, 
and the degree to which for North competitive markets operate both as an analytical model and 
as a normative desideratum has not frequently been discussed in the existing literature. I also 
discuss the ideological components of North’s rhetorical structure, in particular his reliance on 
(sometimes implicit) contractarian views of society and the classical liberal view of markets, 
competition, and the state that emerges from North’s overall historical narrative. 
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Then in chapter 3 I will study what one might call North’s own microfoundations: that is to 
say, his theories and assumptions regarding individual rationality and choice as the basis of his 
understanding of how individuals and institutions interact. The desire to provide 
microfoundations of more general theory in some form of individual rational behaviour is 
arguably - next to Colander et al.’s emphasis on modelling - one of the hallmarks of mainstream 
economics, and how North chooses or justifies his microfoundations, i.e. his assumptions about 
individual rationality and agency, therefore significantly affects the structure of his argument.34 
Identifying these - often implicit - assumptions and assessing their function in his theory is for 
that reason essential to understanding how well the Northian approach succeeds in its larger 
aims. This chapter will concentrate in particular on North’s critique of rational choice and the 
explicit as well as implicit forms of bounded rationality and ‘socialized’ choice he develops in 
the course of his most recent work. This examination gives me an opportunity to clarify North’s 
complex and contradictory relationship with choice theory and the neoclassical microeconomic 
tradition on the one hand, and his disavowal of rational choice approaches and disembodied 
individual choice on the other hand. In so doing, I hope to show how the problem of rationality 
in North’s work illustrates the position of his work in general as a powerful and ambitious, but 
often incomplete and internally contradictory project of ‘successive endogenisation’. 
Subsequently, I will turn to North’s use of evolutionary themes and arguments, which are 
especially evident in his 2005 work Understanding the Process of Economic Change, but also 
appear elsewhere.35 If chapter 3 is primarily concerned with the micro-level of North’s 
theoretical edifice, chapter 4 will be dedicated mainly to the macro-level. As North introduces in 
UPEC and elsewhere an evolutionary framework for his historical narrative of institutions and 
economic performance, I use this opportunity to evaluate the plausibility of this narrative. In 
part, this involves critically examining North’s evolutionary claims in light of theory in 
evolutionary economics and sociobiology. If the identification of evolutionary mechanisms such 
as natural selection is to succeed, the appeal to evolution must be more than a merely 
metaphorical use of words, and this is one aspect I examine here.36 But I also discuss another 
dimension of evolution in North’s work: his turn to cognitive theory and evolutionary 
anthropology to buttress his argument for the significance of beliefs and institutions in achieving 
human cooperation. I will discuss North’s claims in this regard and assess his use – or omission – 
of anthropological and behavioural economic sources in his argument, and draw out the 
implications for North’s general treatment of cooperation. Finally, I give an assessment of 
North’s neglect of sociobiology and present an argument for the significance of sociobiological 
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theory, in particular gene-culture coevolution, as well as behavioural and experimental 
economics for a discussion of the evolution of cooperation. 
The concluding chapter returns to Polanyi’s challenge, and draws out the anthropological 
inquiry that underlies the investigations described above. In this work I intend to read North’s 
NIEH and its foundational concepts not so much from the angle of economic theory or 
methodology per se, but rather in order to draw out what one might call the ‘hidden 
anthropology’ of North’s approach. By this I mean that in order to meaningfully answer the 
question to what extent Douglass North can answer Polanyi’s challenge, one must consider their 
debate one involving competing views of the significance of economic theory for understanding 
premodern societies, and how these different assessments are in turn based on different 
approaches to human cooperation, institutions, and social structure. Insofar as such debates about 
the economics of institutions in historical change are always concerned with how best to 
understand the expression of human nature as socially and culturally mediated individuals, this 
discussion has an inescapable (economic) anthropological dimension.37  
But North’s anthropological assumptions and views are not necessarily explicit: as the 
analogy with modelling suggests, the background theory to a model is often not much specified, 
let alone explicitly justified. In fact, such an investigation also requires a constant alertness to 
whether North’s explicit statements of his theoretical commitments and ambitions are actually 
reflected in the theory he presents. In the course of this work, it is such questions that will guide 
the analysis and the presentation of his works. In short, this means the critical content of this 
work is interpretative in nature. It combines ‘internal’ critique of North’s work at various levels 
of abstraction, i.e. understanding North’s work with an eye to his overall ambition to answer 
Polanyi’s challenge, with ‘external’ considerations from the viewpoint of competing 
‘anthropologies’, i.e. judging the plausibility of either position in light of alternative approaches 
and theoretical resources. For the latter purpose, I attempt in each chapter in which I discuss one 
of the themes in North’s work to also suggest alternatives or complements to his approach, which 
I draw freely and merely as sketches of possibilities from (heterodox) economics, economic 
anthropology, or sociobiological literature, or other sources as relevant.  
In the final chapter, I will sum up my findings in both regards by reassessing Polanyi and 
North’s competing approaches. I will also there consider how a different conceptual frame, 
drawing together my suggestions from the above (sub)disciplines and making a more explicit 
break with the economic and ideological limitations of even North’s institutionalism, can help 
achieve the aims that North set himself in accepting this ‘challenge’ – and thereby go beyond 
either Polanyi or North in the primitivism-modernism debate. To the extent that my reading of 
North convinces, and I am able to show the strengths and limitations of North’s NIEH as a 
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position in the primitivism-modernism debate compared to Polanyi’s strengths and weaknesses, 
this work can be seen as a case study in that debate. 
III. The reception of Douglass North’s NIEH 
This historiographical, philosophical and anthropological angle is not the usual way in which the 
literature hitherto has approached Douglass North’s work. In order therefore to contextualize my 
approach, it is worth giving a summary overview of some of the reception of North’s NIEH 
theory, both in its laudatory and critical dimensions. There is no space here to consider the whole 
of the literature on the NIE or even just on North’s writings, so I will concentrate on some salient 
studies of North’s NIEH insofar as they touch on the main themes of the present work.  
Usually, as mentioned above, his work is perceived as primarily a contribution to the NIE. 
Particularly prominent in the reception of North are the points of continuity and contrast with the 
Old Institutionalism, namely respectively their shared critique of neoclassical economics – 
history and institutions matter - and simultaneously what is often seen as the NIE’s reliance on 
(certain) rational choice approaches and its emphasis on individual agency in the creation and 
change of social institutions. One such comparison, repeatedly made, is between Douglass North 
and Gustav Schmoller, exponent of the German Historical School.38 However, to understand 
North’s work properly means to see not just its commonalities with the NIE as a whole, in 
particular the influential theoretical work of Oliver Williamson, but also its differences with the 
Williamsonian school. Indeed, North has been sufficiently recognised as distinctive because of 
his interest from the very beginning in history, and for his more thoroughgoing disavowal of 
rational choice approaches, neither of which are pronounced in Williamson’s work. For this 
reason, North’s NIE has sometimes been distinguished from the Williamsonian 
‘neoinstitutionalism’.39 But what makes North’s version of NIE theory distinctive is a subject of 
ongoing debate, not least because of the evolving nature of his NIEH itself, as we will see. Many 
NIE enthusiasts praise North and other NIE authors for their reliance on ‘theory’ as opposed to 
the alleged lack of strong theorizing that vitiated the Old Institutionalist tradition.40 Moreover, 
North is widely recognized as having advanced institutionalism considerably by his redefinition 
of institutions as rules and his extension of policy and economic considerations about institutions 
beyond both the public choice and neoclassical paradigms.41 
But as both Rutherford and Helge Peukert have pointed out, simply crediting North with 
further developing ‘theory’ is not always a helpful way to consider North’s contribution. The 
older institutionalist tradition was not lacking in theory; rather, between them and North’s New 
Institutionalism stand a different set of theoretical and methodological assumptions, even when 
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both identify similar problems in economic orthodoxy. This is well illustrated by Peukert’s 
discussion of the commonalities and differences between North and Gustav Schmoller, referred 
to above.42 From her perspective, it becomes clear that some of North’s theoretical contributions 
are specific to him, and some are shared with the NIE in general; but equally, that some are 
responses to problems posed by any institutionalism, as Malcolm Rutherford has also argued.43 
Peukert aptly summarizes Rutherford’s comparative work on this last point: “The problems [of 
institutionalism in general] can be formulated as trade-offs between five complementary but 
dichotomous research strategies and perspectives: formalism vs. anti-formalism, individualism 
vs. holism, rationality vs. rule following, evolution vs. design, and efficiency vs. reform.”44 
Insofar then North has deviated from the mainstream of the New Institutionalist tradition as well 
as from the OIE, he has done so within a larger set of problems shared with all institutionalist 
theorists, including, one might add, Karl Polanyi. 
While this context must be kept in mind, North is more than an institutionalist economic 
theorist, although he has been this too. The first salient observation is to note that what he shares 
with Polanyi but not with the great majority of the institutionalist economic tradition, New or 
Old (some of the GHS authors excepted), is his orientation towards economic history. On this 
point, the literature is somewhat sparser. North is certainly widely recognized as an economic 
historian, not least by the Nobel Prize committee of the Bank of Sweden.45 However, few have 
sought to evaluate his contributions specifically with an eye to how he has joined his specific 
responses to these general questions of institutionalism with justifying his New Institutionalist 
approach to economic history in particular. Rutherford’s identification of these five axes that 
define the opposing solutions to the general problems of institutionalism certainly invite a 
comparative study between North’s positions as compared to the rival approaches of authors 
from the GHS and OIE. Indeed, Rutherford and Peukert’s works cited above can be read as 
contributions to that aim. But I am concerned here that such an approach neglects the historical 
dimension of North’s work, his ambition to use New Institutionalist tools for the purposes of 
examining the long-term structure of premodern (and contemporary) economic history. There, 
the comparison with the sparring partner of his own choice, Polanyi, seems more relevant.  
North himself has always in disciplinary terms presented himself as an economic historian, 
not as an economic theorist pur sang. Yet even early on he was concerned with justifying the 
special role that economic historical theorizing had to play in clarifying and helping solve 
conceptual questions in economic theory, as well as vice versa. Indeed, in a paper published 
mere months before the Polanyi paper, titled “The Place of Economic History in the Discipline 
of Economics”, North described the (in his view) declining interest of economists in economic 
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history as a “market failure of economics”. 46 He stressed the importance of new, transaction cost 
economics-based, theory in economic history both for the improvement of economic 
understanding and for the survival of economic history as a (sub)discipline. So much so, in fact, 
that Francisco Boldizzoni, one of the few major critics who has focused on North’s role as an 
economic historian, has accused him of developing his theory solely in order to fill a gap in the 
academic career market.47  
I do not share that view. Rather, I think North should be taken seriously when he pointed 
so early on in his career to the double bind of economic historians like himself who took primary 
inspiration from orthodox economic theory: they were irrelevant to economists when merely 
applying their theories to the recent past, and equally “anthropologists, sociologists and 
historians” were able to dismiss economic history on the grounds of its neoclassical theory, 
which could not possibly have anything to say about periods before this recent past. Tellingly, as 
primary examples of such critics with rival approaches he cited Karl Polanyi, as well as his close 
collaborator Moses Finley and the Marxist economic historian Immanuel Wallerstein.48 As 
mentioned, I take as the central purpose of North’s work since to answer these rivals with a 
renewed economic history, explicitly oriented towards the longue durée of premodernity. But 
North has from the beginning sought to do so by a creative application of new insights from 
economic theory, since its continuing importance – pace the Polanyian and Marxist critiques of 
economic theory in historical analysis – is the basis of his argument against Polanyi in his 1977 
paper.  
At the same time, fewer have observed that this thereby necessarily implies that North’s 
work is not just a critique of neoclassical economics and its ahistoricity and asociality, but an 
ongoing critical engagement with the uses and disuses of the ‘new mainstream’ for history as 
well. As this new mainstream has emerged out of the old, if we follow the interpretation of 
Colander, Holt and Rosser, so too has North’s approach moved in the same direction with it. 
Insofar as he has then sought to defend economic theory against its Polanyian and Marxist 
critics, he has been able to invoke this new mainstream of imperfect information, transaction 
costs, bounded rationality, and (evolutionary) game theory, not the neoclassical and Cliometric 
approaches that characterized his earliest contributions. But this raises the question, not often 
discussed in the literature, to what extent this appeal is sufficient to counter the Polanyian 
challenge, and thereby fulfil its promise for North’s own purposes. 
That is not to say that the significance of North’s complex attitude to economic theory for 
his ambitions in economic history nor what I call the anthropological dimensions of his work 
have gone entirely unobserved. In economic anthropology itself the New Institutionalism has 
received some cautious interest, in particular among those anthropologists for whom economics 
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is more a source of theoretical inspiration than purely a rival discipline.49 Nonetheless, this work, 
too, has tended to concentrate on the ‘neoinstitutionalist’ – that is to say, more neoclassical and 
ahistorical – NIE as developed by Oliver Williamson, rather than North’s work. Beyond this, 
although these are more the exception than the rule, some authors have also emphasized the 
importance of Karl Polanyi’s thought for understanding North’s theory and purpose. But by my 
knowledge, the only other work to interpret North’s NIEH specifically as a response to Polanyi’s 
challenge is Claude Didry and Caroline Vincensini’s working paper on this topic. In this work, 
they outline how his understanding of institutions as ‘rules of the game’ differentiates his 
approach from what I have called the ‘neoinstitutional’, in this case the work of Oliver 
Williamson (economic theory) and Mark Granovetter (economic sociology).50  
This view of institutions allows North, they argue, to move beyond the dichotomy of 
‘markets vs hierarchies’, or in this case ‘markets vs institutions’ that characterizes the 
neoinstitutional approach. This is a significant insight, not least since the latter authors are 
important reference points for the development of NIE theory as a whole and for North’s own 
work. But unlike Didry and Vincensini, I am not content merely to compare these terms to 
neoinstitutionalist theory. We must also question whether this use of institutions, as well as 
North’s arguments about adaptive efficiency and about the historicity of markets, are valid 
“vectors of historical comparatism” (to use their phrase).51 While I share their identification of 
these themes as central to North’s NIEH approach, as opposed to Williamsonian 
neoinstitutionalism, it is one of the burdens of this work to examine its success: both in terms of 
North’s own ambitions and vis-á-vis the rival anthropologies identified by North in his - so to 
speak - foundational papers of the mid-1970s. 
In a more critical vein, Daniel Ankarloo has also noted the significance of the ‘Polanyian 
moment’ in North. In two papers, Ankarloo critiques NIE theory, concentrating on Williamson 
and North; and in a subsequent conference paper he has extended this critique specifically to 
North’s NIEH. This makes his work, although mostly unpublished, an important part of the 
rather small secondary literature on the NIEH itself.52 Central to his critique, as also in this work, 
is the concern with the uses of historicity in North and the NIE in general: the assumption that, in 
Oliver Williamson’s words, “in the beginning there were markets” and that analysis of economic 
institutions should depart from the assumption of generalised market exchange.53  
For Ankarloo and Palermo, the consequence of this assumption, while perhaps convenient 
for the neoinstitutionalist model of a trade-off between markets and hierarchies in modern 
economies, is that one of the central aspects of ‘capitalism’ – the presence of generalised market 
exchange – is assumed when the purpose of analysing economic institutions is to explain 
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precisely such phenomena. As they put it polemically: “The problem is twofold: first, by 
assuming the existence of one primordial institution in capitalism, Williamson fails to explain it 
and then makes it universal; second, by identifying this primordial institution with the market, he 
inevitably falls into a sterile idealisation of this institution. Had Williamson assumed an initial 
starting point of pure planning or of a mixed institutional set-up, he would have been unable to 
explain some institutions of capitalism and the project would have been contradictory anyway. 
But, the problem is that the choice of the market as a natural institutional arrangement is also 
apologetic, since it idealises the market, transforming it from a historically defined institution 
into a universal category. And this process of idealisation occurs without any clear analytical 
justification.”54 
Of course, Ankarloo recognizes that in North’s case, this Williamsonian assumption does 
not hold so simply, especially not in the later and more developed versions of his NIEH. 
“Having, at least in principle, further and further distanced himself from standard orthodox 
conceptions North has come the closest within NIE to acknowledging the merits in Polanyi and 
the demerits in orthodoxy. This has rendered him rather popular within unorthodox anti-
neoclassical circles...”55 Here, however, the contrast between Polanyi’s approach and that of 
North illustrates for Ankarloo where the problem lies.56 Because this comparative critique 
touches on several major themes discussed here, it is worth a long quotation: 
“To make a long story short, the disturbing problem of North’s economic history is all the 
same that the decisive institutions and human characteristics that are specific to capitalism have 
to be assumed to exist even when he admits that market capitalism is not at hand. Otherwise his 
explanations of institutions and organisations do not work. The market in North’s explanations 
remains the universal yardstick – the eternal reference point. But if we acknowledge that markets 
and the institutions of capitalism originate from somewhere, and evolve, we cannot assume them 
from the start. The market is not a universal yardstick for the comparison of institutions. 
North knows all this, but in order for the explanation to work the economic logic of the 
market has to be described as present, even in the “absence of the market”. This is due to the fact 
that institutions evolve as rational responses to relative price changes, by, albeit “constrained”, 
micro-rational economic men, in his model. But such calculation cannot explain the origins of 
the market. Calculating what to buy only makes sense when there already are commodities on 
the market to buy. These calculations cannot at the same time be the cause of the market for 
these commodities.”57 
Here, precisely North’s conception of institutions as rules, and markets and other allocation 
systems as alternative sets of such rules, that Didry and Vincensini saw as an advance over the 
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Williamsonian approach is criticized as assuming what needs to be demonstrated no less than 
Williamson’s own market premise. The importance of historicity in North’s NIEH is only a 
misleading appearance. For Ankarloo, the result is that insofar as North assumes institutions are 
the product of rational market action, and thereby that the operation of a market-like logic is 
assumed even when very ‘alternative’ allocation systems prevail, the historical differentiation in 
economic institutions and allocation systems so important to Polanyi is reduced to a set of 
variants of a general ‘as-if market’. “History is adapted to support preconceptions of handed-
down economic theory – and in this process history is not a source of knowledge, but is 
transformed into a ‘narrative’, where actual history is said to work ‘as if’ the neoclassical 
principles of ‘market behaviour’ are in ubiquitous operation – explaining not only ‘the 
economy’, but also close on all other aspects of social life.”58  
North’s subsequent attempts to create a more sophisticated theory, by moving from the 
origins of allocation systems in their economic institutions to the origins of economic institutions 
in the structure of social and political life, has not found any more favour with the critics in this 
line. For Ankarloo, the result of the extension of the NIEH to ideology, culture, and other inputs 
into the formation of institutions is that the ‘neoclassical’ economic theory North intends to save 
is rendered irrelevant to the model itself: ‘the economic’ has disappeared, even as the theory has 
extended far into the domain of other social sciences.59 We find a similar critique of Douglass 
North’s work in some of Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis’ critical writings on the history of 
mainstream economic thought. In discussing what they call the shift from “the principle of 
pricing to the pricing of principle” - i.e. the stages from Cliometrics to a developed anti-
neoclassical NIEH theory I will discuss in the next chapter – Fine and Milonakis observe that  
“in North’s hands, transaction costs has become a catchall phrase to be used as an explanatory 
tool in almost any historical or theoretical context…  it becomes possible in principle to explain 
theexistence of any institution in history by invoking the high transaction costs of some other 
theoretically possible institution.”60 As they conclude: “In the absence of markets, explaining the 
(historical) existence of another institution (labour services) through a cost/benefit analysis in 
relation to the market is historically meaningless.”61 
IV. Summary of the central problems of this work 
Despite such observations, these critics also recognise the significance of North’s work, not least 
insofar as this has entailed a systematic distancing from ‘neoclassical’ orthodoxy – as we will 
see, repudiations of neoclassical economics are a recurrent theme in North’s theoretical writings. 
Given this fact, it may appear puzzling how Ankarloo as well as Fine and Milonakis persist in 
classifying North’s work as neoclassical in its foundations, while recognising his attempts to 
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move beyond it.62 This ambiguity is worth examining further, and is one of the motivations 
behind the present work. The critics’ judgement that North has failed in his ambition to move 
beyond neoclassical economics rests on elaborate economic methodological considerations, 
involving precisely those questions about the nature of markets and of ‘economic theory’ that 
North saw as fundamental to his rebuttal of Polanyi. This latter critique is very important for 
assessing the success of North’s enterprise, and for this reason I will have cause to refer to 
Ankarloo and Fine and Milonakis’ observations again in this work.  
But these critiques do not enter into the structure of North’s most advanced theory in any 
great detail, nor do they assess the merits of North’s arguments much beyond this 
methodological critique of his assumptions about markets. In this work I will seek to clarify 
where this ambiguity in economic and historical methodology comes from and how it manifests 
itself in the work as a whole. To do so requires a full-length examination of each of the levels of 
scope and abstraction in North’s work, from the microfoundations to his ideas about historical 
evolution. It also means observing how these considerations in economic methodology operate 
as instances of the larger problem of primitivist and modernist perspectives: whether differences 
in economic behaviour and institutions in history require a different kind of social theory to 
explain them than the “economic approach” or “economic theory” tout court - as even the new 
mainstream still often sees it - can offer. The critics as well as the supporters of North’s work 
emphasize that the central question of his approach, and the fundamental ambiguity within it, is 
how his view of institutions can contribute to a better historical understanding of this observed 
economic differentiation.  
In other words, whether North’s approach can make sense of markets is part of a larger 
question: what is at stake when the new mainstream of economic theory, as exemplified by 
North’s developed NIEH theory, is applied to premodern history. Can it succeed – in terms of 
internal consistency as well as ‘external’ plausibility - in explaining the embeddedness of 
economic institutions in social, cultural, and psychological factors? What are the consequences 
for economic history of the anthropological assumptions about human sociality and individual 
rationality that underlie the ‘economic approach’ of the new mainstream North defends? These 
are questions characteristic of the primitivism-modernism debate, raised once more by North’s 
unique answer to ‘the challenge of Karl Polanyi’. This work provides some preliminary answers 
to these questions, and in so doing contribute to a better understanding of his NIEH project, as 
well as to an assessment of the success of this project.   
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Chapter 1: Douglass North’s New Institutionalist Economic History 
 
Introduction: Beyond the New Economic History 
In considering the origins and development of North’s NIEH theory, a number of things must be 
kept in mind. Due to the complexity of his theoretical apparatus and the great variety of specific 
terms and concepts he has introduced in it, it would be unhelpful to rely wholly on a 
chronological overview of his thought. However, without a sense of chronology, the various 
stages of his NIEH research programme and even the theoretical context in which it was born 
will be lost to view. Of necessity, therefore, this chapter will not be a full and thorough 
discussion of all of North’s theoretical writings, nor will it be entirely chronological and give due 
to every stage in the growth of the NIEH. It will concentrate on the specifically historical-
theoretical works, rather than North’s more purely economic-theoretical contributions or his few 
purely empirical case studies. In this way, the task of drawing out the ‘hidden anthropology’ and 
methodological constraints on North’s own work is best accomplished. This is not to dismiss, of 
course, the importance of the wider intellectual-historical inputs into North’s NIEH, especially 
given North’s frequent reliance on theory from economics, politics, biology and anthropology to 
support his analysis. But in this chapter, I will first concentrate on North’s NIEH theory itself.  
Note that this also means that the more applied, case study like works of North – such as 
his attempts to estimate the size of transaction costs within the American economy, for example - 
will be given relatively short shrift. Not because these are not important, but because, as we will 
see, North himself has generally disobeyed his own strictures that theoretical disputes cannot be 
fought out at that level and are only fruitfully debatable in testable propositions.63 As much 
philosophy of social science can attest, disentangling theoretical claims for the purposes of 
individual hypothesis testing is often impossible.64 North’s theory mostly stands or falls on its 
own merits, and whatever testable hypotheses have been derived from it by North or others have 
had little effect on the development of the theory as a whole. Therefore, I feel justified in mainly 
concentrating on his theoretical monographs, with a bias towards his most sophisticated and 
contemporary work. The latter not only provides a best case for North’s NIEH approach, 
compared to his earlier work, but has also been discussed much less in the secondary literature – 
not least as much of the latter dates from before the publication of Understanding the Process of 
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Economic Change (2005) and North’s collaboration with John Wallis and Barry Weingast, 
Violence and Social Orders (2009).65  
Although Douglass North’s best-known works date from the 1980s onwards, their roots go 
back to his very first reconsiderations of neoclassical orthodoxy. That is to say, while North’s 
NIEH research programme was developed out of the response to Polanyi’s challenge and the 
need for a theory that could account for premodern economic history, these problems first 
appeared on the intellectual horizon when North ceased to be a Cliometrician and became an 
institutionalist. We first find North in the theoretical literature as one of the main exponents of 
Cliometrics, a view diametrically opposed to those of his most contemporary works. We must 
begin, therefore, with this school of economic history and North’s role within it. 
Cliometrics, also known as the New Economic History, is a product of the post-war period, 
becoming prominent for the first time in particular in the United States in the 1960s. It arose as a 
response to two things: the perceived need to go beyond the traditional economic historical 
approaches, which were often closer to social history than to economics, with a method that 
would be based on the best neoclassical economic theory of the time, as well as the development 
of new mathematical and statistical techniques in econometrics that would make the application 
of neoclassical quantitative models to historical cases possible.66 For this reason Robert Fogel – 
one of its most influential practitioners – dubbed it simply “econometric history”.67  
From the very beginning, therefore, Cliometrics was committed to deriving its 
methodology, as well as the interpretation of its models, from the ‘economics approach’ of the 
day in much the same way as North uses that term in his discussion of Polanyi: taking for 
granted that mainstream economic theory offers both a necessary and sufficient means to 
understand economic behaviour in any historical case studied. The implications of this attitude 
for the relations with the ‘traditional’ economic historians, whose narrative approaches looked to 
history as an academic discipline for inspiration rather than to economics, are summed up well 
by the New Economic Historian, Lance Davis: “Once terms are defined and the questions 
framed, an explanatory model must be built. Since the subject is economic history, the models 
frequently draw on economic theory for their form. These models provide a basis for sorting the 
useful from the useless, they suggest methods of possible verification, and they provide 
simplified 'explanations' of a far from simple world. With a model the assumptions are made 
explicit and it is possible to examine reality in the light of the logical system. Like mathematical 
economics, the 'new' economic history 'may not be able to say much, but at least the reader is 
aware of what has been said'. Traditional economic history also has its models, but all too 
frequently they are implicit, not explicit.”68 
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Here we find for the first time an appearance by Douglass North as a major theorist in 
economic history – but not yet anything like the kind of theorist he would become. Rather, he 
appears as, nota bene, “chief propagandist and entrepreneur” of Cliometrics in the first meetings 
of the Cliometrics forum at Purdue University.69 We are here  not primarily concerned with his 
role as Cliometrician, but rather with his critique of this school of thought. It is, however, worth 
noting that despite North’s subsequent defection from this approach, Cliometrics is still one of 
the most widely practiced and influential schools or methods in economic history, with Robert 
Fogel being North’s co-laureate for the only Nobel Prize in Economics ever awarded for 
primarily historical study. In terms of theoretical prestige within economics-oriented 
historiography, it is perhaps only rivaled by the NIEH itself. Of course, a systematic critique of 
Cliometrics cannot be engaged in here; our purpose is to trace the development of the NIEH.70 
Our main cause for mentioning Cliometrics is because of its subsequent role: before the 
‘Polanyian moment’, North’s theoretical work was formulated for an important part in terms of a 
critique of the Cliometric approach he had previously adhered to. In this sense then, Cliometrics 
initially played the role of foil to North’s own theoretical development, in which it would later be 
joined more significantly by Polanyi – or rather, by the substance of his ‘challenge’. This is 
perhaps best illustrated by reference to his Presidential Address, held upon taking that position at 
the head of the Economic History Association in the United States. That North had been selected 
for this position is a sign of his stature already at that time. But his use of the occasion to critique 
Cliometrics is more interesting, especially because of the substance of this critique. His lecture, 
‘Beyond the New Economic History’, expresses a fundamental ambivalence about the virtues 
and downsides of what this reliance on the ‘economics approach’ had achieved: “What the new 
economic history contributed was the systematic use of theory and quantitative methods to 
history. The use of a scientific methodology [sic] has put a distinctive stamp on this approach, 
which clearly delineates it from the old economic history, but it is the theory that provides a 
particular cast to the contribution. It is the systematic use of standard neo-classical economic 
theory which both has provided the incisive new insights into man's economic past and also 
serves to limit the range of enquiry.”71  
We may identify here two characteristics of North’s thought post-Cliometrics that he 
would retain for the rest of his theoretical career. Firstly, the commitment to seeing “the 
systematic use of theory”, namely mainstream economic theory, as the sine qua non of 
scientificity: this, plus quantitative methods (less prominent subsequently), amount to a 
“scientific methodology” tout court. This also heavily implies that the traditional economic 
historians did not have a scientific methodology, thereby in turn suggesting strong and particular 
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standards of scientificity and justification. But if the need to rely on some form of theory that can 
pass muster by economic standards of scientificity is one thing – perhaps reflected in his mostly 
rhetorical appeals to the importance of testing - neoclassical economics being that theory is 
another thing. And this second characteristic, North’s dissatisfaction with using neoclassical 
economics to play that role, is evident here.  
Continuing his critique, he writes of this theory: “The limitations [of the New Economic 
History] are those of the theory. Neo-classical economic theory has two major shortcomings for 
the economic historian. One, it was not designed to explain long-run economic change; and two, 
even within the context of the question it was designed to answer, it provides quite limited 
answers since it is immediately relevant to a world of perfect markets-that is, perfect in the sense 
of zero transaction costs: the costs of specifying and enforcing property rights. Yet we have 
come to realise that devising and enforcing a set of rules of the game is hardly ever costless and 
the nature of these costs is at the very roots of all economic systems' problems.”72 Here the 
second enduring characteristic cited above is further specified. If the dismissal of traditional 
approaches to economic history is based on their inadequate use of economic theory, the 
dismissal of neoclassical economics in turn is based on two more specific considerations. Firstly, 
neoclassical economics is not able to deal with the longue durée, as the Annales historians called 
it: the problem of premodern economic history we encountered in the Polanyi paper is already 
presaged here. Secondly, neoclassical models are insufficiently realistic, in the sense that they 
make assumptions that render the results irrelevant to real world economic systems. All such 
systems encounter market failures and require institutional solutions to such failures, ‘rules of the 
game’: without them, little relevant can be said about the ‘game’ itself. 
Such a consideration might lead one to expect North to develop an interest in applying the 
approaches of other social sciences not based in neoclassical economics, insofar as for example 
economic anthropology has been concerned with understanding economic institutions. But this 
possibility is not open to North due to his requirement that any scientific approach to such 
problems still be rooted in some form of mainstream economics, which is inherently universal in 
scope. The question at this stage is not how institutions should be methodologically understood, 
but simply what theory would best replace neoclassical economics in describing the universal 
problems of resource allocation, the subject of economics as a discipline: ““Let me emphasise 
that a study of the rights associated with the use and transfer of resources is as relevant in 
socialist societies as it is in capitalist ones. The rules of the game determine efficiency and the 
distribution of income in any society: classical Greece, the Roman Empire, the manorial system, 
or Yugoslavia today. To say that government owns the means of production or even that there 
are very limited markets and therefore that the study of property rights is irrelevant is simply to 
fail to understand that all economic systems face a common set of problems about the use and 
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transfer of resources, whether done via the market, via government, or via voluntary 
organisation.”73  
Effectively, he has already chosen his theory: it is to be the NIE, for whom such problems 
appear as choices between markets and hierarchies (vertical or horizontal). The NIE is of course 
mainstream without being neoclassical (orthodox), in Colander, Holt and Rosser’s formulation – 
at least in methodological terms. (This should not mislead one into thinking it was necessarily 
popularly accepted among economists and economic historians at the time, or North would have 
had no need to defend it.) This makes it ideally suitable for North’s search for a theory that 
would accept the general methodological criteria and norms of scientificity of economic 
orthodoxy, but that would not imply its neoclassical assumptions and models. Moreover, as 
North would explain, such an approach has an advantage in dealing with the longer-term 
historical dimension as well: “Our emphasis on the last two hundred years, from the Industrial 
Revolution onward, is a misallocation of scholarly resources. We should spend much more time 
on the preceding 9800 years of man's economic history than on the last 200. (...) In fact, the 
overriding issue of man's economic history has been the relationship between population growth, 
diminishing returns to a relatively fixed factor, and man's efforts to alter institutional 
arrangements to overcome this dilemma. Our emphasis on the present blinds us to the fact that 
few of man's economic problems are new - that most have recurred endlessly in the past.”74 The 
combination of the real-world ‘relevance’ (or realism) of institutionalism with the universality of 
the NIE approach is North’s justification for its superiority over rival approaches. 
What this does not yet tell us is what central concepts for North define both the ‘economics 
approach’ - or ‘economic theory’ tout court - including its virtues he would defend against 
Polanyi in his subsequent paper, and the alternative to neoclassical theory he is proposing here. 
He does not call the latter the NIE, but rather uses its more revealing name for this purpose: 
transaction cost economics. In a neat summary, he defines this central conceptual question on 
both counts: “(1) Neo-classical theory has been a powerful tool of analysis of the new economic 
history and has demonstrated repeatedly that it can shed light upon our economic past. In fact, I 
would put it stronger: A theory of choice - the self-conscious application of opportunity cost 
doctrine - is essential to the framing of meaningful questions in economic history. (2) 
Transaction costs are the link between neoclassical theory and a broader theory of property 
rights. The explicit historical study of transaction costs opens up new horizons for the economic 
historian. Much of the productivity change in past history has been a consequence of reduced 
transaction costs and their study suggests a quite radically different history than we read in the 
standard explanation.”75 
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Let us unpack these two theses in light of this problem of conceptual definition, i.e. in how 
North makes this theory choice operative. It is clear that the central characteristic of the new 
approach is to be transaction costs: it is these that link the general but irrelevant models of 
neoclassical economics to a “broader theory of property rights”. We do not yet know what that 
broader theory would be, but it is clear that it would have to derive its main inspiration from an 
NIE-type approach, centered on transaction costs. Yet the notion of a ‘link’ with neoclassical 
economics once more shows the ambivalence, already so clear here, of North’s attitude to 
neoclassical economics. Why link to something that is not real-world relevant? Because, for 
North, the other central concept the alternative economic historical method must have is the 
orthodox “theory of choice: the self-conscious application of opportunity cost doctrine”. Choice 
theory, the microeconomic foundation of neoclassical economics, is to be retained. It is essential, 
i.e. a strict requirement, for not just a scientific but even simply a meaningful approach to 
economic history. This simultaneous rejection of neoclassical economics with an appeal to the 
indispensability of its microfoundations implies a necessary outcome of theorizing on this basis: 
North would have to build his subsequent macro-level theory, however different from 
neoclassical economics, on microfoundations that are not at all so different. In the below 
discussion of the birth of the NIEH proper and its subsequent development as a research 
programme, we will see how North reconciles these aspects, and what this entails for his 
theoretical apparatus. 
The birth of the NIEH: from the efficient social contract to Polanyi’s challenge 
The Presidential Address does not, of course, come out of nowhere. Indeed, it is not the first time 
institutionalism appears in North’s work. While the Address is his best systematic theoretical 
justification of the need for transaction cost economics to replace neoclassical theory in 
economic historical analysis, at least in the period before the Polanyian moment, in previous 
years he had already made some first steps towards this approach. In 1970 North’s paper with 
Lance Davis on institutional change, written in a consciously neoclassical vein, had revealed the 
weaknesses of this approach to understanding that subject for him. Rather remarkably, in the 
abstract the authors describe the theory deployed in their paper as “at some points woefully weak 
and the explanations at times incredibly simplistic.”76 With this began, perhaps, the search for an 
alternative. It should therefore come as no surprise that we find in his joint writings with Robert 
Thomas in this period an approach merging neoclassical and institutional arguments. 
Characteristic of this is their paper on the sources of Western economic growth. While the 
structure of the economy and its growth presented in this paper is a traditionally neoclassical 
model, in which Malthusian demographic factors, relative factor prices, and technological 
change interact, the novelty rests in the idea that one outcome of these mechanisms of 
neoclassical growth theory was the development of new and historically unique institutions. 
These institutional innovations and the changes in property rights they entailed allowed the West 
                                                          
76 Davis and North 1970. 
32 
 
to shift from the historical virtually zero growth pattern to one of explosive economic expansion. 
Put theoretically, the neoclassical Malthusian model gives way to an institutional explanation for 
historical differentiation in the West in the modern era – here beginning roughly in the 18th 
century, though with its roots in the Middle Ages.77 Most interestingly for our purposes, attached 
to this more or less ‘orthodox’ model is an explanation of institutional formation and change 
based on transaction costs, which in turn result from uncertainty, externalities, economies of 
scale, and the costs of information.78 
An application of these ideas is found in their joint paper on the manorial system of the 
Middle Ages, alluded to above. This paper is interesting for two reasons: one because it reveals 
the growing interest in explaining longer-term economic historical developments, including 
changes in allocation systems, on North’s part, and secondly because the theory North and 
Thomas argue for in this paper uses Marxism as a foil. In this pre-Polanyian phase, the questions 
of historical comparativity are not yet so clear to North, but he and Thomas note the absence of a 
consistent ‘theoretical’ explanation (i.e. one based on economic theory, not historical 
explanation) of the shift from feudalism to capitalism. Since neoclassical approaches do not 
provide one either, the default is the Marxist, something clearly uncongenial to North and 
Thomas. For this reason, the ‘proof of the pudding’ is in demonstrating an approach based on 
“economic theory” that can do better than the Marxist explanation. This theory, once again, is the 
economics of transaction costs and institutional change – especially the institution of property 
rights.79 How is this done? North and Thomas reimagine feudal serfdom not as a form of 
involuntary servitude or as a form of ‘direct exploitation’, but rather as a contractual 
arrangement: a contractarian analysis of feudalism where serfs accept their labor dues in return 
for protection.80 The institutions that allowed this contractarian relationship to function were the 
customs of the manor, which both stated the traditional dues of serfs and protected them from 
arbitrary changes in the ‘contract’ in question. By analyzing these customs as property rights 
institutions, stating the division of property in labor between the different parties, orthodox 
contract theory can be applied, despite the observation that such theory was designed “in the 
context of a market economy”.81  
However, a neoinstitutionalist approach, one complementary to this contractarian view and 
to orthodox contract theory, is also necessary. The explanation for this peculiar contract 
arrangement is the absence of a central authority able to provide protection, the high cost of 
contracting that requires binding political and normative structures, and the high risks of trading 
and of providing subsistence goods through markets. It is precisely the absence of markets that 
created the manorial system, in other words. For North and Thomas, this analysis is therefore a 
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demonstration of the strengths of their New Institutionalist approach: only by understanding the 
property rights arrangements and contractarian normative system as “fundamental institutions”, 
operative at a societal level, on which arise the individual contractual arrangements more 
familiar to neoclassical economists, can one make sense of manorial serfdom. The neoclassical 
case of individual contracting over property rights becomes a special case of a more normative, 
contractarian, and institutional approach favored by North and his colleagues.82 The 
‘fundamental institutional arrangements’, whose importance is reflected in the high costs of 
changing them, are necessarily cases of rules operating in societies or economic formations as a 
whole, whose agents are groups, not individuals.83 This means, then, that North required a theory 
of comparative fundamental institutions, differentiating various economic formations according 
to the interaction of neoclassically understood economic behavior – private contracting in 
markets – with more fundamental collective or intersubjective normative structures and 
‘contractarian’ political arrangements. In other words, North needed a comparative theory of the  
embeddedness of economic behavior in political and social institutions. Albeit, at this stage, only 
yet insofar those affect property rights. This sets the stage for the Polanyian encounter. 
Since the challenge of Karl Polanyi for North’s approach has been discussed at some 
length in the introduction, I will not repeat that here, except to note how Polanyi’s challenge 
transforms the neoinstitutionalist interpretation of historical change North had been developing 
so far. This is not simply a question of replacing Marxism with substantivism as the rival theory 
to be beaten at its own game, although North’s dismissal of Marxist approaches in favor of more 
interest in (if not always approval of) Polanyi and the work of anthropologists can subsequently 
be noted.84 More importantly, the impetus of Polanyi’s challenge has been to provide the 
sophisticated historical comparative theory that North wanted to meet the challenge ‘head on’. 
As we will see, the reappearance of the concept of ‘embeddedness’ in North’s work through its 
legacy in economic sociology also signifies the endurance of the Polanyian challenge in the 
background of North’s work, even as it is equally oriented towards problems of economic 
growth and institutional change in a more traditional way.  
Moreover, from the Polanyian moment onwards we will see the scope and ambitions of 
this theory expand further and further, incorporating ever more of what we will call “successive 
endogenization” of Polanyi’s ‘social background’ into his institutional theory, and this will also 
mean an increasing distance between North’s NIEH and the neoinstitutionalist and neoclassical 
elements still quite dominant in the work just discussed. This expansionary evolution is the 
                                                          
82 Ibid., p. 785-786. 
83 Ibid., p. 786: “When conflict has arisen about fundamental institutional arrangements, that group which achieves 
power has tended to impound its new rules in a written “constitutional” document… This incentive has proved 
greatest when a group has foreseen that its decision-making ability… may not be permanent”. 
84 See e.g. his brief and rather dismissive review of a collection of essays on political economy by anthropologists, 
where North complains about the “strait jacket imposed by simple-minded Marxian theory”, but notes the 
influence of Polanyi. “More than anything else”, he concludes, “this book demonstrates the naivete of 
anthropologists on the subject.” North 1979a, p. 1088. 
34 
 
necessary result, I think, of his adoption of Polanyi’s challenge. This is a point to be kept in 
mind, which I will explore in the discussion below as well as in the historical discussion of 
institutionalism and Polanyi’s work in chapter 2. I will now turn to the next two stages of North’s 
work, the ‘middle period’ of the full-fledged development of his NIEH theory and the most 
recent stage in which it evolves into a grand historical narrative straddling the social sciences. 
Understanding North’s approach to Polanyi as one of successively endogenizing ‘the 
social’ into ‘the economic’, rather than the opposite approach suggested by Polanyi, depends on 
defining the ‘social’ as well as ‘the economic’ into which it is endogenized. Eggertsson does not 
go beyond mentioning endogenization of “social and political rules” and the “structure of 
political institutions”, without further defining the meaning of ‘social’ or ‘political’ in this case.85 
Since the point of Polanyi’s embeddedness concept is to defend endogenization in the other 
direction, to see the economic (whatever it may be in a given case) as part of a wider social 
framework, it may make sense to keep Polanyi’s definitions of these terms in mind when 
understanding this term. For Polanyi, “the individual's motives, named and articulated, spring as 
a rule from situations set by facts of a non-economic—familial, political or religious—order”, as 
contrasted with the sphere of the economic, where “fear of hunger and hope of gain” are the 
dominant motives.86  
Yet Polanyi also defines the economy as the sphere of the production and distribution of 
goods. More useful than the focus on motivation alone (given also the discussion of rationality 
below), we may follow Polanyi’s larger research programme in “drawing on what he calls ‘the 
societal approach’ … conceiving of economic life as a totality of relations and institutions that 
goes beyond transactions of goods and services. Here, rather than investigating the changing 
place of economy in society, Polanyi offers a method for studying economic life that is in 
contrast with the methodological individualism of economics. As a result, embeddedness 
emerges as a methodological principle, and not as an analytical proposition… Thus, ‘economic’, 
in its substantive sense, refers to all interactions with nature and other human beings in the 
pursuit of livelihood, and not to a specific type of behaviour”.87 As Polanyi put it, “the 
substantive meaning of economic derives from man's dependence for his living upon nature and 
his fellows. It refers to the interchange with his natural and social environment, insofar as this 
results in supplying him with the means of material want-satisfaction”88. This as contrasted with 
‘the social’: “the social process is a tissue of relationships between man as biological entity and 
the unique structure of symbols and techniques that results in maintaining his existence”89. This I 
take to include all of the institutions and symbolic spheres of interaction with other humans and 
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with nature insofar as not covered by the definition of the economic immediately previously 
given. 
North’s NIEH in its second stage 
In the Polanyi paper, North had written that “I wish to make the affirmative point that as yet we 
have not even tried to see how far economic analysis will take us in explaining institutional 
arrangements. (...) Transaction cost analysis is a promising framework to explore non-market 
forms of economic organisation.”90 The first of the great NIEH theoretical monographs, his 1981 
book Structure and Change in Economic History, is an expression of this idea.91 Note that this 
represents a gradual extension in terms of the domain of his research programme. Whereas 
before the Polanyian moment the purpose of his neoinstutional analysis was to understand the 
economic impact of ‘fundamental’ institutions insofar as these represented what I have called a 
contractarian solution to widespread market failures, as in the case of the feudal European 
manor, now this is to be extended to nonmarket allocation systems in general. Perhaps a subtle 
difference, but one worth noting: the effect of Polanyi’s primitivist viewpoint, in which the 
absence of market exchange as organizing principle of economic behavior is central, can here be 
felt.  
While most of the institutionalist theory in Structure and Change clearly builds on the first 
NIEH statements discussed above, the purpose is now clearly put in terms of a long-term 
comparative analysis of institutional structures and the different economic formations that result 
from them, with an aim to studying the relative ‘performance’ of each of these structures. This 
performance mainly consists of the advantages security of property rights offers for the 
emergence of efficient markets, which in turn stimulate economic growth. This aspect of the 
work draws still on mainstream economic theory ideas of the benefits of market exchange and 
private property, i.e. the economic desideratum as equalizing private and social returns to 
entrepreneurial activity as much as possible. But the purpose is also more explicitly still than in 
the paper with Robert Thomas to provide a rival theory of long-run historical differentiation in 
economic systems to primitivist accounts, here mainly identified with the Marxist92; so that one 
reviewer at the time described it, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, as a “useful complement to 
recent attempts… by Perry Anderson and Immanuel Wallerstein”.93 Most importantly, in this 
stage the contractarian nature of institutions, in other words their presentation as the results of 
some process of market-like bargaining over security versus property rights, moves more to the 
background (without wholly disappearing). North in this work more clearly perceives feudal 
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elites, as well as those of other allocation systems in the premodern past, as essentially predatory. 
But the institutions sustaining their extractive powers undergo change mainly through exogenous 
factors familiar from standard neoclassical approaches: technological change, demographic 
shifts, and expansion in volume of trade, as well as the more ‘neoinstitutional’ concern with the 
costs of measuring goods. Effectively, then, his approach in this work is to identify the 
neoclassical factors normally held constant and to propose NIE theory as a means to make these 
constants into variables, so that long-term economic change is better understandable. This 
illustrates again the methodological ambivalence of North’s NIEH as an institutionalist theory 
that both criticizes and departs from neoclassical assumptions.94 
One other important development since the Polanyi paper is the realization that if the 
cultural, social, and psychological inputs into normative institutions is to be taken seriously, and 
especially to be - as Polanyi had argued - a subject of comparative analysis, this requires a study 
of ideology. At this stage, this concept is perhaps not yet very well developed in North’s work, it 
is fair to say; at this point North’s discussion of ideology as well as the role of free riding in 
institutional reproduction and change is mainly concerned with pointing to gaps in the theory 
than in filling them.95 But this book does signal for the first time in a serious way the need for a 
theory based on the ‘economics approach’ like North’s to deal with questions of power, altruism 
and ideology. It is worth observing this because these are precisely the kind of subjects that the 
more orthodox economic historians preferred to avoid and which Marxists, Polanyians and 
others thought it one of the advantages of their own framework to address.  
Moreover, it had an important consequence: North’s abandonment of the contractarian 
efficiency view of institutions. Indeed, in his subsequent monograph, North opens by contrasting 
the purpose of Structure and Change as well as his later work with the neoinstitutionalist 
approach of Oliver Williamson, for whom – according to North – institutions or the results of 
institutional competition are always optimal solutions to substitute for markets. Including 
ideology, the predatory nature of elites, and free riding problems into the economic historical 
theory means, for North, to question such a Panglossian assumption: he would come to dismiss 
this neoinstitutional efficiency view as ahistorical.96 Insofar as the spirit of Karl Polanyi pointed 
North the way to taking nonmarket allocation systems seriously, and therewith their cultural and 
social, i.e. ideological, foundational institutions, this abandonment of an overly Panglossian 
market-like interpretation of institutions is another major consequence of the Polanyian moment. 
In quite a bit of the less recent secondary literature, especially the critical works, this 1981 
book is taken as a representative example of North’s NIEH approach. For an important part this 
is because the latter’s most recent works were not yet published at the time of these reflections, 
of course, but it is regrettable because much of the substance of his 1981 book is restated in more 
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complex, ambitious, and sophisticated ways in subsequent works, beginning with his 1990 book 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (IICEP henceforth).97 For this 
reason, I will not dwell much further on Structure and Change and move on to the latter, which 
is perhaps the ‘best case’ expression of North’s NIEH in this stage. One can suffice with noting 
that if the previous work is mainly about defending the NIEH approach against neoinstitutional, 
neoclassical and Marxian rivals, the burden of IICEP is to clarify the conceptual apparatus: it is 
therefore of great significance to understanding the terms of North’s historical framework. 
North proceeds in IICEP to “[delve] much more deeply than the earlier studies into the 
nature of political and economic institutions and how they change. The specification of exactly 
what institutions are, how they differ from organisations, and how they influence transaction and 
production costs is the key to much of the analysis.”98 In fact, IICEP sets out as clearly and 
concisely as can be expected the fundamental concepts mentioned in the book’s title and their 
interaction in North's framework, and unlike his previous works, is explicitly aimed not just at 
economists and economic historians but at “other social scientists” as well.99 North establishes 
that the central explanandum for the NIEH is not institutions per se, but cooperation, and how 
various allocation systems and institutional frameworks help (or do not help) to bring it about. 
However, keep in mind that for North efficient markets are the optimal form of such social 
cooperation, and therefore other allocation systems resulting from different institutional 
structures are judged by that standard: “the central focus is on the problem of… the cooperation 
that permits economies to capture the gains from trade that were the key to Adam Smith's Wealth 
of Nations. The evolution of institutions that create an hospitable environment for cooperative 
solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth.”100 
The question whether such ‘Smithian cooperation’, i.e. capturing the gains from trade, 
succeeds or not depends in a given historical economy on the institutional framework of that 
society in question. If the subject of investigation for North’s NIEH at this stage is then the 
problem of how to achieve efficient market exchange that promotes economic growth, the 
method to get there is the by now familiar means of NIE-inspired analysis of institutions. For 
North, no ambition will do short of replacing the received comparative methods, both of 
neoclassical economics and of the other social science theories not “integrated into economics 
and economic history” with the New Institutionalist approach to economic history. As he 
proclaims: “That institutions affect the performance of economies is hardly controversial. That 
the differential performance of economies over time is fundamentally influenced by the way 
institutions evolve is also not controversial. Yet neither current economic theory nor cliometric 
history shows many signs of appreciating the role of institutions in economic performance 
because there as yet has been no analytical framework to integrate institutional analysis into 
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economics and economic history. The objective of this book is to provide such an underlying 
framework. The implications of the analysis suggest a reexamination of much social science 
theorizing in general and economics in particular, and provide a new understanding of historical 
change.”101 
For the NIEH, institutions are the rules and norms of 'the game'. These rules are 
constraints, created by humans, on human action. These institutions, in turn, “structure incentives 
in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.”102 This small sentence can easily 
hide the enormous extension of the domain of North’s NIEH approach in the direction of the 
general comparative theory of economic behaviour and social structure suggested by the works 
of Marx or Polanyi. Institutions structure incentives not just in the classically ‘economic’ sphere 
of market exchange, but in all other spheres as well. Instead of making market exchange (or its 
hierarchical alternatives) in the modern age the domain of institutionalist theory, as Williamson 
and others do, the domain is now ‘human exchange’ altogether.103 Institutions have their effect 
on economic performance by their impact on the costs of transaction and production, in 
accordance with the transaction cost economics approach. These costs of transaction and 
transformation make up part of the total costs of an economy.104 Each institutional arrangement, 
on which the 'players' of its 'game' rely, provides pervasive externalities, which can reproduce the 
need for these institutions, but also provide incentives for incremental change. This incremental 
change is introduced into the system by what North calls “entrepreneurs in political and 
economic organisations”, who change the system “at some margin”.105  
It is worth considering the implications of this idea of institutional change, since this topic 
will reappear in the more contemporary works of North discussed both below and in subsequent 
chapters. They are firstly that the suggestion seems to be that the political sphere of institutional 
change operates in some way analogously to the neoclassical economic idea of entrepreneurship: 
firms or individual market agents translate, under conditions of limited information, existing 
deviations from general equilibrium (‘gaps in the market’) into opportunities for profit, 
depending on their degree of risk aversion. The structure of the market (number of firms, 
commodities supplied) is changed by entrepreneurial activity such that entrepreneurs privatize 
the residual social benefit to themselves as residual profit, a return for their risk-taking. In 
Anthony Endres and Christine Woods’ terms, “entrepreneurs will arrive at optimally imperfect 
decisions when considering whether or not to exploit a profit opportunity which reveals itself as 
a market divergence between revenue and costs in market disequilibrium states.”106 
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Secondly, the larger implication drawn from this is that the processes of contestation and 
institutional change in a society, which we may for simplicity call politics, are market-like. 
While it is clear that in North’s perspective the states of disequilibrium or market failure that 
permit entrepreneurial activity to obtain returns are pervasive, it equally appears that the 
incentive structure for institutional change is analogous to the incentive structure for profit: 
entrepreneurs change institutions to their own benefit along some margin, and do so depending 
on their ‘taste’ for (political) risk. In this organizations play the equivalent role of firms (and 
indeed include firms), namely collective agents made up of individuals who join them in order to 
better effect the benefits of institutional change (or preservation) as suits them: “Organizations 
are created with purposive intent in consequence of the opportunity set resulting from the 
existing set of constraints (institutional ones as well as the traditional ones of economic theory) 
and in the course of attempts to accomplish their objectives are a major agent of institutional 
change.”107 But the incentive structure of entrepreneurs or organizations, given a particular set of 
institutional constraints, is in turn constrained by limited information. Here, North departs 
slightly from this neoclassical model of institutional entrepreneurship, insofar as – having 
abandoned the efficiency assumption of institutions – he attaches weight to the way in which 
entrepreneurs perceive and interpret these arbitrage opportunities. We have seen this already in 
embryonic form in his observation about the importance of ideology. As we will see, this factor 
will play an increasingly central role in the further development of his NIEH theory. 
The result is that while transaction costs in market exchange may generate imperfect 
property rights arrangements, similar transaction costs in “political markets” as well as the 
ideologies (“imperfect subjective models”) of the agents involved may sustain such 
imperfections over time.108 This distinction between institutions as constraints and organizations 
and ‘political entrepreneurs’ as agents permits North to counter Armen Alchian’s more 
neoinstitutional approach, in which evolutionary pressures of competition will weed out inferior 
institutions in favor of contextually better ones, until the point where, in neoclassical terms, there 
are no bills left on the sidewalk.109 Since institutions are the ‘environment’ and the organizations 
and political entrepreneurs the ‘organisms’ in this analogy, North seems to suggest, the latter 
adapt to the former, creating institutional ‘lock in’ – what he would later refer to as path 
dependence. The costs and benefits of changing the environment itself, after all, depend on the 
organism in question and its abilities to affect it. They cannot be taken for granted. 
North’s model of political action and change, then, entails a combination of fairly 
conventional assumptions about markets and entrepreneurship and their application in a more 
evolutionary framework to processes of institutional change, even when the latter have not 
traditionally been studied as part of that model of entrepreneurial activity. It is much the same in 
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his model of intellectual change and its effects on institutions.110 This is, I would suggest, quite 
in the general line of North’s use of NIE theory. Having corrected neoclassical microeconomics 
to account for evolutionary and historical dynamics and for imperfect information, the domain of 
its assumptions about individual economic behaviour and rationality is extended to the study of 
institutions. These institutions in turn are conceived of as constraints on that same individual 
behaviour. In this way, the interaction between individual (or collective agent) and institutional 
context is analogous to that in the neoclassical model between entrepreneur and disequilibriated 
market: the model of individuals’ relations to their society is that of agents to a market-like 
setting. I will take up these themes further in chapter 3. 
Before moving on to North’s further development of the NIEH, one important further 
theoretical innovation must be pointed out. This has to do with the effects of this individual-
institutional dynamic on North’s larger comparative picture. Recall that, for North, the purpose 
of this institutional understanding is ultimately to provide a comparative theory of different, 
especially nonmarket, allocation systems and their respective performance. So far, this 
performance has been understood simply in terms of economic growth, along the lines of 
conventional growth theory, with the caveat that only institutional arrangements favouring secure 
private property rights can achieve the virtuous cycle between technological and entrepreneurial 
innovation and relative factor price shifts that such growth theory describes. The standard 
criterion in neoclassical economics for evaluating such arrangements is allocative efficiency: the 
stipulation in marginalist theory were efficiency is defined such that every good or service is 
produced with marginal benefit to consumers being equal to the marginal cost. Under standard 
(highly unrealistic) Pareto conditions, only a private, competitive market economy can provide 
allocative efficiency. But for North, this criterion is irrelevant to economic historians for much 
the same reasons as provided by his general critique of applying neoclassical economic theory to 
this field: it does not allow for the study of the actual historical development of economies in a 
realistic way.  
North therefore substitutes the concept of adaptive efficiency.111 This revisits Alchian’s 
argument, while also drawing on the ideas of Friedrich Hayek.112 Adaptive efficiency, for North, 
is not easy to define. But the main idea is that there exists an efficiency of institutional change 
itself. For a society to be adaptively efficient, it seems it must be made as easy as possible to 
undertake entrepreneurial activities with respect to institutions, so that processes of trial and error 
in societal arrangements is maximized. The result of this would be that, under conditions of 
pervasive uncertainty, the development of “tacit knowledge” in response to changing 
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circumstances is maximally encouraged. Another element is making the elimination of inferior 
elements of the organizational structure easier, for example through bankruptcy laws. Generally, 
the upshot of this concept seems to be to suggest, through an evolutionary process, the social 
benefits of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” and of “decentralized decision-making 
processes”.113 I will not discuss this at length here, as these themes are developed in more 
extensive ways in his more recent works, as shown below. 
The behavioural foundations of North’s NIEH 
In this section, dealing with the works from IICEP to Violence and Social Orders, I will 
concentrate mostly on North’s behavioural assumptions, on his conception of embeddedness 
(explicit and implicit), and on the development of the evolutionary-historical dimension to his 
theory. I will begin with the first. Recall that the purpose of NIEH theory is to explain under 
what conditions institutions do or do not favour the emergence of ‘Smithian cooperation’: by 
which I mean North’s idea, which he attributed to Adam Smith, that cooperation in society 
consists of the arrangement of markets and property rights such that individuals capture the gains 
from trade. This somewhat narrow concept of cooperation diverges from the colloquial use. It 
therefore should not perhaps be too easily taken to exhaust the meaning of the term for Douglass 
North. But this type of cooperation, at least, being the explanandum of the NIEH’s institutional 
theory makes it the most important such form of cooperation in that theory. There is no room 
here to go into why North should see this notion, closely related to the traditional economic 
conception of market efficiency discussed above, as a form of ‘cooperation’; this and the 
allegedly ‘Smithian’ concept of markets North refers to will be discussed further in chapter 2. I 
merely here highlight the prominence of this problem of cooperation since this term is one of the 
guiding threads in the complex conceptual web that North has woven from IICEP to the present 
day.  
Observe that posing cooperation as a central problem also implies the possibility, indeed 
the pervasiveness, of non-cooperation. To understand this, we need to return to North’s critique 
of orthodox approaches and his complex relationship to the microeconomic methodology of 
mainstream economics. Chapter 3 of IICEP is dedicated to a discussion of the behavioural 
assumptions North attributes to the methodology of orthodox economics, ones that he wishes to 
reject. North observes that while the strict behavioural assumptions common to neoclassical 
economics are rarely thought to be realistic in the sense of accurately reflecting human behaviour 
in real life, they are nonetheless routinely treated by such economists as “still the best game in 
town for studying politics and the other social sciences.”114 However, North is not so sure that 
this is justified, for two reasons. Firstly, as he says, “The motivation of the actors is more 
complicated (and their preferences less stable) than assumed in received theory.” Secondly, “the 
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implicit [assumption] that the actors possess cognitive systems that provide true models of the 
worlds about which they make choices or, at the very least, that the actors receive information 
that leads to convergence of divergent initial models… is patently wrong.”115 
Why does this matter? Because, North argues in IICEP, “the behavioral assumptions that 
economists use” – by which he means what he views as neoclassical economists – “rest 
fundamentally on the assumption that competitive forces will see that those who behave in a 
rational manner, as described above, will survive, and those who do not will fail; and that 
therefore in an evolutionary, competitive situation (one that employs the basic assumption of all 
neoclassical economics of scarcity and competition), the behavior that will be continuously 
observed will be that of people who have acted according to such standards.”116 We have already 
seen an evolutionary argument of this type in Alchian’s neoinstitutionalist model of institutional 
change and convergence. North continues by pointing out that these neoclassical economists’ use 
of methods and concepts from evolutionary theory has generally dovetailed with their use of 
individual utility maximization, so that the properties of natural selection are thought to be 
operative, at least by analogy, in human social behaviour - even at the macroeconomic level - as 
much as in genetics.117 Importantly, he observes how even apparently altruistic behavior can and 
has been included in such rational choice (expected utility) evolutionary models of economic and 
social behaviour, as for example in Gary Becker’s work.118 
So where does this go wrong, according to North? Precisely the questions of motivations 
and mental models or ideology. For one, there is his notion we have already observed, namely 
that motivation comes with a cost, that following one’s own preferences (or “values and 
interests”) is only likely if the cost of doing so does not outweigh the benefits. This includes 
altruistic behaviour and norm-following generally. “The evidence we have with respect to 
ideologies, altruism, and self imposed standards of conduct suggests that the trade-off between 
wealth and these other values is a negatively sloped function. That is, where the price to 
individuals of being able to express their own values and interests is low, they will loom large in 
the choices made; but where the price one pays for expressing one's own ideology, or norms, or 
preferences is extremely high, they will account much less for human behavior.”119 However, the 
content of neither ideology nor altruism is of much concern to North here. 
The other problem is that of information. Citing Herbert Simon’s discussion of the 
consequences of the perfect information assumption, North points out that one implication is the 
complete convergence between the actual environment and the individual agent’s knowledge of 
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it. In the absence of such an assumption, lack of (accurate) information and limited 
computational capacity on the part of the agent play a major role in explaining the importance of 
why ideologies arise in the first place, and why they matter for the understanding of economic 
behaviour.120 Perfect information plus known utility functions give you predictable behavior, 
which - together with tractability - was the justification of these assumptions in economic theory 
in the first place. With limited information and limited computational capacity on the part of 
agents, they will require external or internal guides to complement their given ‘rational’ ability to 
make choices under conditions of uncertainty. Institutions, ideologies, mental maps: such mental 
constructs play, North suggests, precisely that role.121 This is not simply a question of optimizing 
institutions, but of the functional explanatory power of ideologies and norms in their own right, 
whether ‘optimal’ or not: norms of fairness can often operate to constrain individuals to choices 
that avoid the ‘optimal’ free-riding behavior that rational choice models would predict.122 But in 
this work, North allows that he does not yet have a theory why ideology should work this way. 
Nor does it seem immediately clear how this can be reconciled with the view of ideologies as 
complementary to, rather than substitutes of, the rational choice view in which one responds so 
to speak ‘ideologically’ depending on the relative cost of doing so.  
The thesis of IICEP could be summed up by North’s statement that “the condition of the 
world throughout history provides overwhelming evidence of much more than simple rational 
noncooperative behavior. The behavioral assumptions of economists are useful for solving 
certain problems. They are inadequate to deal with many issues confronting social scientists and 
are the fundamental stumbling block preventing an understanding of the existence, formation, 
and evolution of institutions.”123 The solution is to incorporate uncertainty and limited 
information into the picture. This allows for the explanatory necessity of institutions (to reduce 
transaction costs) and of ideologies (to reduce menu costs, i.e. the costs of choice itself).  
In this way, the neoclassical model can still operate in the entrepreneurial relation of 
individuals to institutions and to their pursuit or neglect of ideological values in practice, but this 
microeconomic foundation is now complemented by institutional analysis drawn from the NIE 
tradition and Herbert Simon’s procedural, cognitive psychology approach to individual choice. 
Finally, a loose evolutionary framework emerges from this set of theoretical positions. It rejects 
the interpretation of cultural evolution as a Panglossian optimization process. Rather, it suggests 
what one might call an ‘evolutionary marginalism’, social (cultural) as well as economic: 
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incremental rational changes in the margins of institutional frameworks add up to longer-term 
cultural evolution (for good or ill) and path dependence.124  
The latter is a concept North borrowed from Paul David and W.B. Arthur, and in IICEP is 
described as the kind of local monopolies of technology, even when inferior in the long run, that 
may emerge in the case of differential rates of growth or differential returns to scale. More 
generally, it describes in North’s work the kind of local optima or equilibria that, even when less 
efficient than existing or future alternatives, nonetheless persist. Following Arthur’s discussion, 
North suggests there is a self-reinforcing mechanism that occurs when for a given innovation 
there are returns to scale, learning effects (which lower costs as prevalence increases), 
coordination effects (so costs are reduced with frequency in a given context or among a given 
group of agents), or because of expectations of future prevalence. The consequences are also 
fourfold. These are the possibility of multiple equilibria, the persistence of inefficient solutions 
or innovations, the problem of lock-in (the difficulty of changing technologies once they have 
been adopted), and finally what he defines as path dependence sec, which really summarizes the 
whole of these mechanisms and their implications: “the consequence of small events and chance 
circumstances can determine solutions that, once they prevail, lead one to a particular path”.125 
While this discussion is here (and in Paul David’s influential QWERTY example126) primarily 
concerned with adoption of technology in imperfect markets, it is easy to see how North could 
subsequently apply it to institutional choice. 
But even so, the problem of cooperation remains: “the fact that individuals acted upon 
those [ideological] perceptions to overcome the free-rider problem is more difficult to 
explain.”127 So for North, at this point, we find once again the overall problem framed in terms of 
how to explain “the imbeddedness (sic) of informal constraints in societies” and the variety of 
ways this im- or embeddedness has operated in history: “How have societies diverged? What 
accounts for their widely disparate performance characteristics?”128 
All this as regards the relation between the behavioural assumptions discussed by North in 
IICEP and his concern with embeddedness and cooperation. The Polanyian problem of the 
historical differentiation of institutions and its role in generating different ‘allocation systems’, 
i.e. economies, is to be explained first and foremost at the level of individual motivations and 
constrained choices. The partially neoclassical, partially New Institutional behavioural 
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assumptions serve to explain why institutions and ideologies matter.129 At the macro-level, they 
result in historical path dependence and the persistence of imperfect equilibria, subject to 
adjustment at the margin. However, besides the insufficient content of ideology in this model, 
this does not yet explain sufficiently how ideology interacts with the remaining rational choice 
assumptions regarding the ‘meso-level’ of individual-institution dynamics. North still has to 
show how ‘Smithian cooperation’ can come about despite the constraints on choice he has 
described. Equally, we need to understand how rational non-cooperation can turn into 
cooperation (‘altruism’) to enable states and institutions to come about in the first place, given he 
has by this point abandoned the rational choice contractarian view of such matters he held in his 
works with Robert Thomas.  
Finally, North’s use of the concept ‘embeddedness’ (or ‘imbeddedness’, ‘imbodied’, and 
other synonyms), being such a core aspect of Polanyi’s historical comparative approach, cannot 
be read as fortuitous. Yet Polanyi gave it a definite functional explanation. For him, as we will 
see in the next chapter, the separation of the functions of markets, money, and trade implied 
market exchange was not the dominant form of economic integration in the premodern world, 
and therefore anthropological explanations rather than the ‘economistic fallacy’ were justified.130 
What kind of embeddedness relation, modernist rather than primitivist in theory, can North 
substitute?  
North’s third stage: embeddedness and cooperation in UPEC and Violence and Social 
Orders 
We must now turn to the remaining theoretical literature on these subjects in order to see how 
North answers these questions. I will first consider how North in his most recent works of NIEH 
theory has developed his thinking on the problems of cooperation and sociocultural evolution. I 
will therefore discuss each of the two major post-IICEP books in chronological order of their 
appearance, explaining both the new steps in the theory and the ideas about ‘Smithian 
cooperation’, ideology and evolution they imply.  
As we have seen, over time the emphasis of the structure of NIEH theory has changed, 
with the more conventional exogenous constraints on growth such as technology and 
demography fading more into the background, and the importance of 'social' phenomena such as 
ideology, cooperation, and other mental elements affecting fundamental cognitive uncertainty 
being foregrounded. Where in Structure and Change and even in IICEP ideology still lacked 
content, it has become a centrepiece of the theory itself in Understanding the Process of 
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Economic Change (henceforth UPEC).131 Nonetheless, there is also considerable continuity. The 
themes discussed above and the NIE framework in which they are formulated are developed 
further in scope and sophistication in North’s most recent books, but the essential ambitions 
formulated in the Polanyi paper, and the justifications of method of the Presidential Address 
remain valid even so. Indeed, North practically opens UPEC with the observation that its theory 
is “an extension – a very substantial extension – of the new institutional economics”.132  
This extension consists of the following. Put schematically, in the previous works the 
emphasis was on how institutions are causes of (differentiated) economic performance (Structure 
and Change) and subsequently how individuals interact with institutions to create a particular 
political economic dynamic (IICEP). In UPEC, however, North goes one step further: the central 
question is now how institutions themselves arise. If the interaction between individuals and 
existing institutional frameworks constitutes what I have called the meso-level of North’s NIEH 
theory, UPEC is decidedly about the micro-level. For North, the problem is to move analytically 
from the improved behavioural assumptions discussed above to the formation of ideology and 
culture, which in turn generate institutional arrangements that are inherited by subsequent 
generations. The whole then constitutes an evolutionary process of learning.  
Although based on evolved human psychology and sociality, this evolutionary process is 
for North not wholly reducible to Darwinian, because of the centrality of intentionality: the 
beliefs of the ‘players’ of the ‘game’ matter. “The selection mechanisms in Darwinian 
evolutionary theory are not informed by beliefs about the eventual consequences. In contrast, 
human evolution is guided by the perceptions of the players; choices—decisions—are made in 
the light of those perceptions with the intent of producing outcomes downstream that will reduce 
uncertainty of the organizations—political, economic, and social—in pursuit of their goals. 
Economic change, therefore, is for the most part a deliberate process shaped by the perceptions 
of the actors about the consequences of their actions.”133 The larger implications are about how 
such learning does or does not contribute, via institutions, to economic performance: “The focus 
of our attention, therefore, must be on human learning—on what is learned and how it is shared 
among the members of a society and on the incremental process by which the beliefs and 
preferences change, and on the way in which they shape the performance of economies through 
time.”134 
Of course, North realizes that this presumes knowledge of what exact combination of 
‘genetic’ and ‘cultural’ traits ultimately produces individual economic behaviour as well as the 
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normative frameworks that generate formal and (especially) informal institutions. But he is 
agnostic on this question. For him, it is sufficient that natural selection should have endowed 
humans with a limited cognitive capacity, limited enough to make uncertainty the basis of human 
action, but capacious enough to make intentionality relevant. This constitutes his ‘theory of 
consciousness’: one that moves from uncertainty to ideology to institutions to large-scale and 
long-term economic change.135 Beyond this, as he states, “we may never completely untangle the 
complex interconnections between the genetic and cultural attributes, but combining the two 
enables us to make sense of the human condition over time even if some of the combinations are 
arbitrary assertions at this point.”136  
What matters is that biological evolutionary theory is not enough, but that it must be 
combined with an economically sound theory of intentionality – for which of course the NIE is 
the source. If uncertainty and sociality are to be explained in Darwinian terms as the result of our 
physical limitations and needs, North has no truck with doing the same for the products of 
intentionality. He rejects the memetic approach in favour of the more traditional economic 
understanding of ‘culture’, i.e. the domain of human intentional action and its products that is not 
explainable in terms of immediate economic interest. As he explains: “Cultural traits do not 
possess attributes parallel to those of genes and indeed the growing literature of the new 
institutional economics makes abundantly clear that institutions must be explained in terms of 
the intentionality of humans. Informal norms develop that blend the moral inference of genetic 
origin with the intentional aims of humans, which together provide the backbone of what we 
should mean by the term culture.”137 
UPEC therefore provides North’s NIEH with a theory of how institutional economics can 
analyse culture in this sense.138 The way to do so is to understand the structure of culture and its 
institutions by means of a game theoretical model: individuals are players and the rules of the 
game are given by institutions and the costs of maintaining them as external constraints on the 
individual strategies of these players. “All organized activity by humans”, North proclaims, 
“entails a structure to define the ‘way the game is played,’ whether it is a sporting activity or the 
working of an economy. That structure is made up of institutions—formal rules, informal norms, 
and their enforcement characteristics.”139 This game theoretical approach to the artifactual 
framework can provide us with the basis for a virtually complete theory, one that can move from 
individual cognition under uncertainty to transaction cost economics and historical 
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differentiation in economic institutions and performance. “The structure that humans create to 
order their political/economic environment is the basic determinant of the performance of an 
economy. It provides the incentives which shape the choices humans make… The strength of 
informal norms and the effectiveness of enforcement play a key part in the story. Where do the 
rules, informal norms, and for that matter the effectiveness of enforcement, come from? They are 
derived from the beliefs humans have.”140 
In a nutshell, this works as follows. We begin with uncertainty as the foundation of human 
action. For North, there are five ways uncertainty interacts with belief formation: “1. Uncertainty 
that can be reduced by increasing information given the existing stock of knowledge. 2. 
Uncertainty that can be reduced by increasing the existing stock of knowledge within the existing 
institutional framework. 3. Uncertainty that can be reduced only by altering the institutional 
framework. 4. Uncertainty in the face of novel situations that entails restructuring beliefs. 5. 
Residual uncertainty that provides the basis for “non-rational” beliefs.”141 Beliefs and the ‘stock 
of knowledge’ therefore interact to form belief systems which constitute structured responses to 
uncertainty. 
‘Belief systems’ are internalisations of the environment, limited in their accuracy by 
cognitively induced uncertainty. These belief systems incorporate norms about social life as well 
as understandings of that life, so that they unite the beliefs and desires of traditional intentional 
theory. People impose institutions on societies based on these systems in order to achieve their 
desired outcomes within those societies. Informal institutions are simply outward manifestations 
of the norms incorporated in belief systems and are difficult to change, whereas formal 
institutions are the immediately political, constitutional form of such norms and are easier to 
change. Because both institutions and the belief systems are inherited across generations, the 
trajectories of societies, insofar as they are shaped by them, are subject to path dependence. This 
means not just the mere fact of institutional inheritance, but also the slowness and incrementality 
of changes in their structure. (Recall the distinction between the slow-changing ‘fundamental’ 
institutions and the easier to change political ones in the works with Robert Thomas.) This 
incrementalism about cultural evolution is to be explained by the fact that institutions give rise to 
organizations, which then have a stake in existing institutional frameworks and may oppose their 
change. (Recall here, in turn, the discussion of similar themes in IICEP.) Therefore, constraints 
operate at several levels: individuals are constrained in their beliefs by uncertainty, individuals or 
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groups are constrained in their choices by their beliefs and institutions, and societies are 
constrained by path dependence.142 
This constrained path dependence of societies in turn determines their ‘economic 
performance’. The artifactual frameworks described above interact with the familiar givens of 
technological change and demographic change to produce historical change. Economic 
performance can only be gotten right if the institutional structures in question change along with 
the rest, in all three their aspects (informal, formal, and enforcement). This requires that those 
with the organizational power to change institutions at a given point, or the individual 
entrepreneurs with the necessary ability, make those changes. If not, the inheritance of previous 
institutional arrangements and beliefs, in other words culture, and the inheritance of existing 
organisational structures, in other words politics, will constitute a case of flawed social 
learning.143 The ultimate lesson of UPEC is then perhaps this: “Successful economic 
development will occur when the belief system that has evolved has created a “favorable” 
artifactual structure that can confront the novel experiences that the individual and society face 
and resolve positively the novel dilemmas. Failures will occur when the novel experiences are so 
far removed from the artifactual structure of the evolved belief system that individual and society 
do not have the “building blocks” of the mind and artifactual structure to resolve the novel 
problems. If we are going to come to grips with an understanding of the differential performance 
of different parts of the world both over time and cross-sectionally in the modern world it is here 
that we must begin... That is what is meant by adaptive efficiency; creating the necessary 
artifactual structure is an essential goal of economic policy.”144 
One of the chapters of UPEC in which North discusses these determinants of performance 
over time is called “getting it right and getting it wrong”.145 North is by no means sanguine about 
how easy institutional adaptation is in practice: for him, much of history is the story of people 
‘getting it wrong’.146 Nonetheless, we will recall that in the second stage of his NIEH, North 
suggested the key to successful adaptation was the development of a decentralised flexibility that 
allowed the necessary institutional change to happen. Now, North is ready to specify this idea 
further in three ways. Firstly, he stresses the importance of what he calls a shift from personal to 
impersonal exchange. This idea plays an analogous role to the Polanyian shift from other 
dominant transactional modes to market exchange playing that role: it is what distinguishes the 
modern economy from previous allocation systems. This shift is essential to achieve cooperation, 
which as we have seen before has been defined as capturing the gains from trade, in other words 
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private benefits in market exchange: “Personal exchange relies on reciprocity, repeat dealings, 
and the kind of informal norms that tend to evolve from strong reciprocity relationships. 
Impersonal exchange requires the development of economic and political institutions that alter 
the pay-offs in exchange to reward cooperative behavior.”147  
This then brings us to the second specification, namely the importance of political 
institutions. We have already observed how in previous formulations the protection of private 
property rights was the sine qua non for economic performance in North’s theory. More 
generally, political institutions need to be such that impersonal exchange can be performed with 
a minimum of transaction costs: a staple of NIE theory. This requires order and state 
enforcement of private agreements and of an economically desirable institutional order alike. But 
this contractarianism is more Lockean than Hobbesian, insofar for North the risk of state 
expropriation is as real as that of insufficient enforcement. Order therefore necessarily entails “a 
strong but limited polity”; perhaps not coincidentally the traditional demand of liberal political 
theory.148 The third specification is the need for a property arrangement so that the benefits of 
new knowledge or ideas is distributed effectively in light of the other dimensions of the 
institutional framework: knowledge is to be dispersed at low costs of transacting.149 This last 
point is essentially simply an application of the transaction cost approach, and I will therefore not 
discuss it in detail here; except to note that this transaction cost approach dovetails well with the 
more conventional measure of market performance in economic history, namely by measuring 
levels of price volatility. On this argument, market performance consists of the ability of markets 
to withstand external shocks without great volatility or great differences between one region or 
market and another. With low transaction costs, arbitrage becomes easier and so relative prices 
respond to compensate for the volatility induced by the external shock.150 While I do not intend 
to discuss the economic historical literature on the concept of economic performance here, this 
affinity of concepts is worth noting because for North it is important to the application of his 
NIEH ideas to contemporary development economics, a point I will return to below. 
The final NIEH theory monograph I will discuss here is North’s most recent, his 
collaboration with John Wallis and Barry Weingast titled Violence and Social Orders.151 Insofar 
as UPEC was concerned with the emergence of belief systems out of uncertainty and the impact 
of such cultural frameworks, when joined with bounded rationality, on institutional 
arrangements, Violence and Social Orders puts the state, politics, and formal institutions central. 
Nonetheless, the argument in this book as a whole is equally concerned with the origins of 
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‘cooperation’ – as always, in the sense North attributed to Adam Smith – and of human sociality 
itself. In this approach embeddedness, as a term to describe the relations between economic 
behaviour and institutions and those of the ‘artifactual framework’ of a given society at large, 
plays an important role as well. As indicated above, I will discuss these aspects of North’s theory 
as it stands today, in that order: cooperation, evolution, and finally embeddedness. I will also 
raise some larger questions from this overview of North’s NIEH theory. But first, we have to see 
what this book has added to the Northian approach. 
In UPEC, North argued for the importance of a shift from personal exchange to impersonal 
exchange, and for the emergence of an impersonal and limited state power to enforce the formal 
institutions. Violence and Social Orders is in part a working out of this suggestion. In order to 
create an origin story for the emergence of human sociality and the 'artifactual framework', 
Violence and Social Orders divides history into a progressive evolution, if not necessarily a 
linear one, of different types of state. While this contains various categories and sub-categories, 
on my reading the most important of these is the distinction between what they call 'natural state 
orders' and 'open access orders'. The authors describe the former as follows: “The logic of the 
natural state follows from how it solves the problem of violence. Elites – members of the 
dominant coalition – agree to respect each other’s privileges, including property rights and 
access to resources and activities. By limiting access to these privileges to members of the 
dominant coalition, elites create credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight among 
themselves. Because elites know that violence will reduce their own rents, they have incentives 
not to fight. Furthermore, each elite understands that other elites face similar incentives. In this 
way, the political system of a natural state manipulates the economic system to produce rents that 
then secure political order.”152 
The open access order, by contrast, is simply the opposite of this: an order where the state 
has a monopoly on violence but allows free entry and exit for citizens into political organisations 
and the economy, and where the state takes on a wholly impersonal character, which ensures 
equality. The open access order is without further ado identified with the state regimes of the 
Western world today, whereas the natural state orders characterise all non-Western countries 
today as well as essentially all state orders of the past. Proceeding from the self-regard of 
individuals, game theoretical models are used to support the idea that repeated cooperation will 
be difficult to sustain given the benefits to free riding and cheating, requiring an external 
enforcer of the 'rules of the game' of some sort. This enforcer then is whatever elite is concocted 
out of temporary alliances of self-seeking individuals and turns out to be strong enough to 
transform into a state. The transition from this stage to the paradise of the open access order is of 
course the real problem in the book. The answer to this is a situation in which it becomes in the 
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rational interest of the elites to treat each other impersonally, rather than violently, and 
subsequently to extend access to the impersonal institutions so created to a wider and wider 
section of the population.153 
Conclusion 
But what is the foundation for this dynamic at the level of the individual and their interaction 
with the ‘economic system’, whether subject to predatory elites or otherwise? Even if we allow 
this as a plausible explanation of the political economic transition from premodern to modern 
allocation systems, it must be directly based on the behavioural assumptions and micro-level 
concepts already identified. In other words, it must have its microfoundations within the theory. 
North, Wallis, and Weingast therefore have recourse to economic anthropology. But they do so 
in a way intended to counter the ideas of the anthropologists they rely on.  
North, Wallis, and Weingast go back to the Neolithic revolution and the rise of elites, 
which for them arise naturally out of the increasing size of human communities. Based on the 
work of Allen Johnson and Timothy Earle on the evolution of human societies, the authors 
theorise the origins of states as stemming from the ability of elite figures, when organized 
together, to limit a Hobbesian war of all against all. They do so in explicit contradistinction to 
the prevailing approaches of economic anthropology. “State is a term of art with a specific 
meaning in anthropology, but less so in political science and economics. States are distinguished 
from chiefdoms by size and structure and include formal administration of government. For 
anthropologists, states do not appear until populations rise into the hundreds of thousands. In 
contrast, what we define as the natural state arises as societies reach populations of one thousand 
or more, and new forms of integrated political and economic organisation develop to limit 
violence. As Earle recognises, “The fundamental dynamics of chiefdoms are essentially the same 
as those of states, and . . . the origins of states is to be understood in the emergence and 
development of chiefdoms”. We add the logic of natural state to the approach of Johnson and 
Earle: the key link that constrains military power is embedding the individuals who direct 
military power in a network of privileges. By manipulating privilege, interests are created that 
limit violence.”154 
In other words, the key assumptions are the pervasiveness of violence in the ‘state of 
nature’ (pre-state societies), the role of the ‘natural state’ in stemming this violence, and the 
centrality of the creation and distribution of rents to doing so. Indeed, the whole explanation of 
premodern economic history (and also contemporary non-Western societies), being the history of 
‘natural states’, is summarized by the authors as follows: “The dynamics of natural states are the 
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dynamics of the dominant coalition, frequently renegotiating and shifting in response to 
changing conditions. If adjustments lead to more power and rents based on personal identity, 
institutions become simpler and organizations less sophisticated, and the society moves toward 
the fragile end of the progression of natural states. If adjustments lead to more power based on 
durable agreements, institutions become more complex and organizations become more 
sophisticated, and societies move toward the mature end of the progression. No compelling logic 
moves states in either direction.”155 With some rhetorical exaggeration, one can jest that for 
North and colleagues the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of rents; it is rents 
that restrain violence, while simultaneously being extracted by the constrained violence 
exercised by predatory elites.156 The one exception are the open access orders achieved by the 
West, which have taken the logic of reducing transaction costs and increasing institutional 
adaptability to a maximum, thereby maximally achieving the gains from trade.  
In the next chapter, we will now turn to North’s ‘theory of markets’. By this I do not mean 
a theory ever explicitly formulated in those terms, but rather a closer examination of the way 
North conceives of how markets function within larger social structures, how he justifies his 
appeal to the ‘Smithian result’, and the functionalist philosophical structure of North’s market 
concept. By using the recently repopularised term ‘embeddedness’, I hope to show how the 
contrast with Polanyi implied in the way North has taken up his ‘challenge’ helps clarify the 
particulars of North’s approach to market exchange in economic history. I will also discuss some 
critiques of North’s interpretation of social and political noncooperative coordination as market-
like, and discuss the differences between North’s approach and the neoinstitutionalist view of 
markets of the Williamsonian tradition. 
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Chapter 2: North versus Polanyi on markets and embeddedness 
Introduction: A New theory of comparative economics 
In the previous chapter I have set out North’s NIEH theory and its historical development, 
identifying a number of concepts and themes that on my reading constitute the core of the theory 
and its defining differentia specifica. In particular, I have tried to show how North’s approach 
has shifted over time in domain as well as conception: from an efficiency view of institutions to 
one of multiple equilibria, from an explanation of premodern societies in terms of reducing 
transaction costs alone to framing this by study of the origins and inheritance of institutions, 
from market failures as the object of inquiry to ideology, cooperation, and embeddedness. 
Finally I have tried to show the role of the Polanyian moment in giving North the impetus to 
remake New Institutionalism into a rival comparative historical theory of great scope and 
ambition.  
In this chapter, I want to explore two aspects of North’s NIEH works in more detail. 
Firstly, I want to deepen our understanding of the relationship between Polanyi and North in 
terms of the specific problems for historical and economic theory posed by Polanyi’s primitivist 
approach. This specific conception of the relationship between economic behaviour and 
sociocultural institutions Polanyi proposed is encapsulated in his (late) concept of 
‘embeddedness’. It is interesting that this same concept not only appears in a modified form in 
North’s 1977 paper, but subsequently re-emerges in the work of Mark Granovetter, whose 
approach to economic sociology has much in common with the ideas of the NIE (or at least its 
Northian branch).157 In order therefore to clarify what precisely Polanyi’s challenge might 
consist of, a brief exploration of the interconnectedness between Polanyi’s theoretical framework 
for studying economic history and the purpose of the NIE as a special kind of ‘substantivism’ in 
its own right may be useful. In particular, I want to focus on how Polanyi’s challenge, as North 
took it up, had been shaped by his idiosyncratic view of price-making markets and the role of 
economic theory (supply and demand) in understanding their functioning. 
This leads me subsequently to discuss North’s own, rival approach to understanding 
markets. Firstly, this means examining more closely the complex analytical relationship between 
individual self-interest, transaction costs, and market efficiency in his theory. Secondly, we must 
clarify what North means by what he calls the ‘Smithian result’. This term, and variant 
references to Smith in the context of perfect market competition, plays an important normative 
role in North’s theory. We must therefore examine this (dubious) apparent attribution to Adam 
Smith of the insight that once an institutional order permits well-functioning markets, the logic 
of neoclassical economics does obtain, and economic growth as well as adaptive efficiency are 
furthered thereby.  
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Necessarily, such an examination also requires looking at the ideological context of this 
idea in North’s work, where I want to point to the importance of social contract theory in his 
presentation of the ‘choice’ between markets and nonmarket allocative systems, the question 
raised in his 1977 paper. The political-ideological background to this, in classical or ordoliberal 
theories of the market inspired by Friedrich Hayek, must also be observed, although I will say 
more about this in chapters 3 and 4. Finally, I will discuss some of the previous critiques of 
North’s theory on precisely this point, the understanding of the role of the market and its 
institutional structure when compared with institutional orders not primarily based in market 
exchange: a point important for both Polanyi and North. Since North’s response to Polanyi 
begins with this discussion about markets and other allocation systems, and since much of 
North’s theorizing of the historical function of market exchange rests on more implicit than 
explicit assumptions, this examination will lay the foundation for subsequent discussions of 
North’s rationality concept, his use of evolutionary theory, and his relationship to economic 
anthropology.  
As Sally Humphreys has pointed out, the implications of Polanyi’s project are that if 
orthodox economic theory could not simply be applied to premodern economic formations, one 
would need a “new theory of comparative economics”.158 North himself clearly interpreted 
Polanyi’s challenge as constituting one such theory. My argument is that his own NIEH 
approach should be seen in this light as another, namely one intended to demonstrate Polanyi’s 
primitivist premises are not required for such a theory to succeed. The present chapter therefore 
stands on two legs. One is getting a better grip on North’s attempt to answer Polanyi’s challenge 
from this “economics approach” by examining what Polanyi’s approach to markets and their 
embeddedness in sociocultural and political institutional structures actually entailed. The other is 
to clarify North’s subsequent development of a different kind of substantivism about markets, 
first and foremost based on transaction cost economics but entailing a much wider range of 
theoretical positions. Some of these positions have striking areas of overlap with Polanyi’s, but 
in other respects North’s approach to markets is much more indebted, I will argue, to a 
contractarian liberal tradition about the virtues of markets as engines of growth and coordination.  
Finally, I will also make some critical comments on North’s approach to markets and 
discuss some alternative approaches to their role in (premodern) economic history – in particular 
with an eye to Polanyi’s own use of anthropological theory to study this subject. If I therefore 
violate disciplinary strictures against concentrating on philosophical and theoretical problems 
over practical empirical studies or new models, so be it. If this work suffers from what Clifford 
Geertz called “epistemological hypochondria”, I justify it as a prerequisite for improving 
explanation in economic history and by the impact of the NIEH on wider debates in the social 
sciences.159 Even so, the literature on markets and market theory is far too vast to allow even an 
approximation of an exhaustive study of these topics; the present discussion will have to serve 
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merely to highlight a number of important aspects of North’s approach to markets, and to 
consider their strengths and weaknesses compared to Polanyi’s. 
Markets, institutions and embeddedness in Polanyi 
With this in mind, let me now return to the themes to be discussed below. In this chapter, I will 
discuss the afterlife of embeddedness, in the Polanyian sense, in the work of North and his 
engagement with the reappearance of this concept in New Institutionalist-inspired economic 
sociology. This also allows us to situate North’s work more clearly in the context of his relation 
to Polanyi. Among Polanyi’s theses on the embeddedness of economic behavior in social and 
cultural norms in premodern societies was the contention that markets, money, and trade were 
separate social functions that did not operate along the same lines in such societies as they do 
when generalized market exchange is the dominant ‘transactional mode’.160 His claims regarding 
ancient markets, that they were fundamentally not determined by ‘supply and demand’ but 
embedded in social and political structures supporting other dominant transactional modes, is 
one of the most controversial aspects of his primitivist economic comparative theory. For North, 
as we have seen, the universality of the ‘economics approach’ is central, and for this reason he 
cannot consistently accept such a primitivist account. Yet we have also seen that North has been 
readily willing to concede the limited nature of market exchange in premodern societies. 
Because of this, after the brief discussion of the afterlife of Polanyian embeddedness in 
North I will consider how North perceives the nature of markets and market exchange in such 
societies. I will also discuss his theories of ‘political markets’ and their role in extending the 
analysis precisely to such institutional embeddedness as Polanyi was concerned with. This point, 
North’s description of markets or indeed of ‘the economic’ as equivalent to market-like 
phenomena, has been most often the target of his detractors’ critiques. But embeddedness is a 
notoriously vague term, one which has been used in different ways by different authors and even 
within the work of one, for example that of Polanyi, can give rise to many ambiguities of 
meaning.  
For at least one eminent Polanyi specialist, there is no doubt that “the logical starting point 
for explaining Polanyi’s thinking is his concept of embeddedness. Perhaps his most famous 
contribution to social thought, this concept has also been a source of enormous confusion.”161 
This confusion is at least in part the fault of Polanyi’s own inconsistent use of the term. As 
Kurtulus Gemici has pointed out, for Polanyi the term ‘embeddedness’ came to symbolize two 
separate theoretical viewpoints. On the one hand, it entails Polanyi’s argument for the 
impossibility of separating a sphere of economic logic from the larger social-institutional context 
in which this form of ‘the economic’ (however defined) operates. On the other hand, Polanyi 
uses it to indicate the difference between the functioning of markets in premodern societies 
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(embedded) and in modern societies (disembedded). There is therefore a contradiction in his use: 
in some sense all economies are embedded in institutions, whereas in another sense the 
transactional mode in which market exchange dominates is a case of disembedding from 
institutions.162  
As Gemici suggests, this is partially to be explained by Polanyi’s shifting interests. In The 
Great Transformation (TGT), Polanyi uses it only twice, but in his later works (which are more 
relevant for the present study) the term gains in significance.163 This can be explained by 
Polanyi’s increasing concern with differentiating in what historical economies the independent 
logic of the market, represented for him by the thinking of mainstream economics, operates from 
those historical economies in which this logic does not operate and therefore such thinking is 
inapplicable.164 In TGT, the main thrust of his argument is to explain the emergence of modern 
market society and its negative effects, indeed its unsustainability in every sense; in his later 
economic historical/anthropological works, his argument is at least as much about the 
applicability of economic theories as about the history of markets and trade.  
Standard economic theory is fine for the period covered by TGT, even if Polanyi 
disapproves of that type of society. But the division between modern and premodern is 
established by the inapplicability of such theory to the societies of the past that had different 
dominant transactional modes. As Polanyi put it in a 1947 essay: “The market mechanism, 
moreover, created the delusion of economic determinism as a general law for all human society. 
Under a market-economy, of course, this law holds good. Indeed, the working of the economic 
system here not only “influences” the rest of society, but determines it… In terms of the present 
article, instead of the economic system being embedded in social relationships, these 
relationships were now embedded in the economic system.”165 In premodern economies the 
embeddedness relationship was the reverse. That is to say, economic behavior was not a question 
of determination by the operation of the market, but by different motives: “The individual’s 
motives, named and articulated, spring as a rule from situations set by facts of a non-economic—
familial, political or religious—order”.166 As Hannes Lacher puts it: “For political economy and 
neo-classical economics, the profit motive was a given, deduced from human nature or the 
structure of competition. For Polanyi, by contrast, the question is how such a specifically 
economic interest came into existence.”167 
Polanyi’s idea of embeddedness, now taken as historical differentiation in the sense 
described above, i.e. where the motives that guide the economic actions of individuals are 
dependent on the institutional context in which they operate, rests on two foundations. The first 
                                                          
162 Gemici 2008, p. 3-4. 
163 Polanyi 2001. 
164 Ibid., p. 12-14. 
165 Polanyi 1968, p. 70; Cited in Gemici 2008, p. 12-13. Emphasis added. 
166 Polanyi 1968, p. 85. 
167 Lacher 1999, p. 316. 
58 
 
is the motivational one. As we have seen, embeddedness meant for Polanyi rejecting the idea that 
certain motives, or logics of choice, operated throughout human history and defined a separate 
sphere of the economic. The ‘substantive’ view of the economy, for Polanyi, is after all simply 
defined as the sphere of the production and distribution of the necessities of life, of the 
‘livelihood of man’ – also the title of a posthumous collection of his essays.168 This distinguishes 
itself consciously from the motivational universalism of the standard economic approach, at least 
in its choice theory, which is considered to apply whenever a choice is made between scarce 
means for competing ends – in practice usually mediated by relative prices in some form.169  
Here, I want to concentrate on the second point: the institutional context. Insofar as 
embeddedness has served, as Gareth Dale says, “as a doorway for explorations of the 
relationship between economic behavior and the social integument”, it is clear that if Polanyi and 
North differ strongly on how to understand the former, they share an interest in the latter, in the 
form of the institutional framework.170 To sum up, Polanyi’s embeddedness thesis appears as a 
challenge for the ‘economic approach’ insofar as it rejects its universality; but insofar as 
concerned with historicizing the institutional context of ‘markets and other allocation systems’, it 
appears as rather complementary to North’s ambitions. Both approaches do have something in 
common: taking individuals as the primary agents of analysis. Postponing the methodological 
discussion of rationality inherent in this aspect to the next chapter, I will now discuss how 
North’s has taken up the historical differentiation aspect of the embeddedness thesis and to what 
extent it has succeeded in improving on Polanyi on this point. 
Is there embeddedness in North? 
In Polanyi we find that the term ‘embeddedness’ is introduced early on (in 1934)171, more or less 
en passant, then plays only a minor role in the theoretical analysis (in TGT), only to subsequently 
blossom into a much more significant concept for the whole. Curiously, something similar can be 
said for the use of this term, or virtually synonymous terms, in Douglass North’s writings. I 
observed previously that in discussing Polanyi’s challenge, North notes that “the key to Polanyi’s 
system is the view that economic organization is embodied in society in the sense of ‘having no 
separate existence apart from its controlling social integument’. Transactional dispositions… are 
expressions of socially defined obligation and relationships.”172 Although North here writes 
‘embodied’, we may take this as his definition of Polanyi’s embeddedness concept, as it is 
difficult to imagine what else it might refer to. But in subsequent works, this term or synonyms 
do not appear much at all, just as with Polanyi’s first monograph: in IICEP for example there is 
only one relevant use of the word ‘embedded’, namely where North states that “the incentives 
embedded in the institutional framework direct the process of learning by doing” – not even a 
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context very close to Polanyi’s concerns.173 In UPEC, embedded and embeddedness appear three 
times, and in contexts closer to Polanyi’s use; and in Violence and Social Orders, it suddenly 
gains a great prominence, being mentioned (by my count) no fewer than eighteen times in 
Polanyian formulations.174 Polanyi’s own name does not reappear in these monographs (only his 
brother does), so the increasing emphasis on embeddedness is all the more interesting.  
Polanyi may be present in North’s concept indirectly as well. One important ‘afterlife’ of 
embeddedness has been in economic sociology, where Mark Granovetter rediscovered the 
concept in a 1985 paper.175 In this paper, Granovetter wanted to distance himself from what he 
called the “undersocialized image of man” in neoclassical economic theory as well as the 
“oversocialized image of man” in Polanyi’s work.176 Associating the latter with ‘embeddedness’ 
tout court, he suggested his own approach, an NIE-inspired concept of ‘network embeddedness’, 
as a middle ground between the two. As Granovetter argued, “much of the utilitarian tradition, 
including classical and neoclassical economics, assumes rational, self-interested behaviour 
affected minimally by social relations... At the other extreme lies what I call the argument of 
'embeddedness': the argument that the behaviour and institutions to be analysed are so 
constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous 
misunderstanding.”177  
Granovetter has since repudiated the association of embeddedness with Polanyi, claiming 
he did not have Polanyi in mind and did not mean to reintroduce it.178 But there is at least an 
analogy between Granovetter’s view of network embeddedness and North’s ambiguous position 
between neoinstitutionalism and Polanyi’s challenge.179 This makes it suggestive that precisely 
this term, so associated with Polanyi (even if not original to him), should have appeared 
inescapable for describing the effort to reconcile the ‘economic approach’ to economic behaviour 
with how it was ‘constrained by ongoing social relations’. So much so, that in this paper 
sometimes Granovetter slips into using embeddedness for his own position. It is therefore 
imaginable that for all Granovetter’s subsequent protestations, North found this Polanyian 
concept amenable for his own middle ground approach, perhaps even drawing on Granovetter’s 
initial formulation. But of course, none of this constitutes more than circumstantial evidence 
pointing at the afterlife of Polanyi’s embeddedness problematic in North’s work. 
At the very least we can say this: there is a late return to the embeddedness concept in 
North as there was in Polanyi’s own work, a return – I would suggest - prompted by Violence 
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and Social Orders as the most complete formulation of a general comparative economic history 
comparable to Polanyi’s own. For this, North clearly needed some concept to describe the 
relation of the individual, and his economic action, to the social whole and its normative 
structure: the faits sociaux totaux so important to Polanyi as well.180 Characteristic are 
formulations like “the set of social interactions, organizations, and networks in which individuals 
are embedded” and “rules and norms, by themselves, are not self-sustaining; they must be 
embedded in a larger structure of organizations and beliefs”.181 North’s use of the term is clearly 
somewhat broader than Polanyi’s, but gets at the same problem: how to relate individual 
economic behaviour - including within and towards institutions, organisations, and political life - 
to the institutional structure as a whole and its constraining effect on such behaviour. Which is 
just to say: Polanyi and North are both institutionalists in their own way, and the reappearance of 
embeddedness in Violence and Social Orders to describe the nature of this institutionalism is one 
piece of evidence for the convergence of their institutionalisms at the level of explanatory theory, 
if not on the salience of economic microfoundations.182 
The point of this discussion is not primarily philological, but rather to allow me to use the 
concept of embeddedness to discuss the points of overlap and contrast between North’s and 
Polanyi’s views of what the economy is, and in particular what markets do within them; and to 
relate these to the problem of the absence of generalized market exchange in premodern societies 
and how the individual relates to the social-institutional context in those societies. From his 
‘Polanyian moment’ to Violence and Social Orders, one cannot escape the sense that he was 
consciously or implicitly setting up his own view of this complex problematic as a Polanyian 
one, even if his answers to this problem converged with Polanyi’s view only in part. We have 
seen they converge in a very general sense, namely insofar as both accepted normative 
institutional structures as the fundamental constraints on economic behaviour in the premodern 
world (if in Polanyi’s case not in the modern). We have also seen that in the 1977 paper North 
conceded Polanyi’s assertion that the premodern world was largely dominated by transactional 
modes other than market exchange. So what of markets then? Do they at least agree on what 
those are, and how they function? If not, can North consistently formulate a theory of 
embeddedness as a response to Polanyi’s challenge that nonetheless has a very different view of 
markets than Polanyi had?  
After all, for Polanyi the different function and determinants of markets and the separation 
between markets, money, and trade was at least as important as economic methodology for his 
primitivist case. For some critics, North’s interpretation of markets and their historical function 
is fundamentally indebted to economic perspectives irreconcilable with a Polanyian 
embeddedness project. Insofar as this is true, Polanyi’s inconsistent embeddedness theory would 
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be matched by an equally inconsistent embeddedness theory on North’s part, at least as far as the 
theory of the market is concerned.  
North’s theory of markets 
In order to get a sense of what North’s theory of markets and their historical function is, in light 
of the above discussion, I begin once more at the beginning. Inevitably this means first another 
close reading of the 1977 paper on Polanyi, but now with a different focus than before. Directly 
following on his discussion of Polanyi’s embeddedness viewpoint in the 1977 paper, North 
points out (correctly) that one implication of Polanyi’s argument is that exchange and trade must 
not necessarily imply “economic motivation” – by which he appears to mean a profit motive. He 
points to Polanyi and George Dalton’s famous arguments regarding administered trade in ancient 
Babylonia and the kula trade of the Trobriand Islanders – a set piece of economic anthropology 
taken from Bronislaw Malinowski – as illustrations of this argument.183 As we have seen, far 
from reacting as many of the strict ‘modernists’ might, or as one might expect from an orthodox 
economic historian, and simply denying the truth of this Polanyian claim, North goes out of his 
way to accept this premise. In fact, for him this is even true in the post-Industrial Revolution 
economies of the modern world, so that he falls clearly on the ‘always embedded’ side of 
interpreting that Polanyian concept. In a sense familiar from Coase, Williamson, and the wider 
NIE tradition, North points out how firms and governments also undertake economic activity in 
modern market societies, so that even there price-making markets do not fully dominate all 
transactions.184  
For North, the challenge is to explain the fact that “substitutes for markets have dominated 
exchange in past societies” (and to a lesser extent to explain these today as well), and to do so 
without accepting Polanyi’s assertion regarding economic motives. As we have seen, for North 
in the 1977 paper we have to see how far “economic analysis” will take us in explaining these 
nonmarket transactional modes, and economic analysis implies rational behaviour “in the 
economic sense of the word”.185 This much is familiar by now: this is his argument for the 
advantages of transaction cost economics as a theoretical framework for doing so. 
What we have not yet investigated, however, is what understanding of the market underlies 
this argument regarding market and nonmarket transactions. Insofar as North has accepted 
Polanyi’s premise, and based the NIEH on this challenge, he has to accept a particular definition 
of markets that is consistent with Polanyi’s argument about the separation of markets, money, 
and trade at both institutional and motivational levels. This point did not escape North, and for 
this reason his Polanyi paper also includes a discussion of how to define markets for historical 
comparative purposes. For Polanyi this was the central heuristic, but in the orthodox economic 
literature this is not a familiar starting point of inquiry. As North observes: “it is a peculiar fact 
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that the literature of economics and economic history contains so little discussion of the central 
institution that underlies neoclassical economics: the market.”186  
It is clear to North that Polanyi’s definition of markets is a very specific one, namely the 
price-making market. The absence of this type of market exchange, with its independent 
endogenous logic of supply and demand, in premodern economies is the cornerstone of the 
latter’s analysis of economic historical differentiation.187 Polanyi importantly distinguished 
markets per se from what he called ‘price-making markets’, one in which supply and demand act 
as independent forces to determine the relative prices of goods and which is integrated, or tends 
to integrate, into a larger system of market exchange.188 As North points out, this seems to apply 
to markets with “a large number of buyers and sellers, a variety of goods, an agreed-upon 
medium of exchange and an enforced set of property rights”.189 For North, as one might expect, 
it is the latter that is decisive: the property rights arrangements (and their enforcement) determine 
transaction costs (information costs, measuring costs, and so forth) and thereby the viability of 
such markets compared to other forms of exchange.190 The salient point is that “the costs of 
defining and enforcing property rights… lead to non-price allocation of many goods and services 
today… transactions costs in the ancient past would have been an insuperable barrier to price-
making markets throughout most of history.”191 
As mentioned, for the neoinstitutionalist perspective on ‘markets versus hierarchies’, such 
as that of Oliver Williamson, the choice between market contracting and hierarchical non-price 
structures is between the twin poles in an efficiency tradeoff. North here appears to extend this 
concept of markets and other ‘allocation systems’ (in North’s jargon) as a choice within a 
tradeoff structure to Polanyi’s distinction between price-making markets and other ‘transactional 
modes’ (in Polanyi’s). For North, the NIE version of the economics approach can be extended to 
viewing this type of ‘choice’ for one or another of these transactional modes as a response to 
transaction costs. So what determines the ‘choice’ of institutional arrangement? Here North 
draws directly on the neoinstitutional literature. While pointing out that the literature differs on 
the precise nature of the firm (a hierarchical structure, a legal fiction, a joint production 
arrangement), North agrees with all that it is a “wealth-maximizing institution which substitutes 
for price-making markets”. And so, North says, “it is reasonable to assume that the forces that 
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lead to the substitution of firms for markets today may also help us to explain the variety of forms 
of economic organization in past societies.”192  
In other words, the neoinstitutionalist choice theoretical approach can, by extension, 
explain the past ‘choice’ for nonmarket forms of allocation. If firms substitute for markets in 
order to maximize wealth, given the constraints necessitating a tradeoff between them, North 
seems to argue, why should not other allocation systems be just like firms and also choices 
within a wealth-maximizing tradeoff? It is reasonable to assume the forces of competition, 
motivation, or whatever may be involved are no different in past societies as in the present, 
insofar this type of institutional choice is concerned. Firms or other nonmarket allocation 
systems act in this framework as substitutes for price-making markets (leading to the ‘nonprice 
allocation’ referred to), which therefore serve as a benchmark. Even insofar as North concedes 
Polanyi’s empirical claim regarding price-making markets in premodern history, i.e. even in their 
absence, a wealth-maximizing motive is still assumed in the ‘choice’ between allocation systems. 
This view of the market-like functioning of allocation systems and their institutional 
embeddedness has serious consequences for North’s subsequent NIEH research programme. 
It is by this perspective that in the 1977 paper the kula trade becomes a “least-cost trading 
solution where no system of enforcing the terms of exchange between trading units exists”, i.e. in 
the absence of the contractarian state. Similarly, the ‘ports of trade’ Polanyi described as 
fundamental to administered trade in the classical and medieval worlds are re-described as risk-
reduction solutions underpinned by norms (informal institutions). Since prices did change from 
time to time (as Polanyi admitted), price making markets might even originate in such 
phenomena.193 In a similar way, ideology is measured in a later paper as the costs people are 
willing to incur rather than free ride off public goods (such as informal institutions), and the 
second category specifies “exchange in which kinship ties, friendship, and personal loyalty all 
play a part in constraining the behaviour of participants” in order to reduce transaction costs.194 
Precisely those aspects which for Polanyi’s anthropologically derived approach are the 
fundamental differences in motivation and meaning attached to economic behaviour in general 
here appear as special cases of a more general rule concerning exchange throughout history, 
without differentiation as to what kind of ‘markets’ are involved in this exchange. Although 
rejecting neoclassical Walrasian models as well as neoinstitutional efficiency approaches, 
North’s view is – perhaps malgré lui – at this more fundamental level not so far removed from 
the standard economic understanding of what ‘exchange’ is and how it is reducible to a gains-
oriented conception of individual action. (Indeed, North here also shares with standard economic 
theory the view that production is a special case of exchange, quite contrary to for example the 
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traditions of Marx, much economic anthropology, and indeed the approaches of classical and Old 
Institutional Economics.) 
A similar case can be made for North’s conception of ‘political markets’. This is a term he 
frequently favours to describe the structural characteristics of political institutions, organisations 
and processes independent of their specific historical content. Here, too, North is quite clear that 
he rejects modelling such processes as if the results must be some form of efficiency, whether 
defined in Pareto terms or in terms of favourability to economic growth. Indeed, North doubts 
rather understandably that we would know what a Pareto efficient governmental structure would 
mean195; and as regards economic growth as a measure of efficiency, he questions empirically 
whether in economic history political structures have often promoted it.  
The latter point is worth elaborating on, because in the process of commenting on this, 
North on certain occasions also clarifies what he thinks that type of efficiency in the ‘political 
market’ would look like (if we did have it): “Just as the efficiency of an economic market can be 
measured by the degree to which the competitive structure, through arbitrage and efficient 
information feedback, mimics or approximates the conditions of a zero-transaction-cost 
framework, so an efficient political market would be one in which constituents accurately 
evaluate the policies pursued by competing candidates in terms of the net effect on their well-
being; in which only legislation (or regulation) that maximized the aggregate income of the 
affected parties to the exchange would be enacted; and in which compensation to those adversely 
affected would ensure that no party was injured by the action. To achieve such results, 
constituents and legislators would need to possess true models that allowed them to accurately 
evaluate the gains and losses of alternative policies; legislators would vote their constituents' 
interests-that is, the vote of each legislator would be weighted by the net gains or losses of the 
constituents, and losers would be compensated so as to make the exchange worthwhile to them - 
all at a transaction cost that still resulted in the highest net aggregate gain.”196 
North of course rejects any implication that this is actually what happens in such ‘political 
markets’ in most countries today, let alone in premodern history. This is his argument against the 
neoclassical approach as well as the public choice school: they need to take the pervasiveness of 
transaction costs seriously, and allow for ideology in the sense that people may have different 
(more or less true) individual models of how the world and the political process operates. Both 
act as constraints on their action within and towards a political structure. Also, as an economic 
historian North never fails to point to the path dependent nature of such an institutional 
“matrix”.197 But as with the notion of efficient market exchange in the economic sphere, 
compared to substituting institutions, here too the notion of the efficient political market 
described above functions as a benchmark. In fact, occasionally it is even more explicit: for as 
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North states on one occasion, “the task as I see it is to structure the institutional framework so as 
to approximate this ideal model.”198  
We can find ample proof of an equivalent conception in all the stages of North’s NIEH 
project, even up to the most recent theory. UPEC virtually opens with the observation that 
“various kinds of markets (political as well as economic) have different margins at which 
competition can be played out, the consequence of the structure we impose will be to determine 
whether the competitive structure induces increasing economic efficiency or stagnation”.199 This 
particular formulation also recalls North’s argument for the incremental nature of institutional 
change as pursued by individual ‘political entrepreneurs’ acting in their own interests: they 
operate ‘on some margin’, implying shifts in the relative (shadow) ‘prices’ in a political or 
institutional ‘market’. “The outcome is a mixture of both economic and political decisions that in 
the aggregate affect the performance in individual political and economic markets as well as 
determine the direction of the economy as a whole.”200  
Note that this market benchmark, so to speak, determining the way North speaks about 
political and economic behaviour and processes operates for him independently of motive: “It is 
something else again exactly what the intentions of the players are. The overall direction of 
economic change will reflect the aggregate of choices made by political and economic 
entrepreneurs with widely diverse objectives, most of them not concerned with the consequences 
for overall performance.”201 These ‘entrepreneurs’ need not have economic performance at the 
macroeconomic level in mind. Rather more likely, North seems to suggest, their aim is “lining 
the pockets of the players”.202 But insofar as these actions – constrained by the usual mental 
bounds - mirror the supply and demand (price and quantity) mechanisms of the market, they will 
have efficient consequences: “the Smithian result ensues”.203 If not, the implication goes, the 
institutional structure and/or property rights arrangement is inefficient and should be (or have 
been) altered. 
Political structures may often be inefficient and path dependent, individuals acting within 
them ideologically and institutionally constrained – even so, this does not make politics any 
different than any other market with high levels of transaction costs, and does not make the ideal 
efficient market, geared towards economic growth, any less relevant as a model for 
understanding and evaluating political formations. This point is essential to North’s market-like 
conception of institutional and political ‘matrices’ or ‘artifactual frameworks’: the same criteria 
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to evaluate them in terms of efficiency are the criteria used for understanding their function and 
historical ‘meaning’ for the purposes of explanation.  
The ‘Smithian result’ and the social contract 
As we have seen, in the more developed stages of his NIEH theory, North recurrently makes use 
of the concept of the ‘Smithian result’ (or equivalent phrases). This term serves him as 
shorthand, it seems, to describe the efficiency and coordination results one can expect from well-
functioning – that is to say, institutionally well-supported – modern markets, of the kind whose 
internal functioning (‘laws of supply and demand’) is according to both North and Polanyi best 
described by standard neoclassical models. This concept requires further examination if we are to 
understand North’s market theory. What is this result, and what does Adam Smith have to do 
with it? 
In the conclusion of section 1 of UPEC, we are told that “when economic markets are so 
structured that the players compete via price and quality rather than at non-productive margins 
then the Smithian result ensues.”204 This seems to capture a rather more neoinstitutional insight, 
one that has affinities with the public choice literature: namely the trade-off not so much between 
markets and hierarchies, as between rent-seeking through non-market means and the pursuit of 
marginal advantages within the market. In the most classical models, such advantages come 
about through technological innovation improving productivity and thereby giving the innovator 
(temporarily) a competitive edge, permitting the obtaining of super-normal returns. But in the 
same work we are told more about the ‘Smithian result’ than this rather conventional economic 
observation. For Smith’s result, North makes clear, is a special case implied by neoclassical 
theory. For this reason, in the more general case – described by his own NIE-based approach – 
the result does not obtain, although at all times, as mentioned above, for North it would be ideal 
if it did obtain.  
North makes this explicit when a little later in UPEC he points to a number of problems 
with the neoclassical model that reduces it, and the Smithian result with it, to this special case 
status. There are four such problems: the “movement from personal to impersonal exchange” (a 
redescription of Polanyian embeddedness and disembedding, one is tempted to think) is 
necessary to obtain the Smithian result. This requires “fundamental rethinking at odds with our 
genetic heritage”, namely by shifting from small group cooperation to large group 
noncooperative coordination (more on this in the following chapters). What one needs is 
therefore for markets to become general and large in scale, so that the necessary ‘impersonality’ 
is the result. Secondly, “Adam Smith’s specialization and division of labor— the necessary 
condition for achieving such markets—is really specialization of knowledge”. This, North 
argues, cannot be done by a “price system” alone, and requires institutional support to coordinate 
and achieve public goods. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, there is a direct relationship 
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between market competition and the ‘Smithian result’. And this is not easy: for “all well-
functioning factor and product markets must be structured to provide incentives for the players to 
compete at those margins, and those margins alone, that induce growing productivity. Only then 
do we realize Smith’s beneficent result. Moreover, in a dynamic world with changing 
technology, information costs, and politics there is nothing automatic about the structure 
changing in response to these changing parameters to continue to produce efficient markets.” 
Fourthly, achieving all this requires strong political support, perhaps even initiative, and this in 
turn demands political institutions strong enough to generate and sustain public goods, but weak 
enough not to interfere with market efficiency or individual property rights.205 
What we are told about the ‘Smithian’ view of markets is then this: that with his name is 
associated a “beneficent result”, the nature of which is not stated, if and only if markets are 
structured in a competitive way such that they foster productivity increases. Such productivity 
increases are meant here presumably as opposed to rent-seeking, as indicated in the previous 
mention of Smith; the latter forms one of the main subjects of his subsequent book with John 
Wallis and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders. But this beneficent result is not just a 
matter of channelling competition through markets, but also of having as general a market 
structure as possible: only by politically and institutionally providing for scale and scope in 
market exchange does one achieve “the potential envisioned by Adam Smith when he viewed the 
wealth of nations as being a function of the size of markets”.206 Finally, towards the end of the 
work we are told that one additional problem for achieving Smith’s result is the Hayekian 
problem of ignorance: people do not sufficiently realize the correctness of this Smithian analysis 
of markets, and this prevents a structuring of political and economic institutions favourable to it. 
As North suggests, “It is more than two hundred years since Adam Smith explained the 
underlying sources of the wealth of nations but the extent to which such views are embedded in 
the decision-making process of those shaping political/economic change is problematic… Adam 
Smith’s wealth of nations was a function of specialization and division of labor. But the logic of 
specialization and division of labor implies a world in which individuals know a great deal about 
their specialty but in consequence know less about the rest of their world. Hayek emphasized the 
crucial additional point that in consequence individuals can have only a very imperfect 
understanding of the overall character of the political/economic system.”207 
Although on other occasions North does refer more explicitly to Adam Smith’s actual 
writings on the 18th century commercial economy208, the strong impression here generated is that 
Smith is not really invoked as an economic thinker, but rather as a shorthand for a particular 
model of the capitalist market. Smith stands for the belief that competitive and well-structured 
markets are ultimately both beneficial in economic terms and have the capacity to coordinate 
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individual actions and desires in a society large enough that most interactions are impersonal and 
noncooperative. This latter aspect, the need for coordination under noncooperative conditions is 
also, on my reading, the context of North’s many references to game theory and the ‘players’ of 
the ‘game’, something I will discuss in more detail in chapter 3. Significant is here to note that 
North simply uses Smith to defend an assumption about the overall desirability of competitive 
markets, but to also point to the difficulties of achieving and sustaining such markets at the level 
of institutional and political support. Using Smith to make the neoclassical perfect competition 
argument a special case of a more general – and considerably less optimistic – framework allows 
North to take the desirability and efficiency of classical competitive markets for granted, and to 
shift the subject of contention to a deeper level ‘beneath’ the market, namely the ‘artifactual 
structure’. 
One may wonder how much this view really has to do with Adam Smith’s own work; 
indeed North seems singularly unconcerned with this problem, despite the extensive literature on 
the complexities of Smith’s writings and the degree to which the view of Smith as the founder of 
‘free market economics’ is a misrepresentation.209 Why would North do this? One may perhaps 
only be able to give a speculative answer to this, and the why may be less important than the role 
this ‘Smithian result’ plays in his overall argument. Even so, I will introduce a to my mind 
plausible explanation here, one which I will explore further in discussing other major themes in 
North’s work as well. My suspicion is that this use of Smith serves a triple purpose:  
1) in that ‘Smith’ stands for the way markets can turn coordination problems into mutually 
beneficial solutions, an attribution that not coincidentally has a pedigree in game 
theoretical approaches in economic and public choice theory210;  
2) that ‘Smith’ stands for the ability of markets to promote the division of labour, distribute 
scarce knowledge, increase productivity, and other economic behaviour that is beneficial 
for economic growth and thereby for general well-being (this is clear from North’s 
references to the ‘wealth of nations’);  
3) that Smith’s ‘two faces’, i.e. his emphasis on the way markets enable cooperative 
solutions to strategic games as well as his interest in their background in personal 
sympathy and moral values, represent each of the two aspects of North’s own approach to 
markets, namely the special case described by neoclassical theory and the general case 
for which the emphasis must be on social institutions (norms and values as rules of the 
game). In both cases, Smith can be said to stand for the suggestion that society works best 
when both the market itself is relatively free, competitive, and impersonal, and when the 
normative institutional order is oriented towards market exchange.211 
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Not all of this is explicit in North’s own writings in this way. The references above are to 
authors in the public choice and economic theory tradition close to his own, but that does not 
mean we can simply conflate them; rather, they may serve to provide us with an idea of how to 
clarify this aspect of North’s work. This is therefore emphatically an interpretation of why North 
should seek to use this notion of the ‘Smithian result’ in this way, without much clarification or 
justification in his works. But as mentioned, the equation of Smith to the wealth generating and 
cooperation-enabling abilities of markets certainly is explicit. North uses for this the claim that 
institutions do, or should, serve ‘capturing the gains from trade’. For example in IICEP, we are 
straightforwardly told that “the central focus is on the problem of human cooperation - 
specifically the cooperation that permits economies to capture the gains from trade that were the 
key to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. The evolution of institutions that create an hospitable 
environment for cooperative solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth.”212  
That trade has such gains, and that they can be captured by institutional arrangements that 
allow an approximation of competitive, open and non-rent-seeking markets is taken as given. In 
the background of such an assumption, I think, is North’s commitment to what one might call a 
classical or ordoliberal perspective on society, something which comes to the fore in his 
contractarian approach to the formation of institutions. I will elaborate on both in the next 
chapter; but suffice here to say that North has made little secret of his fundamental political 
sympathy with the classical liberal tradition.213 Partially this is exemplified by his effusive praise 
(though not without criticism) of Friedrich Hayek, partially it becomes clear through his own 
description of his trajectory in economic thought: moving from Marxism through neoclassical 
economics to an interest in what makes efficient markets possible. Since he abandoned Marxism, 
his work has throughout been characterized by the search for the right way of providing an 
effective but limited government, competitive markets, strong individual rights, and a tendency 
to explain institutional orders as emerging out of organically formed social contracts.214 One may 
also point, as some have done, to “his status as Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution at 
Stanford University [and] his participation in activities with the Cato Institute”.215 
North himself makes his classical liberal perspective on freedom in the market more clear 
when, in an essay in National Review on the problems with ever-expanding government tasks, he 
concludes: “From my perspective, individual liberty is inextricably entwined with the options—
the alternatives—available to individuals in a society. By this definition individual liberty has 
been seriously eroded. The choices of occupations, the decision to hire, fire, or promote 
employees, the exploitation of natural resources, the establishment of new enterprises, the 
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determination of quality standards for products, the disposition of one’s earnings all are 
increasingly more circumscribed than in the past…What have we obtained in return—greater 
economic security for individuals, a more desirable distribution of income, the reduction of 
environmental deterioration? Aside from the difficulty of agreeing about what is a desirable 
distribution of income, the assessment of these benefits (particularly as compared to hypothetical 
alternatives) would differ widely. I am somewhat sceptical about our successes in these 
directions. Yet obviously, we have experienced some degree of success. But the cost in terms of 
my definition of individual liberty has been substantial.”216 
To point to this context is to give a plausible political explanation of why for North the 
emphasis should be shifted from the given desideratum of competitive markets and small 
governments to the institutional context that makes it possible. On my argument, it is this role 
that is played at the various levels outlined above by the references to the ‘Smithian result’. To 
say that North’s politics have classical liberal influences is not to reduce his theory to his 
political views, or to say that it stands or falls with it; nor is it to simple-mindedly accuse North 
of being a laissez faire enthusiast in the style of those pseudo-‘Smithians’ associated with the 
Adam Smith Institute and similar bodies. For North, as for the actual Adam Smith, the 
institutional-normative context of markets is at least as important for what markets do as the 
degree of laissez faire.  
Even so, the ‘Smithian’ framework – whether actually to do with Smith or not - provides 
for a remarkably different idea about markets than Polanyi’s careful distinctions between 
markets, trade, and money, and between price-making and non-price-making markets, despite 
North’s willingness (in 1977) to concede the merits of Polanyi’s approach for understanding the 
premodern economy. Smith therefore stands, one suspects, not just for an analytical assumption, 
but also for a normative criterion: the desideratum of modern, impersonal, competitive market 
exchange, along the lines of the models of the neoclassical colleagues North otherwise 
excoriates. If he disagrees with his colleagues at the analytical level, he certainly disagrees with 
them less than with Polanyi when it comes to the desirability of competitive market exchange as 
the primary allocation system – provided one gets the institutions right. 
Heroic opportunists and as-if markets: The critical reception of Douglass North’s market 
theory 
For some, this approach of North’s has been one of the sources of the strength and viability of 
North’s NIEH research programme. As I have mentioned, the secondary literature on North 
frequently places him in the context of NIE theory as a whole, or even in the wider context of 
institutionalist economics as such. North’s interest in the interaction between individual and 
institution-as-rule, and his appreciation of the significance of normative and social conceptions 
and cohesions for that interaction, form a contrast to the approach of Coase, Williamson, and 
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fellow neoinstitutionalists for which North’s work is often valued. The partial convergence, but 
also remaining differences, between North’s approach and the concerns of the OIE (even as far 
back as the German Historical School) is also a frequent subject of discussion in the literature.217 
Not all of this literature properly separates North’s later work - focused as it is on bounded 
rationality, ideology, cultural evolution, and problems of cooperation - from his former 
efficiency-based model of institutions. Some of it predates his latest, most sophisticated and 
ambitious publications.218 But among the literature that engages with North’s developed NIEH 
theory comparatively in this way, only a few works stand out in their discussion of North’s 
theory of historical markets in the context of this work’s anthropological and philosophical 
concerns. I will here discuss and evaluate a few of these contributions, before giving an 
assessment of the problems with North’s market-centric perspective on history. In closing, I will 
comment briefly on the suggestive role of market rhetoric in North’s work. 
In separate publications, Claude Didry and Caroline Vincensini as well as Don Kanel have 
observed the importance of North’s ‘Polanyian moment’ for his market theory.219 Indeed, the 
former suggest to some extent that North’s Polanyian engagement differentiates him from the 
other New or neo-institutionalists on precisely this point: the nature and historical context of 
market exchange.220 What is striking is that for both these commentators, among the very few to 
have noted the importance of Polanyi’s substantivist (anthropological) institutionalism for North, 
the latter’s work is seen in some sense as a continuation or extension of the former’s approach. 
The reason for this is that they identify Polanyi’s challenge as the significance of the market/non-
market distinction, one that North has clearly taken up. 221 In this, North’s approach is rightly 
identified by these authors as opposed to the markets/hierarchies distinction of Williamsonian 
neoinstitutionalism and the neglect of institutions in neoclassical economic theory. As Didry and 
Vincensini put it in very Polanyian terms (though referring to what I have called 
neoinstitutionalism): “’new institutionalism’ ignores this challenge by sticking to the coexistence 
of two spheres, market and non-market, in economic activities, the latter referring to ‘social 
structures’ in which the economy is embedded.’”222 
 
These authors are clear that for them, North’s market theory is a clear improvement over 
those of his neoinstitutionalist and neoclassical rivals, especially insofar as North has accepted 
Polanyi’s challenge, and much of Polanyi’s framework for thinking about markets besides. Kanel 
defines North’s market theory as follows: “transaction costs… prevent availability of [public 
goods] through market transactions, and a non-market way of making [them] available is a better 
allocation of resources, but only if social pressure and an internalized sense of honorable 
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behavior keeps free riders in line”.223 He subsequently states his agreement with the usefulness 
(suitably adapted) of this theory for historical explanation. For Didry and Vincensini, North’s 
cue from Polanyi allows him to make “institutions as explanatory factors of historical dynamics 
by going beyond the opposition between market and non market dimensions of the economy”, 
clearly a desideratum.224 
I use these examples not because these authors have been particularly influential in the 
secondary literature on North, but because they clearly illustrate how even those who have 
observed the importance of Polanyi’s challenge for North, and the way North has taken up 
Polanyian ideas about markets and historical differentiation, still judge the former’s NIEH 
approach primarily by comparison with the main alternatives for whom institutions are not such 
a central variable. Although these works stand out for their focus on the Polanyian challenge, this 
means of evaluating North’s theory is fairly representative for the secondary literature on the 
whole. It tends to emphasize, for good reason, the advantages of North’s approach over the 
Williamsonian or the neoclassical one for understanding embeddedness and ‘vectors of historical 
comparativity’, as Didry and Vincensini put it.  
The question to what extent North’s market theory in the NIEH takes Polanyi’s arguments 
seriously and has a good answer to the latter’s critique of the ‘economistic fallacy’, including his 
substantivist perspective on markets and market exchange, threatens to be overshadowed by this 
excessive focus on less institutional economists. Similarly, this line of argument tends not to ask 
to what extent North’s virtues are also his defects: that is, whether in situating himself between 
Polanyian ideas and neoinstitutionalist and neoclassical ideas does not lead to an incoherent 
approach to the embeddedness of institutions. Granovetter found a solution in sociological 
network analysis, but his theory did not engage with Polanyi and North’s primarily historical 
concern. Because the nature of markets in history is one of the central issues raised by Polanyi’s 
challenge, this makes the question whether North really can have it both ways – to have his 
Polanyi and his economic approach too - all the more urgent. 
North has also been criticized by a number of authors on his view of the market/non-
market relationship and his privileging of perfect competition in markets as a benchmark. Some 
of these are quite wide ranging and discuss also his historiography and views on individual 
rationality and motivation, subjects I will discuss in the following chapters. Here, I will 
concentrate on the problems identified in the literature with this idealized markets as benchmark 
approach. Particularly significant are the ambiguities in distinguishing competitive markets as 
interpretative heuristic and as normative ideal in North’s theory, and the problem of seeing 
institutions as substitutes or complements for markets even where markets (by North’s own 
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admission) have in premodern history often not been dominant or even significant allocation 
systems. 
One such critic is Daniel Ankarloo, who has written several critiques of the theory of 
markets in New Institutionalism, using both Williamson and North as cases of this approach. 
Ankarloo objects to this conception of markets at several levels. Firstly, he observes that there is 
an apparent inconsistency between the use of transaction costs as ‘shadow prices’, that is as the 
“underlying costs of exchange”, and individuals acting rationally, in however bounded a form of 
rationality, to reduce transaction costs and maximize gains.225 After all, if transaction costs are 
not already reflected in market prices, how are agents – boundedly rational or otherwise – to 
know what the transaction costs are and act according to standard choice theory in response to 
these relative costs? If this is allowed, then it is allowed that either individual rationality in 
market settings is not just a response to relative costs, or that if transaction costs do not appear in 
a market setting as prices, there is no way for agents to obtain information about such transaction 
costs. In either case, transaction costs cannot explain individual choices on their own. Only the 
institutions generated by transaction costs can, and therefore institutions rather than transaction 
costs should explain choice behaviour.226 In other words, in explaining institutions by transaction 
costs, North puts the cart before the horse, as far as Ankarloo is concerned.  
Secondly, Ankarloo has extensively criticized what he calls the ‘as-if economic history’ 
produced by the market theory of New Institutionalism. Although this critique has been aimed at 
a wide range of NIE and associated authors, including Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and 
even Morris Silver, it is also applied to North’s NIEH approach.227 With ‘as-if economic history’ 
Ankarloo seems to describe the effects of this market benchmark on the explanation of non-
market phenomena in North’s NIEH. If the market is the explanation for the existence and nature 
of the non-market, there is potentially a problem of assuming what needs to be proved. Ankarloo 
hones in on just this point. As he writes, “the market in North’s explanations remains the 
universal yardstick – the eternal reference point. But if we acknowledge that markets and the 
institutions of capitalism originate from somewhere, and evolve, we cannot assume them from 
the start. The market is not a universal yardstick for the comparison of institutions.”228 Yet he 
notes how North in his discussion of Polanyi’s challenge – a point of departure for Ankarloo’s 
argument as well – acknowledged the insignificance or absence of market exchange as allocation 
system in premodern history.  
The point of North’s approach is to show that the economics approach can explain such 
allocation systems, their institutional structure and the direction of change regardless. But, 
Ankarloo suggests, given the above problem North can only do this by assuming the very market 
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relations he has just denied: “This is due to the fact that institutions evolve as rational responses 
to relative price changes, by, albeit “constrained”, micro-rational economic men, in his model. 
But such calculation cannot explain the origins of the market. Calculating what to buy only 
makes sense when there already are commodities on the market to buy…  North fails to 
acknowledge the fact that the “free” individual – the micro-calculating consumer – is the result 
of capitalist markets, rather than the other way around. In North’s theory this individual has no 
history, and that is a critical limitation on his program of “history matters”. This problem of 
neoclassical theory is not solved at all. It is inherited.”229 
In several works, Ankarloo has argued that this incoherence of the NIEH originates in the 
NIE’s ambiguous position between what he terms ‘neoclassical orthodoxy’ and the desire for a 
more realistic theory of historical and present economics than that orthodoxy allows. In words 
applied to Oliver Williamson’s approach, but clearly intended to describe the NIE as a whole, he 
argues: “Williamson tries to solve these dilemmas by escaping from them. Markets are 
everywhere. Capitalist micro-rationality is a universal trait of human beings (even in the absence 
of prices and markets)… But granted the fact that capitalism — including capitalist markets and 
firms—is a result of history, the market too should be considered as a consequence, not the cause 
of historical development.”230 Hence, the economic history produced by the NIE approach is ‘as 
if’ economic history: it is history ‘as if’ the economy and politics were structured by markets 
throughout.231  
These two objections Ankarloo has formulated are, I believe, closely related. In both cases, 
the problem results from the market as benchmark, as means of explaining institutional structures 
even in the acknowledged absence of significant price-making markets. Polanyi’s point about 
premodern economic history had been precisely to point out that the absence of such price-
making markets required an institutional explanation of economic behaviour that could not be 
rooted in responses to relative prices. Therefore, institutions could only be explained in terms of 
the social and cultural characteristics of the societies in question, and behaviour in the economic 
sphere, i.e. the transactional modes, only explained in terms of those institutions. It is clear that 
the NIE approach must reject such an assumption, for its raison d’être is the ability of an 
economics approach to explain institutions and the choice between markets and nonmarket 
economic formations. Much of the neoinstitutionalist tradition has undertaken this in a somewhat 
Panglossian manner.232 For them, institutions must be efficient responses to transaction costs, or 
else private contracting would have supplanted them.233 This can be supported only by a 
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relatively strong idea of rationality and by Williamson’s explicit ahistoricity: the assumption, 
strongly assailed by Ankarloo among others, that “in the beginning there were markets”.234  
We must consider to what extent Ankarloo’s critique applies to North, at least in the later 
stages of North’s work. After all, North does not say that in the beginning there were markets, 
and he explicitly abandoned and rejected the efficiency model of institutions as unrealistic. (I 
postpone discussion of how compatible this is with North’s rationality assumptions to the next 
chapter.) Indeed, not all of Ankarloo’s critiques seem to me to hit the mark. In his paper on 
North, Ankarloo alleges that for him, too, “explanation of these phenomena [institutions and 
transaction costs] starts from orthodox equilibrium: a ‘zero transaction cost world’, where 
institutions do not exist.” Since it is not obvious how one would get to a world of institutions 
from a world of zero transaction costs, Ankarloo reasons one must then concede the existence of 
institutions independent of transaction costs, which defeats the purpose of the transaction cost 
argument.235 But this is to underestimate the historicity of North’s approach: for him, the 
benchmark of competitive markets is not an empirical starting point. Rather, it is a way of 
analytically moving from the neoinstitutional framework to a still more realistic and historical 
discussion: why nonmarket allocation systems often prevail and why institutions matter, indeed 
persist despite their inefficiency.  
We must allow that North does not claim that markets have always existed, nor that 
institutions need be efficient. Also, as the discussion of embeddedness and North’s response to 
Polanyi has shown, North’s NIEH approach does not concentrate on the markets vs hierarchies 
tradeoff, but rather on why markets often do not appear; or when they do, why they do not 
function according to the efficiency models of the neoinstitutionalists and neoclassical 
economists alike. In that sense, North is more of a critic of the Williamsonian view - at least 
implicitly and on occasion explicitly - than Ankarloo and other critics allow when they 
incorporate North in their sweeping critiques of the NIE in general. As I have argued before, it is 
not unproblematic to see North’s work as simply an application of existing NIE theory, 
especially as regards the later stages of the NIEH.  
However, Ankarloo’s general point about the potential incoherence of North’s still market-
centric approach is well-taken, in my view. It is perhaps possible to read his work as an inquiry 
into the origins of markets as well as nonmarket allocation systems. But in taking up Polanyi’s 
challenge he committed himself to providing an explanation of these that could rest on choice 
theoretical microfoundations and on explaining variation in institutions by differing transaction 
costs. North has certainly made serious attempts at estimating transaction costs empirically; but 
always in those Western economies already taken as benchmark to begin with, and there is no 
consensus on how they are to be measured.236 While some inspired by New Institutionalism have 
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sought to measure “non-market transaction costs”, this has generally come in the shape of studies 
measuring the costs of obtaining government licenses or of finding trading partners and the 
like.237 But these are relevant examples for the Williamsonian paradigm in studying the relative 
costs of competitive market exchange versus government action as substitute. The same applies 
for studies that have focused on the quality of institutions in contemporary societies for 
achieving growth.238 As Ning Wang points out, generally “what is measured or indexed in these 
studies is not transaction costs per se, but the cost of institutional inefficiency or poor 
governance.”239 
These studies, whatever their value, do not address the problem of the meaning or 
measurement of such ‘non-market transaction costs’ in societies where private contracting in 
response to relative prices are not the dominant allocation system, which is North’s ‘challenge’. 
This problem is conceptual: it is not obvious how one could say what the transaction costs in a 
given historical economy are except insofar as individuals are attempting to contract through 
markets and prices are able to adjust to reflect the relevant costs. Such phenomena certainly have 
existed in economic history, and the theory of transaction costs may explain relevant aspects of 
such markets. North for example rightly points to the importance of standardized weights and 
measures for reducing costs of transacting in formalized market-places.240 Equally, it may be 
possible to interpret the effect of informal institutions (norms, bonds of trust, and their in-group 
enforcement) in trading settings as reducing transaction costs and thereby making e.g. caravan 
trade or other long-distance trading operations in premodern settings easier.241 
It is quite another thing, however, to explain nonmarket behavior by these means, 
especially in societies where, by North’s own admission, most economic transactions do not take 
place by the price-sensitive exchange of privately owned commodities. It is telling that the wider 
NIE-inspired discussion of transaction costs in empirical studies has virtually exclusively 
focused on cases of private trade for gain. This suggests Ankarloo’s critique points to a serious 
weakness in the analysis. Even insofar as it is possible to identify the function of institutions in 
such a market setting as reducing transaction costs in some form, or as expressing the interests of 
particular powerful agents in maintaining higher transaction costs to extract rents – this as 
regards both economic and ‘political markets’- this functionalist explanation is not generalizable. 
Where such individual contracting is not already operative in a way sufficiently analogous to the 
‘benchmark’ case of perfect markets, no functional explanation in terms of transaction costs is 
possible. The kula trade cannot, pace North, be explained as a least cost trading solution because 
it first must be demonstrated that it is, in fact, a ‘trading solution’, and secondly, there must be a 
measure of the transaction costs operative in the situation that can explain the kula trade and 
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explain why precisely this ‘solution’ was found rather than another. It is not obvious that North’s 
approach is capable of either. 
This is where North’s own ambiguous position between methodologies causes difficulties 
for his theory. North’s dismissal of Williamsonian efficiency explanations is effectively a 
dismissal of a relatively powerful functionalist explanatory method that rational choice 
efficiency assumptions provide. Williamson can assume that any given institution must be 
efficient for the market in some way, and therefore try to investigate what aspects of market 
failure would make this given institution ‘necessary’ from that viewpoint. One can doubt how 
plausible such explanations are, but the functionalist mode allows the model to be at least fully 
determined: there is always a definitive explanation for why an institution exists. In North’s case, 
this efficiency assumption is rejected. Moreover, North admits that ideology affects the 
formation of institutions, that path dependence can lock in institutional patterns across time, and 
that markets are often minimal or absent.  
Conclusion 
Given these concessions, North’s view of markets and institutions is certainly more realistic and 
historical than Williamson’s approach. But it also means that he has very little left by which he 
can give any determinate explanation of a given institutional framework, unless he assumes that 
the situation is functionally analogous to self-regarding rationality in a setting of market 
exchange. This explains perhaps his insistence on concepts like ‘political markets’. But North 
cannot demonstrate that the kula trade, or the medieval Catholic church, or the Kwakiutl potlatch 
are functionally equivalent in this way, because there are no prices that could reflect transaction 
costs and he may not assume that these institutions are efficient in market terms. He can 
therefore only assume this functional equivalence; and this despite having denied himself the 
assumptions of institutional efficiency and the appropriate model of individual rationality he 
needs to make this assumption work. Therefore while North allows that markets and other 
allocation systems are embedded in institutional frameworks, he cannot fully carry through this 
idea. If he did so, he would have to abandon the notion that transaction costs can explain 
institutions, and to do so would be to give up on the NIE framework of his theory. He must either 
concede too much to Polanyi and other primitivist (and anthropological) institutionalisms and 
give up on the idea that transaction cost economics can explain the ‘choice’ between market and 
nonmarket institutions, political or economic. Or he must concede too much to the “economics 
approach”, and give up the attempt to provide a theory of institutions and historical change that 
is able to explain premodern economic formations in a realistic fashion. This is the dilemma 
North’s NIEH faces, at least as far as its theory of markets and other allocation systems is 
concerned. 
To wrap up, let me return to the problem I have identified in North’s inconsistent 
functionalism about markets and transaction costs. That North’s theory needs some type of 
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functional explanation also has consequences for the coherence of his assumptions at other 
levels. Firstly, it needs to be seen how the explanation of individual behavior in terms of 
intentionality, i.e. beliefs and desires, can be reconciled with such a model absent certain 
assumptions about rationality and efficiency. North is keen to emphasize the boundedness of 
rationality as well as the importance of ideology and other mental content for the behavior of 
individuals towards and within institutions. Moreover, his view of rationality underwrites the 
problem of cooperation that the ‘choice’ between markets and other allocation systems is 
supposed to solve. In the next chapter I will discuss to what extent North’s theory is coherent at 




Chapter 3: Rationality, Social Contract, and Cooperation in North’s 
NIEH 
Introduction: cooperation and its constraints 
In this chapter, I will examine the interaction between the behavioural (choice) foundations of 
North’s NIEH theory and the role of ideology, cognition, social learning, and other foundations 
for informal institutions within it. Since in this domain in particular North’s distancing from 
neoclassical economics is most rhetorically marked, and yet at the same time most incomplete, 
this requires in part a review of the well-established debate around rationality and rational choice 
approaches in social theory. Considerations of space and coherence do not allow me to engage 
here in a full discussion of all aspects of the rationality assumptions common in mainstream 
economic theory and their problems, nor to fully explore the vast literature on free riding and the 
prisoner’s dilemma. Rather, I will try to focus on a few salient elements of the mental 
foundations of behaviour as depicted in North’s approach: (bounded) rationality, ideology, and 
cooperation. 
In the discussion of North’s approach to markets, I have only considered some aspects of 
these insofar as they relate to market theory: namely the contrast between Polanyi’s motivational 
approach and North’s ‘as if’ approach to market orientation. What makes North’s response 
problematic, I argued, was that while North wishes explicitly to acknowledge the importance of 
ideological and moral considerations in economic behaviour as much as ‘institutionalised’ 
behaviour in general, he does not draw Polanyi’s conclusion that if these matter, they should also 
matter for our interpretation of the economic phenomena themselves. Insofar as monetary 
exchange, markets, and trade are constituted by the behaviour of individuals, their ideological 
and mental motivations as well as representations involved in these economic activities should, 
Polanyi argued, affect both meaning and function of the economy in our model of a given 
society.242  
North, too, acknowledges the importance of ideology and gives moral, religious, and other 
considerations a central role in his theory in the appearance of informal rules; yet for him, 
ideology and moral norms are often claimed to be merely constraints on individual behaviour. 
Even where containment of violence, and questions of power and rent-seeking are involved, the 
fact remains that North assumes that “the forces that lead to the substitution of firms for markets 
today may also help us to explain the variety of forms of economic organization in past 
societies” and (implicitly at least) that therefore individual motivation is in this respect merely 
constrained, but not fundamentally changed, by the operation of morality and ideology. Indeed, 
here North appears to have recourse to a familiar economic argument from the rational choice 
literature: namely that although people may not historically consciously (motivationally) pursue 
the reduction of transaction costs, we can understand institutional formation and change as if 
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they do. As he acknowledges, “it is something else again exactly what the intentions of the 
players are. The overall direction of economic change will reflect the aggregate of choices made 
by political and economic entrepreneurs with widely diverse objectives, most of them not 
concerned with the consequences for overall performance”. But even with this caveat, his 
assumption remains that individuals act on institutional frameworks as ‘players’ of a given 
‘game’, in which they seek to “line their pockets”.243 Since these statements (appearing on the 
same page of UPEC) are not clearly reconciled, I must assume in line with North’s general ‘as if’ 
approach that this is intended as an instrumentalist approach to modelling such interactions, 
rather than a descriptive one. Even so, it is difficult to remove the impression of a fundamental 
contradiction. 
An important role is here played by this rhetoric of game theory, which requires 
consideration both in terms of the methodological implications of North’s use of it and in terms 
of its rhetorical significance. As I have indicated in the previous chapter, to my mind these 
methods are not neutral in their implications. Depending on how they are used and how they are 
justified - two aspects I will investigate in this chapter - particular concepts of rationality, 
including those modeled by game theoretical methods, have consequences for the explanatory 
role of individuals and of institutions alike. They affect these at two levels: at the level of the 
relationship of agents to institutions, and at the level of individual agency itself. In North’s 
treatment of these problems, it appears all the more that they cannot just be seen as modelling 
assumptions for the sake of tractability and simplification, but at least as much as part and parcel 
of what one might call the ‘pessimistic anthropology’ of much social contract theory.244  
In other words, to explore North’s shifting conceptions of rationality is also to explore his 
contractarian view of institutions and their role in achieving human cooperation, a central 
concept to much of his more recent work. For North, certain assumptions about gain-oriented 
motivation, the pervasiveness of violence, and the prevalence of prisoner’s dilemma type 
situations play a major role in his accounts of how institutions function: whether they do or do 
not overcome free riding, constrain violence, and (in his words) ‘achieve the Smithian result’. 
This aspect of his work I have highlighted already in the previous chapter, but it will prove 
important again in the present discussion. If the existence or nonexistence of this ‘Smithian 
result’ is the criterion for how well institutions enable cooperation in a particular historical 
society, one may expect this view to also affect North’s ideas about how individual rationality 
works and how it brings about particular institutional orders rather than others. We move 
therefore here to the most ‘micro-level’ analysis in North’s theory. His approach, or rather 
approaches, to rationality and ideology engender the interaction between individuals and 
institutions in his NIEH, and these in turn sustain the larger edifice in which institutions and their 
function for cooperation are part of a contractarian, market-oriented vision, such as described in 
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the previous chapter. Moreover, this meso-level in turn supports the macro-level evolutionary 
dynamic of human culture (artifactual frameworks) North identifies, which - although departing 
from our most basic cognitive capacities and limitations - provides a grand narrative explanation 
of recorded human history as the unfolding of greater or lesser levels of ‘adaptive efficiency’.  
 The purpose of this chapter is not to engage with these methodological concepts for their 
own sake. Indeed, the literature on rationality, the social contract, self-interest or even game 
theory (which is only implicitly referred to in North’s work) could fill many bookcases. Rather, 
in this chapter I want to engage more deeply with some of the presuppositions of North’s 
thinking about the classic economic and social problem of how individual agency can sustain 
large scale cooperation, and what role markets and institutions play in this process. I have said 
much about the latter, and will say more yet, but the question of cooperation and the formation of 
spontaneous order, and the individual rationality or lack thereof that determines the difficulties of 
approximating an optimal outcome in aggregating individual agency remains. North’s references 
to the ‘players’ of the ‘game’ or to the difficulties and desirability of achieving the ‘Smithian 
result’ are merely examples of how he conceives the relationship between individual agency, the 
mediating role of markets and institutions, and the desideratum of low-cost exchange. To make 
sense of this, we must have a – necessarily extremely brief - look at the context of the 
contractarian tradition in North.  
I will focus here first on the ‘spontaneous order’ tradition of Hayek and his idiosyncratic mixture 
of epistemology inspired by evolutionary theory and classical liberal politics, which I think has 
had considerable influence on North’s thinking on the above concepts. This may also serve as a 
framing device for more practically discussing this otherwise rather broad, even unbounded, 
range of problems in social theory as they appear throughout North’s work. In chapter 4 I will 
then return to this tradition, but concentrating on the evolutionary dimension in this Hayekian 
tradition. Subsequently, I will discuss how this tradition has expressed itself in economics in 
game theory and the debates about cooperation, rationality, and spontaneous order as they are 
interpreted through this form of rational choice analysis.  
In light of these discussions, I want to clarify what it means for North to refer to the ‘players of 
the game’ who are self-interested (‘lining their own pockets’), and why this creates a point of 
tension with his critique of neoclassical economics as based on rational choice theory. As 
discussed in chapter 1, North’s critique of neoclassical economics emphasizes in particular the 
importance of a substantive, non-probabilistic meaning of beliefs (or ‘ideology’) for a proper 
concept of rationality, something rational choice theory does not in his view comfortably 
accommodate. Yet his game theoretical language and his references to rational choice of 
institutions as a self-interested process would suggest otherwise. Since in standard choice theory 
as expressed in game theory rationality has a specific set of criteria, derived from the axiom of 
utility maximisation, North’s attempt to simultaneously use this rationality concept and critique 
it becomes a puzzle. I will then explore the difficulties of North’s use of ‘bounded rationality’ 
and – later in his oeuvre – cognitive science as solutions to this puzzle. 
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Spontaneous order, cooperation, and the classical liberal tradition 
In the classical liberal economic and sociological tradition, the concept of spontaneous order has 
long been important. Deriving from the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment in particular, such 
as Adam Smith (as invoked by North), but also David Hume and Adam Ferguson, the concept of 
spontaneous order suggests the aggregation of the actions of very many individuals in such a 
way that society does not become – as Hobbes suggested – a bellum omnium contra omnes, but 
that rather, for example in the generation of public goods, a cooperative order ensues in which 
the whole is more than merely the conflict between its parts. In the classical liberal interpretation 
of this approach, in particular in the tradition of Herbert Spencer and Friedrich Hayek, this idea 
is further specified. In this tradition, it is economic coordination through the market that enables 
cooperation, and to be precise, cooperation through the action of self-interested individuals. 
Already in the work of Bernard Mandeville and in Spencer the concept of ‘private vices, public 
benefits’ plays a foundational role in the analysis of spontaneous order.245 For Hayek, it was 
specifically the problem of limited information, implying the ubiquity of tacit and local 
knowledge, that made cooperation only possible through market coordination. As Peter Boettke 
notes on Hayek’s interpretation of the Smithian legacy: “The voluntary action of thousands of 
individuals, each pursuing their own interests, generates and utilizes economic information that 
is not available to any one individual or group of individuals in its totality… Smith’s case for 
economic liberty amounts to an argument and demonstration that individuals pursuing their self-
interest can, and will, produce a social order that is economically beneficial… It is this emphasis 
on the use of contextual knowledge that underlies the critical defense of the liberal order from 
Smith to Hayek”.246 
One operative word for this idea of mutual benefit, mediated by the market, is cooperation. This 
word is not always clearly defined in the relevant economic literature, and in any case can have a 
range of meanings. In game theory, it means the opposite of defection, in other words to choose 
that strategy which would be mutually welfare enhancing if jointly followed (say in a 2-player 
noncooperative game): the prisoner’s dilemma game revolves around the possibility that such a 
mutual cooperation may not be possible by following self-interested rationality.247 This does 
express the more general notion that ‘cooperation’ implies some form of mutual (economic) 
interaction such that it enhances welfare for both parties in traditional welfare economic terms. 
In this political economic tradition, cooperation then comes to have a very particular significance 
(and signification), one that leans on the contractarian pre-history of the Scottish Enlightenment 
and its liberal progeny itself. In the social contract political philosophy of the early modern age, 
the main problem was to consider how many different individuals could coordinate their 
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behaviour and interests in such a way as to generate a legitimate and (preferably) mutually 
beneficial form of government. While the answers varied considerably from one theorist to the 
other, the problem as such remained fairly stable: one could say as a question of how to make 
possible sufficient coordination (collective action) that a society, thus formed, could achieve 
cooperation, i.e. mutual welfare benefit. 
In this liberal contractarian tradition one can trace through Spencer and Hayek, then, we find two 
vehicles of such coordination: the free market, as seen above, and the sphere of social 
institutions. The latter coordinates the psychological or cultural propensities or norms of 
individuals in much the same way that the market, through the price mechanism, coordinates 
their local information (beliefs) and preferences. Institutions constitute the ‘order’ implied in 
spontaneous order, a social arrangement that can be more or less favourable to the operations of 
decentralized market exchange. As Boettke summarizes the Hayekian view: “The key question 
for the social theorist is how the various and diverse images of reality that individual minds 
develop could ever be coordinated to one another. The social institutions that arise through the 
voluntary association of thousands of individuals serve to guide individuals in the process of 
mutual accommodation.”248 Through the spontaneous formation of institutions, and through the 
process of market exchange, a spontaneous order – a form of collective cooperation – arises. Not 
coincidentally, this emphasis on order as the (desired) outcome of collective action, either as the 
form taken by cooperation or as the preconditions for it, is found also throughout Violence and 
Social Orders. Order as in safety from violence is a precondition; order in the sense of a (more or 
less) stable set of institutions with welfare-enhancing properties (relative to the Hobbesian state 
of nature) is the result. 
The difficulty with this perspective is the question of how desirable results should come about by 
means of coordination, and indeed whether this leads to desirable results at all. In the Spencer-
Mandeville tradition, the outcome of the process of spontaneous order is often depicted as 
optimizing, so that ours is the ‘best of all possible worlds’, or would be if we let the process do 
its work. In the Hayekian tradition, such optimization and efficiency is explicitly disavowed: for 
him, there was nothing about either coordination through the market nor through social 
institutions that necessitated any kind of optimality about the result, only the impossibility of 
improving on it by any form of pre-planned coordinating action, especially by the state.249 For 
David Ramsay Steele, this claim – particularly strong in Hayek’s work of the 1980s, such as 
Knowledge, Evolution, and Society entails a change in Hayek’s own relationship to the classical 
liberal tradition of spontaneous order: from a liberal claim that the resulting order would be one 
characterized by desirable traits of cooperation to the conservative claim that however 
undesirable the order, it simply is as it is and cannot be consciously improved upon.250  
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Although whether or not this entails a shift within Hayek’s own perspective is disputed, it is 
perhaps illustrative for Hayek’s influence on North that the latter has followed a somewhat 
similar trajectory: from the efficiency contractarian approach, where the medieval manor was as 
it was because it was optimal that way, to an explicit disclaiming of such optimality, preferring 
to see – as Hayek did – the process of institutional change as an often decidedly inefficient 
process. Like Hayek, he reorients the discussion away from the efficiency characteristics of a 
particular economic order to the evolution of institutional orders in general, where any optimality 
is at best local and temporal, but where the evolutionary characteristics of institutions and market 
exchange join together to form some spontaneous order, even if it is from the viewpoint of 
neoclassical economics a bad one. However, as Viktor Vanberg has noted for Hayek’s case, this 
leaves open the question of why it is that the evolution of institutions should be such that it 
favours cooperative outcomes, as the spontaneous order represented by the free market 
suggests.251 Hayek may have thought this outcome not ‘optimal’ in some strict sense, but 
certainly at least better than any other institutional order, for it is manifestly the case that many 
institutional orders have come into being that were not based (integrated, in Polanyi’s terms) on 
free market exchange. I will engage in chapter 4 with the question of how and whether an 
evolutionary account can save the Hayekian argument. 
North himself was quite explicit about the influence Hayek and his intellectual genealogy had on 
his own work. On one occasion, he declared Hayek to have been the “the greatest economist of 
the twentieth century, and by a long way” and even “if you look for people who really want to 
try and understand the world, Hayek came closer to that ideal than anybody who has ever 
lived.252 On one occasion, North discussed at greater length the contribution of Hayek to his own 
understanding of the process of economic change.253  His discussion of Hayek focuses in 
particular on how Hayek has helped ‘us’ understand how intentionality and institutions 
contribute to generating economic change as well as constraining such change within the 
boundaries of inherited belief and normative systems. Moreover, in this paper North himself 
suggests a union of Hayek’s insights with the ‘Smithian’ concept of expanding market exchange 
as driver of increases in productivity. This forms for him the basis of his approach to the study of 
economic change.254  
The main difference between North and Hayek is the former’s rejection of the idea of 
spontaneity in spontaneous order, at least insofar as this involves an a priori rejection of the 
possibility of social engineering of any kind. For North, we are rather condemned to social 
engineering because of our intentional engagement with our environment and each other, but we 
do – and here he has common ground with Hayek – very often fail to achieve what we aim for 
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when doing so.255 But besides this one mostly definitional objection, Hayek is clearly a major 
contributor to the shape of North’s most mature work. Indeed, Hayek’s ideas in The Sensory 
Order and elsewhere are also the foundation of North’s shift towards cognitive science and the 
centrality of how beliefs are formed, which frame the discussion in UPEC, arguably his most 
developed theoretical monograph. The layer of New Institutionalist economic analysis in terms 
of institutions and path dependence is, for North, “complementary to and in the spirit of his 
framework”.256 Ultimately, for North “our economic history can be rendered intelligible in a 
Hayekian framework”, joining an evolutionary approach to cognition and trial-and-error to the 
New Institutionalist conceptual toolset and the argument, shared by North and Hayek alike, that 
getting the institutions right is a question of fulfilling the promise of “Smith’s happy 
conclusion”.257 
That said, it is worth noting that for North, this has been an impetus to study precisely the 
problems of coordination, with an emphasis on the frequent failure of the ‘right’ combination of 
institutions and market exchange to come about. It is this that is the subject of the present 
chapter, postponing (as mentioned) the evolutionary-cognitive dimension to the next. That 
North’s theoretical inspiration, and indeed often (seemingly) normative standpoint regarding 
what form of institutionalised cooperation is most desirable from an economic point of view 
derives much from Hayek and this larger classical liberal contractarian tradition is beyond 
doubt.258  
But North’s comparative economic historical research gives it a decidedly more pessimistic cast. 
Partially this may be because much of economic history revolves around nonmarket forms of 
allocation and often very seemingly dysfunctional political institutional orders, as his discussion 
of Polanyi points out. But I suspect that his approach to economic rationality also has much to do 
with his pessimistic interpretation of the liberal contractarian tradition. As we have already seen, 
North’s rejection of the ‘efficiency approach’ to interpreting institutional change goes hand in 
hand with his ever more emphatic rejection of the rationality criteria he attributes to neoclassical 
economics, preferring instead the bounded rationality approach of Herbert Simon. In a Hayekian 
vein, North excoriates the unrealistic nature of assuming optimizing forms of rationality and 
complete information. But the more he does so, the more restrained individual reason, the more 
difficult it becomes to see how a spontaneous order emerging from such reason could have the 
desirable properties associated with cooperation that the Smithian tradition (as interpreted by 
North) suggests. This applies in particular when such reason is assumed to be self-interested.  
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Here the prisoner’s dilemma and its implications become significant, especially in light of 
North’s invocations of self-interested players of a game seeking to line their pockets as an 
explanation of institutional change. In a nutshell, the rational pursuit of self-interest by different 
‘players’ of the ‘game’, the prisoner’s dilemma implies, can lead to outcomes that are suboptimal 
from the point of view of all players involved.259 The spontaneous pursuit of self-interested 
action therefore can have decidedly undesirable outcomes, which is a major challenge to the 
more ‘Panglossian’ version of the spontaneous order tradition. As Vanberg notes, the problem 
here is that this tradition needs to distinguish between coordination problems, which are self-
enforcing once individuals can be brought together to pursue collective action, and those kinds of 
problems, exemplified by the prisoner’s dilemma, where “there is no ‘natural’ harmony between 
constitutional and action interests, even if there is perfect agreement on the former between all 
members of the community”. 260  
That is to say, the pursuit of self-interest may, when sufficiently coordinated, lead to positive 
cooperation in the design of social institutions (as rules or norms) and be sustainable because of 
mutual self-interest; but this does not guarantee that the pursuit of self-interest within such an 
order necessarily has this property. A classic example is the economic observation that while 
cooperation in the form of exchange may be mutually profitable to both parties, it is to greater 
individual advantage of each party to steal from and at the expense of the other. The result of 
rational self-interest in this case would be mutual theft, mutual non-cooperation, leading to the 
least desirable outcome in welfare terms.261 It would seem then that insofar prisoner’s dilemma 
type situations may be ubiquitous, rather than coordination problems, this poses a problem for 
the classical liberal emphasis on the mutual benefits of rational self-interest. The spontaneous 
emergence of institutions or conventions to solve this problem cannot be assumed, as in the 
coordination problem case, because the mutually rational strategy in a prisoner’s dilemma is 
mutual defection, and no coordination can take place (ex hypothesi).  
The question is then under what conditions there may be compensating factors that can realign 
incentives, provide additional incentives, or make cooperation otherwise more likely. This 
problem, relevant for the prisoner’s dilemma, speaks to the evolution of reciprocity and its role 
in the formation of institutions, and to the evolutionary argument about spontaneous order more 
generally, as discussed in chapter 4. But another question is under what conditions coordination 
can take place in the first (i.e. coordination) type of problem, for which ‘free’ market exchange 
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is, in the classical liberal political economy of Hayek, North, and indeed Vanberg himself262, an 
exemplary case. For North, moreover, one cannot ultimately expect the decentralized free market 
to do the work of coordinating so as to make the ‘Smithian’ cooperative result possible if one 
does not have the proper institutional structure. This proper structure therefore needs to come 
about, not only despite coordination problems, but also despite prisoner’s dilemma type 
situations.  
We can therefore read North as putting on the research agenda the integration of the two into a 
single account of how institutions and the state (or ‘elites’) mediate between both sets of 
problems. To do this, he must sustain a flexible and in a sense ‘pessimistic’ account of the limits 
to individual rationality and the ‘suboptimality’ or ‘inefficiency’ of many real-life historical 
orders, while simultaneously defending an account of market exchange in such a context that 
legitimates the assumption that, given the ‘right’ institutional order, in this kind of situation the 
problem will be mainly of the coordination type, and not of the prisoner’s dilemma type. 
Cooperation in the normative sense depends then on the evolution and ‘spontaneous’ emergence 
of the right norms and rules (as well as psychological states such as trust and the right beliefs), 
such that they become self-enforcing; where ‘right’ is defined as being favourable to the 
‘Smithian’ process of mutual advantage through market exchange. The payoffs in the prisoner’s 
dilemma game will be changed so that the results are a coordination problem, one for which the 
Hayekian tradition of markets and spontaneous traditions has already established a solution. In 
short, in this tradition one can say the cooperative outcome first and foremost is the ‘Smithian 
result’.263  
Game theory, the social contract, and the context of North’s NIEH 
Before moving on to the specifics of North’s arguments on these themes, such as his discussions 
of ideology and cognition, it is necessary to develop the argument a little further. This may take 
us slightly away from North’s work, but it helps if we can understand how the two traditions 
leading up to that oeuvre – the classical liberal tradition of Smith and the (often more 
pessimistic) social contract tradition of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, both already united in some 
fashion in his inspiration, Hayek – are joined specifically in the postwar economic theories and 
ideas that North’s arguments respond to. I have mentioned previously public choice theory and 
the more neoinstitutionalist types of New Institutionalist Economics as the immediate context of 
North’s writing, and authors in these schools are the most common reference points in North’s 
own discussions, especially those more oriented towards economic theory rather than historical 
analysis. So to understand North better, and to grasp the meaning of his emphasis on ideology’s 
independent role or his reliance on terms like ‘players of the game’ when theorising the 
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relationship between individuals and institutional orders, I think a bit more context is helpful for 
my subsequent argument.  
Why games? Why should coordination and prisoner’s dilemma problems matter so much? It is 
undeniable that North uses virtually no formalized game theory. And yet the language of game 
theory, and the emphasis on how difficult it is to achieve cooperation through rational behaviour, 
indeed comments on how difficult rationality as a concept is, are omnipresent in his work. As 
Lee Cronk explains, the kind of economic problems dealt with in the tradition of Hayek are the 
problems of spontaneous order, and this means the “largely unintended results of the actions of 
individuals”.264 Or as Carl Menger, not only a founder of marginalist economics but also a major 
figure in the study of institutions and spontaneous order in his own right, put it: “how can it be 
that institutions which serve the common welfare… come into being without a common will 
directed towards establishing them? (…) The unintended result of innumerable efforts of 
economic subjects pursuing individual interests”.265 Of course, the state, or some central planner, 
or some other formal authority can establish rules, but this would not answer the question how 
such authorities come into being themselves, nor how they can succeed in creating welfare 
enhancing institutions.  
Underlying this question is the ‘pessimistic anthropology’ I have referred to before: an 
anthropology because, as Cronk has argued, the problem of relating individual values, beliefs, 
and reasons to the emergence of symbolic, economic, or institutional patterns is one that has 
immediate bearing on the domain of anthropology (even if anthropologists have not always 
recognized it in those terms); pessimistic, because North’s contractarian approach departs from a 
pessimistic idea about human (bounded) rationality in a ‘state of nature’, and because of his 
interpretation of most historical societies as generally suboptimal, even dysfunctional, path 
dependent local equilibria, emerging from the interaction of such blinkered individuals. North is 
much more inclined than Menger or Smith to ask why cooperation does not (optimally) come 
about rather than why it does, and is pessimistic both in the sense of expecting improvements to 
be difficult and in the sense of relying on a pessimistic idea of human nature. The latter 
constitutes a mixture of rational self-interest constrained by ignorance and ideology and norm 
following behaviour in an unstable synthesis, as discussed further below. 
So this is one of the main questions pursued in North’s NIEH, often in a more pessimistic form 
than Menger’s presentation: how it can be that such institutions often do not come about, or only 
suboptimally. And it is a question that has been extensively discussed in the theoretical schools 
or traditions in the immediate backdrop of North’s work, such as public choice theory and 
various NIE theories. Since the question is ultimately concerned with the welfare effects, or 
payoffs, of the strategic (self-interested) action of individual agents in particular institutional 
settings, game theory has been one of the main tools used in exploring such problems. That the 
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problems of social contract theory are very similar – how can order come about from the state of 
nature? – and also representable as strategic action in particular institutional settings, including a 
Hobbesian setting where no prior institutions or conventions exist, makes attempts at unification 
of these problems via game theory tempting. Combined with some strong economic theory, such 
as the New Institutionalism, it permits exploration of all sorts of variants of ‘invisible hand’ 
explanation, including of the state itself.266 I think North’s use of the terminology, and his 
explorations of rationality and beliefs should be seen in this light.  
To understand how these questions then came to be formulated in the NIE paradigm, a 
comparison with the work of Andrew Schotter may be helpful. Next to North and Williamson, 
Schotter is arguably one of the most influential NIE theorists – be it in a decidedly 
neoinstitutional vein – and he has extensively relied on game theory to develop the NIE 
argument, particularly in his 1981 book The Economic Theory of Social Institutions.267 Schotter’s 
approach is somewhat different from North’s: his definition of institutions revolves around social 
conventions as the outcome of rule-based action, not the rules themselves, and he sees 
institutions primarily as information conveying mechanisms in the style of Hayek, a claim North 
does not defend explicitly.268 Moreover, for Schotter the primary assumption is a rationality 
assumption that North precisely abandoned at around the same time: the notion that institutions 
will come into being as solutions to market failures in a ‘functionalist’ way such that they can be 
fully explained as – possibly path dependent – outcomes of strategic self-interested action in 
such a situation of market failure. In Schotter’s approach, the individual is a “selfish, maximizing 
agent who is capable of coordinated social action”.269 This leaves out some of the problems of 
the content of ideology and ‘worldviews’ that North later became concerned with, as discussed 
below.  
But more than differences, their approaches have remarkable and for our purposes useful 
commonalities. Schotter views institutions as results of an evolutionary ‘survival of the fittest’ 
process that enables social order270; they are subject to path dependence271; they should be 
understood as a social contract emerging from strategic action in an (imagined) state of nature272; 
they are the product of spontaneous order or of political bargaining (though Schotter’s book 
concerns only the former)273; and finally, they are a rich and varied, indeed unpredictable 
although reverse engineerable, substitute for market exchange in cases where the price system is 
absent or fails274. Moreover, Schotter, like North, defends Simonian bounded rationality and its 
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implications of satisficing275, and similarly criticizes neoclassical economics as hopelessly 
inadequate because of its neglect of nonmarket institutions, myopically focusing on ‘perfect’ 
market equilibria alone.276  
Because of these commonalities, despite North’s more historical focus and subtly different 
definition of institutions, I think Schotter’s work helps us understand more about the relationship 
between rationality, strategic ‘games’, and institutional orders in North’s work. Since North 
often seems to assume a theoretical background of NIE theory here that he does not develop at 
any great length, such as in his references to the ‘players of the game’ or how bounded 
rationality relates to self-interest and “the motivations of the players”, their interpretation is a 
matter of contextualizing. For this, a comparison with Schotter’s approach can give is a clue as to 
why North’s discussion of rationality, further described below, takes the shape it does, and what 
games have to do with it. This also helps in developing a more explicit formulation of the 
‘pessimistic anthropology’ of the state of nature that underlies North’s idea of social orders.277 
What Schotter contributes is the understanding that insofar institutions emerge as substitutes for 
the price system in cases of market failure, they need to be explicable in terms of the interests of 
the individuals that help them come about. The origins of institutions are therefore a question of 
strategic interaction, as described by game theory. For example, cooperative games, in which 
communication and bargaining are central, have been at the foundation of public choice theory 
and the analysis of what North would call ‘formal institutions’, which for this tradition (as for 
North) involves bargaining between elites and between elites and constituents.278 North’s 
different definition of institutions is also important seen in game theoretical context: drawing on 
the work of Leonard Hurwicz and others, Schotter remarks that on this definition of institutions 
“each social institution can be considered a set of rules that specify or constrain the behaviour of 
agents in various social and economic situations. If these situations can be specified as games of 
strategy whose equilibria can be calculated, then… the proper institutional structure (rules of the 
game) can be determined that yields these outcomes as equilibria”. In other words, a game 
theoretical backdrop exists to using institutions as rules of the game, because such an approach 
permits a more normative comparative approach, as is indeed part of North’s work.279  
However, Schotter’s view of institutions as outcomes of the strategic interaction process, as 
regularities so established, helps us understand how one can noncooperatively go from the ‘state 
of nature’ to the emergence of such rules in the first place: it addresses the origin problem that 
concerns North a great deal as well (see below and chapter 4). Game theory defines under what 
conditions social institutions could arise as the result of individual self-interested action in 
situations resembling coordination games or prisoner’s dilemmas (as well as other types of 
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games).280 In short, the interaction between individuals to create institutions as well as the 
interactions between individuals and institutions once they exist (and either operate as parametric 
constraints or affect the payoff structure) can be seen as strategic problems for ‘players’ of a 
‘game’, and this forms a basis for a New Institutionalist theoretical approach to comparative 
study of such institution formation and change. The emergence of spontaneous order is a game 
theoretical problem fundamental to New Institutionalist Economics and the Hayekian tradition, 
as Schotter’s work helps us see. It therefore makes sense to read North’s references to games in 
this context. A classic example is the institution of property rights (here in North’s terms), 
something North’s work has been much concerned with: all NIE theorists agree that their clear 
definition and enforcement is essential for achieving what North calls the ‘Smithian result’. But 
how they emerge (and with what characteristics) in the first place as the result of self-interested 
action is not explained in the Smithian framework, and this requires a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ 
analysis that can be dealt with via game theory.281 Spontaneous order is a problem of strategic 
nature, once self-interested individuals are assumed, as North at times does, and one that in 
North’s pessimistic interpretation frequently has the character of a prisoner’s dilemma type 
situation. 
However, as discussed more in detail below, North does not always assume self-interest. Indeed, 
if he did, the prisoner’s dilemma could not be solved, because no cooperative solution to it exists 
except in the case of indefinitely repeated games. Although institutions have been interpreted as 
such in the literature, not least because of the enduring nature of many institutions despite the 
coming and going of the agents that, as it were, partake of them282, this does not necessarily 
solve the problem of the rational strategy agents would or should pursue in such situations. 
Indeed, in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games, the rational strategy is indeterminate: 
although tit-for-tat cooperation is one possible equilibrium solution, there exist also much less 
cooperative ones.283 This weakens the ability to explain the emergence of cooperation enhancing 
institutions in prisoner’s dilemma type situations, which are widely taken to be ubiquitous in 
collective action problems, as in the case of public goods.284  
For this reason, and because of the experimental evidence that cooperation in experimental 
games takes place well above the levels predicted by self-interested strategic action, other 
solutions have been suggested. Put briefly, these tend to come in two types: either by defending a 
different (normative or explanatory) theory of rationality, or by suggesting ways in which norms, 
conventions, trust, and so forth can change the strategic situation. Both approaches are defensible 
from an explanatory viewpoint, although it can be argued that they involve abandoning the 
original prisoner’s dilemma game, because on some readings of rational choice theory they 
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simply involve changing the payoff structure.285 North, I believe, does all these to some extent. 
He looks for institutions that would enable cooperation where instrumentally self-interested 
action would not rationally permit it; he looks for the origins of institutions in ‘strong beliefs’, 
which are not probabilistic judgements but rather sources of such judgements and therefore of 
the explanation of choice behaviour; in other ways looks for the sources of the payoff 
distribution, sources that operate prior to the strategic situation itself286; and finally, by 
emphasizing the actual content of beliefs, attempts in a groping way to move away from the 
functionalist explanatory framework that underlies rational choice interpretation of institutions, 
as exemplified by Schotter’s work.287 He also attempts to defend (in my view) various not 
obviously compatible interpretations of rationality, as the case demands. These I will now 
discuss in more detail, with the game theoretical and Hayekian context of the problems of 
spontaneous order, rationality, and cooperation in mind. 
First, I will come to grips with North’s definition of rationality and how he uses the concept of 
bounded rationality to distinguish his approach from both neoclassical approaches and from 
those not partaking of the ‘economics approach’. Since rationality can be said to be bounded in 
various ways, it is important to appreciate both which bounds North considers relevant and how 
he justifies his use of the concept. Secondly, I will examine North’s approach to beliefs and 
ideology and how he relates these to the emergence and persistence of a particular institutional 
framework. In his more recent discussions of ideology, North has shifted from seeing it as part of 
the institutional framework to a source for it, and with this shift has come an increasing emphasis 
on particular models of human cognition and social learning. I will briefly outline what purpose 
these models have for North’s conception of ideology. Nonetheless, I will also point to the 
ongoing significance of conventional economic ideas of incentives and self-interest in North’s 
discussion, which creates a tension with the implications North claims for his own bounded 
rationality concept and its relation to economic theory.  
Having established these points to define North’s initial New Institutionalist framework, I will 
then return to the themes of cooperation and the social contract as mediated through game 
theory. I will discuss North’s use of game theoretical concepts and language and discuss why and 
how he uses, or rather implies, insights derived from game theory. Given the particular modes of 
rationality conventional noncooperative game theory is designed to represent, this frequent 
rhetorical device – for little formalization of game theory appears in his work – sits uneasily with 
his other assertions about the nature of rationality and ideology and their role in individual 
agency. 
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Why rationality is bounded for North 
Next to the (methodologically related) rejection of the efficiency assumption, the emphasis on 
bounded rationality is for North arguably the main behavioural premise separating his approach 
from the neoclassical. The ‘rationality assumption’, by which North seems to mean the more 
traditional rational choice approach of orthodox economics, is for him not just an unnecessary 
premise but in fact a major methodological hindrance to advancing economic thought along the 
lines he has indicated. It prevents a proper consideration of ideology, of institutions, and of long-
term evolutionary patterns, concepts that make up the bulk of North’s own historical theory. As 
he emphatically states in UPEC: “The rationality assumption has served economists (and other 
social scientists) well for a limited range of issues in micro theory but is a shortcoming in dealing 
with the issues central to this study. Indeed the uncritical acceptance of the rationality 
assumption is devastating for most of the major issues confronting social scientists and is a major 
stumbling block in the path of future progress. The rationality assumption is not wrong, but such 
an acceptance forecloses a deeper understanding of the decision-making process in confronting 
the uncertainties of the complex world we have created.”288 
For North, there are two ways economic historians (and economists) should deal with this 
problem. Firstly, they need to take the cognitive processes of social learning into account, since 
these affect how humans form ideas about the world and respond to pervasive uncertainty. 
Secondly, the proper rationality concept is a bounded one, in which people do not live up to 
rational choice expectations of “substantive rationality”, but rather face imperfect information 
and imperfect feedback from the environment in interpreting the effects of actions. Because of 
this, the content of intentionality matters since understanding subjectivity becomes essential to 
understanding behaviour.289 The boundedness of rationality appears for North both in limitations 
on information and in our limited cognitive capabilities: we face uncertainty and frequently act 
‘irrationally’ in terms of the expectations of traditional economics models.290  
The implications of the former are that informal and formal institutions are necessary to 
help us cope with our changing environment, and that such institutions may suffer from ‘lag’ 
relative to such changes and therefore have unintended negative effects down the line. The 
implications of the latter are that subjective models may often be wrong and that ideology, 
including political and religious beliefs, matter for understanding individual behaviour in 
institutional contexts. Indeed, North even suggests such beliefs, when hardened into ideologies, 
can be seen as imposing transaction costs on institutional change. Typically, for North one 
example of such subjective irrationality is the inability of many to accept ‘Smithian’ arguments 
for how to improve economic performance: “In a Coasian world the players would always 
choose that policy that maximized aggregate well-being with compensation for any losers; but 
                                                          
288 North 2005, p. 5. 
289 Ibid., p. 23-24, 64.  
290 Ibid., p. 74, 156. 
94 
 
the real transaction costs are frequently prohibitive reflecting deep-seated beliefs and prejudices 
that translate into such prohibitive transaction costs. It is more than two hundred years since 
Adam Smith explained the underlying sources of the wealth of nations but the extent to which 
such views are embedded in the decision-making process of those shaping political/economic 
change is problematic.”291  
In UPEC and Violence and Social Orders, North’s emphasis is understandably on 
explaining what theories of each he adopts for the purposes of his work, rather than elaborating 
on his critique of ‘substantive’ rational choice approaches. This therefore does not tell us that 
much about how he relates the implications of his bounded rationality concept to the existing 
economic literature on this subject, which would be helpful to clarify his methodological 
justifications. Fortunately, in a 1993 paper North undertook the latter in more detail. A number 
of important points stand out. Firstly, his primary justification for abandoning the standard 
rational choice approach is that such an approach is neither realistic nor robust: “A dissection of 
the rationality assumption is essential in order to incorporate much more ’realistic‘ assumptions 
to be derived from the diverse mental models that guide human decision-making… Taken over 
from economics was not only the scarcity and hence competition assumption - a robust 
assumption, but also the assumption of a frictionless a-institutional world and the assumption of 
expected utility theory, incorporated in the rationality postulate. Neither of these latter two 
assumptions is robust.”292  
Why are they not robust? Because they are unrealistic in the sense that they cannot explain 
the existence and function of institutions. Since the function of institutions is to help people cope 
with uncertainty, assuming away such uncertainty leads to a failure to understand the dynamics 
of real historical economies. “In the real world the actors have in complete information and 
limited mental capacity by which to process that information. In consequence they develop 
regularized rules and norms to structure exchange. There is no implication that institutions are 
efficient in the sense of providing low cost transacting. Ideas, ideologies, myths, dogmas, and 
prejudices matter because they play a key role in making choices and transaction costs result in 
very imperfect markets or no markets at all.”293 
We will not get there, North avers, by incorporating limited information itself into a 
rational choice framework, as in models of ‘rational ignorance’ and principal-agent problems. 
Such models cannot explain the fact that subjective models compete with each other in the form 
of ideologies, and since there is imperfect feedback from the environment on choices made, 
“there is a continuum of theories that agents can hold and act upon without ever encountering 
events which lead them to change their theories”.294 This leads North to the second point: in 
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rational choice approaches, we already know everything worth knowing. Such approaches, North 
argues, are right for markets characterized by low transaction costs, but since that only describes 
very few societies (perhaps open access orders?), they are unlikely to be of much further use.295 
Institutional analysis can do the job instead, combined with theories from cognitive science, 
evolutionary approaches, and perhaps other social sciences too. “Simple problems, complete 
information, repetitive situations, and high motivation will produce conditions that lend 
themselves to rational choice models. As we move away from these conditions we must explore 
not only the immediate consequences in terms of choices but particularly the kinds of institutions 
that will evolve in such contexts to structure human interaction… How do we learn? 
Specifically, what set of circumstances lead us to change the mental models we possess and 
modify or alter the choices we make? Why do ideologies such as religions or political doctrines 
exist? They entail faith rather than reason and persist in the face of overwhelming contrary 
evidence. What makes some persist and others disappear? These are old questions, but cognitive 
science offers the promise of shedding new light upon them and in the course of doing so 
opening up new frontiers in the social sciences.”296 
Ideology and social learning: North’s approach to beliefs and rationality 
Having established North’s justifications for rejecting the rational choice approach associated 
(by him) with neoclassical economics and public choice theory, let us now take a closer look at 
what answers he gives in his more recent work to those questions posed in 1993. It is clear that 
the scope of his theory has become vastly more interdisciplinary and requires more ‘external’ 
theory from social, cognitive, and biological sciences since he first set out to justify a historical 
and institutional approach to economic orthodoxy, and that this is in considerable part due to his 
changed approach to individual rationality and social context.297 It is therefore no more than 
reasonable that North relies on the claims of particular specialists in fields like cognitive science, 
evolutionary anthropology, and the like to provide some microfoundations for his larger 
historical theory. Yet even so, he puts his particular stamp on this aspect of his work as well, 
both by his choice of ‘external’ theoretical premises and by the characteristic rule-based 
functionalism which guides his interpretation of the evidence. 
North and colleagues repeatedly emphasize how difficult it is to get a grip on the workings 
of beliefs and ideology. Statements abound about how in their judgement the social and 
cognitive sciences have not yet come very far in understanding where beliefs come from and 
how they influence behaviour, and North therefore shows an appropriate recognition of the 
imprecise and contentious nature of his analysis.298 In chapter 1, I explained how for North 
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uncertainty gives rise to subjective beliefs as well as institutions (especially informal ones), 
where both function as heuristic devices in order to cope with the physical and human 
environment. For North, the trick to getting to the right institutional order from the viewpoint of 
economic performance is then to generate the right feedback loop between beliefs, institutions, 
and the ‘human environment’ in question so that the Smithian result obtains. As I explained 
there, North distinguishes various types of environment and various types of uncertainty; here I 
will not go into these further, but concentrate on the content and role assigned to ideology and 
learning in his larger functionalist approach. 
Helpfully, North himself provides a list of methods for interpretation of behaviour that a 
cognitive science based model of rationality should provide. This list, already expressed in the 
language of the New Institutionalism, contains the following elements: “cognitive foundations 
focused on the dynamics of categories and mental models; heuristics as quite general processes 
for decision and learning; context-dependence, and, relatedly, social embeddedness of both 
interpretative models and decision rules; endogeneity of (possibly inconsistent) goals and 
preferences; organizations as behavioral entities in their own right; processes of learning, 
adaptation and discovery apt to (imperfectly) guide representations and behaviors also (or 
primarily?) in ever changing environments.”299 We can see how far this takes North from the 
standard rationality approach of neoclassical economics, and how he emphasizes rationality 
operates as rules, as guides for the mind to least-cost ways of coping with complex and changing 
environments. But this does not tell us by what mechanism the content of these heuristics is 
determined.  
Additionally, North suggests that learning takes place in a conformist way, so that “a 
common institutional/educational structure will result in shared beliefs and perceptions. A 
common cultural heritage, therefore, provides a means of reducing the divergent mental models 
that people in a society possess and constitutes the means for the intergenerational transfer of 
unifying perceptions.”300 Ideology, indeed beliefs in general appear in this approach as a means 
to reduce uncertainty. For North, institutions, both formal and informal, can be seen as 
embodiments of such beliefs in the face of uncertainty, and while formal institutions can be 
changed more readily following political processes, informal institutions are slow and difficult to 
change consciously (this appears to be part of their respective definitions).301 Moreover, since 
there are inequalities of power in many societies, there are differential abilities of agents 
(individuals, organisations) to undertake such institutional change, so that particular 
ideologies/beliefs will be more embodied in a lasting institutional form than others based on 
previous political constellations: “Thus the structure of an economic market reflects the beliefs 
of those in a position to make the rules of the game… (always with the caveat that their beliefs 
may be incorrect and produce unanticipated consequences). When conflicting beliefs exist, the 
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institutions will reflect the beliefs of those (past as well as present) in a position to effect their 
choices”.302 
This phenomenon, combined with the operation of social learning, creates an iterative 
process in which the ‘artifactual structure’ of a society (its accumulated institutionalized beliefs) 
contains descent with modification: modification that is, however, intentional as well as 
constrained by the power relations of past and present, as agents will prevent the change of such 
institutions as favour them. The result is the operation of path dependence: the shaping of 
institutions by the beliefs and power of agents in previous generations generates firstly the 
organisations of the present that benefit from the artifactual structure and secondly the 
individuals that have obtained the same belief systems through social learning. Both will act as a 
considerable brake on the change of existing artifactual structures, North suggests.303 Path 
dependence plus the content of the artifactual structure then determine the divergent economic 
courses (and presumably also other social dynamics) of various societies in history. 
It is clear then that ideology, as institutionalized in an artifactual framework, does a lot of 
work in North’s theory. It operates as a constraint on individual rationality in a given societal 
setting; it generates institutions, on which both levels of (relative) transaction costs and adaptive 
efficiency depends; and it creates path dependence, so that present opportunities are constrained 
by past decisions. Insofar as the ideologically constrained operation of individual rationality is 
the basis for institutions and organisations, and institutions and organisations in turn give rise to 
transaction costs, incentives, power relations, and all such supervening mechanisms, this trinity, 
the ‘scaffold’ of society as North calls it, in fact reduces to the first element. From the belief 
systems of individuals and the way they constrain how individuals cooperate rationally (or 
irrationally), all else follows. In this sense, North’s theory is ‘microfounded’. Indeed, North’s 
own summary of his discussion of the ‘scaffolds’ makes clear just how much depends on it: “The 
scaffolds humans erect not only define the economic and political game but also determine who 
will have access to the decision-making process. They further define the formal structure of 
incentives and disincentives that are a first approximation to the choice set. But the scaffold is 
much more. It is equally the informal structure of norms, conventions, and codes of conduct. 
And still beyond that it is the way the institutional structure acts upon and reacts to other factors 
that affect both the demographic characteristics of a society and changes in the stock of 
knowledge.”304 
‘Players of the game’ 
The general concept of the artifactual framework, or scaffold, clearly carries a lot of different 
analytical burdens. Postponing for the moment the question whether it can do so consistent with 
North’s different statements about rationality and belief, I now turn to North’s own observations 
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about ‘players of the game’, the implicit references to game theory and how they express the 
problem of social cooperation as described in the beginning of this chapter. It is striking how the 
first functional role of the scaffold, even before the conventional choice theoretical claim about 
incentives or the normative-ideological role, is described as to “define the economic and political 
game”. That a game theoretical framework is present in the background of much of North’s 
thinking about the emergence of institutions, the emergence and persistence of state power, and 
indeed in describing the interaction of agents with institutions and with each other is not difficult 
to establish. On the very first page of UPEC, we are told that “the structure of constraints we 
impose to order that competition shapes the way the game is played”, and later that “all 
organized activity by humans entails a structure to define the way the game is played”.305  
In fact, North is quite explicit that the whole mode of human interaction in a given social 
context is game-like in nature: “The game is played within a set of formal rules, informal 
norms… and the use of referees and umpires to enforce the rules and norms. How the game is 
actually played depends not only on the formal rules defining the incentive structure for the 
players and the strength of the informal norms but also on the effectiveness of enforcement of the 
rules.”306 Elsewhere we find a definition of institutions as “the rules of the game”, and in 
Violence and Social Orders much of the discussion focuses on the distinction between zero-sum 
games (natural states) and positive sum games (open access orders).307 On occasion, the game 
theoretical implications are made even more explicit, such as when North observes, in discussing 
institutions and their contribution to cooperative outcomes, that “effective institutions raise the 
benefits of cooperative solutions or the costs of defection, to use game theoretic terms”.308 
For North and colleagues, such enforcement mechanisms build then on existing normative 
informal framework, which equally arises spontaneously out of the repeated interactions of 
individuals and their need for cooperation: “The spontaneous emergence of informal institutions 
is a process of innovation and imitation that takes place in a social group that is learning 
collectively. Individuals respecting conventions, following moral rules, and adopting social 
norms cause (as an unintended outcome of their action) the emergence of social order. In close-
knit groups, informal institutions largely suffice to stabilize expectations and provide discipline, 
because the members of the group engage in personal relationships. In primitive societies, 
informal institutions alone can establish social order; and often there is no need for additional 
institutions with an explicit third-party enforcement mechanism.”309 
It is therefore safe, I think, to say that for North institutions are analogous to the norms and 
conventions that various game theoretical approaches suggest as solutions to the cooperation 
problems mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. Equally, North’s argument for states and 
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other norm enforcers as agents to change the payoff structure of such games so that rather than 
mutual defection, mutual cooperation becomes the (desirable) Nash equilibrium is a standard 
response to the implications of the prisoner’s dilemma. Not coincidentally too, I think, is that this 
is also the conventional explanation or justification for the state in certain traditions of social 
contract theory, whether Hobbesian, Lockean, or even Humean.310 In this regard, North’s 
approach to the connection between these problems of rationality and cooperation in social and 
political life is conventional within certain traditions of economic and political theory, those 
belonging to what I have earlier described as the ‘pessimistic anthropology’ of his social contract 
theory. Indeed, given the statements about players of the game cited above, and the presentation 
of institutions as coordinators and of states/elites as enforcers in spontaneous order, plus finally 
North’s ongoing concern with normatively interpreting these in terms of their enabling or 
prevention of achieving the spontaneous order of the ‘Smithian’ type, makes it difficult to 
interpret his work in any other way. North is not a game theorist, but he relies on concepts that 
have been specified in conventional game theory, and he does not hesitate to rhetorically invoke 
them. If conventional game theory is a Humean contractarian enterprise, as Shaun Hargreaves-
Heap and Yanis Varoufakis allege, North is such a Humean par exemple.311 
North and colleagues argue that reasoning in long-term economic historical change should 
move from the cognitive level, with its implications for rationality, to the institutional level and 
from there to the economic. The mechanism of interaction between these, giving rise to an 
artifactual framework, and its persistence through time creates path dependence. It is important 
to note that it does so by creating a particular payoff structure (often a low or negative one) in the 
‘game’: “institutional path dependence may structure the economic game in a standardized way 
through time and lead societies to play a game that results in undesirable consequences.”312 As 
they write: “cognitive and institutional path dependence will ultimately lead to economic path 
dependence. The intuitively formulated proposition that "history matters" designates the 
importance of the phenomenon of path dependence, starting at the cognitive level, going through 
the institutional level, and culminating at the economic level.”313 Whatever then the constraints 
at the cognitive level, about which I will say more further below, they must be consistent with a 
game theoretical presentation of individual rationality in an institutional setting.  
I will now examine what kinds of rationality must be assumed for conventional 
noncooperative games to lead to meaningful results, and then examine North’s own varied 
statements about the types of rationality and their function in his explanatory framework. In the 
process, I will question to what extent this joining of concepts and implications derived from 
game theory and his contractarian approach to institutions is internally consistent with his 
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recognition of the role of ideology and his critical statements (cited earlier) about rational choice 
theory. Insofar as they are not consistent, we must ask then whether it would help North’s overall 
ambitions to abandon this ‘Hobbesian-Humean contractarianism’ about formal and especially 
informal institutions. 
Between social contract theory and economic rationality 
We have seen how coordination problems and prisoner’s dilemma type problems, as 
analysed through game theory, suggest the need for institutional arrangements so as to overcome 
the implied difficulty of achieving welfare maximizing outcomes in collective action problems 
given self-interested rational choice. Indeed, such collective action problems have often been 
held to be (and have been) quite general in societies and to be a major problem central to the 
research agenda in the study of economic and political arrangements.314 Indeed, Hume’s 
approach to social contract theory already recognized free riding as a serious problem of 
collective action in situations requiring the cooperation of large numbers of agents. In essence, 
such formulations recognize, as Russell Hardin has pointed out, the risk of a fallacy of 
composition in a similar way as the prisoner’s dilemma does: the interests of individuals may not 
line up with the interests of the group to which they belong, what he has called a “fallacious 
move between individual and group motivations and interests”.315 Indeed, this fallacy results 
from the assumption of self-interest and its dire consequences, in turn associated with Hobbes’ 
social contract theory: “The modern view of the fallacy of composition in social choice is a 
product of the understanding of politics as self-interested… To some extent, therefore, one could 
credit Hobbes with the invention of social science and of explanatory, as opposed to hortatory, 
political theory.”316 But of course public goods often do come about, and many people do not 
free ride when they could. Therefore solutions to the analytical problem must exist. 
What such solutions could be found? Put in a simplistic way, there are two ways of 
answering this problem. The first is what the conclusion of the Hobbesian approach, where state 
bodies or other external enforcers have the ability to change the payoff structure and turn 
prisoner’s dilemma problems into coordination problems, either through e.g. taxes and subsidies 
or through the enforcement of formal institutions such as to raise the payoff of particular 
outcomes and lower those of others. The state itself can be taken as an instance of such a game, 
where rational actors will decide to allow a third party to undertake enforcement by distributing 
part of their payoff to it, such that this cost for each agent is lower than the marginal benefits 
obtained by the cooperative outcome to the dilemma.317 As we have seen, North is inclined to 
explain the emergence of violence-reducing states or elite groups in a like manner, at least as a 
partway explanation. Since governments and such bodies reduce transaction costs by 
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enforcement of formal institutions (rules, laws), they can increase the payoffs of cooperation 
(contracting) relative to defection (not contracting). 318 Indeed, the further back one goes in 
North’s work, the more important this solution appears: North’s earlier work, the state appears 
explicitly as a rationally chosen enforcement mechanism as a response to imperfect information 
and transaction costs.319 In North and Thomas’ model of manorial feudalism, for example, the 
importance of this approach for the ‘efficiency view’ can still be seen: in their book, the authors 
write that the feudal lord and his manor have “the functions of providing justice and protection” 
in high uncertainty environments, and that “the contractual arrangement of the classic manor can 
now be seen as an efficient arrangement for its day”.320  
North’s de-emphasising of this solution is probably the joint result of his abandonment of 
the efficient contracting interpretation of institutions and of the realization that such a model 
does not provide much room for the role of informal institutions. Traditionally, the weakness of 
such solutions to the dilemma is precisely in explaining how the state itself then comes to exist 
as a stable equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction. In North (and colleagues’) later work 
much more attention is paid to this problem, but the issue remains that states or elites, and their 
transaction-cost reducing powers, are explained as the result of a bargaining equilibrium (i.e. a 
cooperative equilibrium) between the resistance of the ‘citizens’ and the predation of elites. 
Ultimately, North et al. can only solve this problem with reference to the problem of beliefs and 
values: only with shared values and legitimacy can such third party enforcement produce a 
credible mutually shared interest, i.e. a Nash equilibrium outcome.321 The state is then not an 
efficient Hobbesian result, but rather a Lockean-Humean one: one where the consent of the 
governed and their cooperative agreement not to resist when the benefits outweigh the costs 
(including in less physical terms than money or safety) is necessary for the state to operate as a 
solution to the public goods problem.322 
This points to the second solution: what one, following Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 
might call the Humean approach.323 That is to say, the building up of ‘custom and habit’, as well 
as the influence of non-self interested rationality guided by moral considerations and sympathy, 
that guides choices, changing the game’s characteristics or payoff structure. For example, one 
version of this approach might be where the prisoner’s dilemma is seen to model the ‘state of 
nature’, but the emergence of normative institutions and conventions permit the building up of 
trust over repeated games and thereby change the dominant strategy, somewhat akin to ‘tit for 
tat’. Indeed, valuations and beliefs, insofar as they affect choices, determine the payoffs given in 
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the game itself. This leads to the Hayekian view of conventions, alluded to above. Hayek’s 
famous arguments about the ‘road to serfdom’ could be seen as having argued that due to 
pervasive uncertainty and imperfect information, the Hobbesian approach to solving the public 
goods (or free riding) problem will not succeed, but that the role of conventions and tradition 
allows the Humean approach to succeed instead.324  
Much of North’s more recent work can be seen as an expression of this idea, as can be 
taken from North’s many examples and assertions of the importance of beliefs and of institutions 
in shaping people’s behaviour. As we know, much of his criticism of neoclassical rational choice 
rests on his perception that by emphasizing efficiency models, they do not acknowledge the 
importance of beliefs or norms and conventions in regulating social life in a mutually beneficial 
way (albeit with the risk of path dependent suboptimal trajectories). The blending of self-interest 
and of convention, norm and belief in agents then generates the structure of strategic interaction 
between them. As we shall see, this view is not an inaccurate representation of most of North’s 
observations on agents’ individual rationality, but it poses serious philosophical problems. One is 
the problem of indeterminacy, which although seemingly technical, actually reveals the way 
appeals to ‘players’ of the ‘game’, with payoffs set by institutions, is a conceptual structure that 
cannot fully carry the weight North places on it. This in turn points to the conflicted and 
inconsistent way North has carried through his critique of self-regarding rational choice as the 
starting point of analysing individual agency. I will as briefly as possible expound these below, 
with this Northian context in mind. 
Firstly, it would need to be explained where the conventions and norms themselves come 
from. It is difficult to argue these emerge by an analogous process of given norms and 
conventions that determine the payoff structure of a game without falling into an infinite regress. 
Indeed, this problem is somewhat analogous to the problem where in repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma games with a known ending, backward induction of rationality means that the chain of 
strategies is equivalent to the choice in a one shot game; and in such a game the rational choice is 
to defect. One common answer to this is to resort to evolutionary explanations to provide an 
origin story for human conventions and cooperation, which we will discuss in chapter 4.  
Related to this is the second and most important problem, which is the ambiguous status of 
rationality and its relation to values and beliefs in conventional game theory. This is because on 
standard interpretations of rational choice, it is necessary that the payoffs of the games already 
reflect one’s preferences in a consistent way, so that the payoffs represent hypothetical rational 
choices. But this causes problems when in practice ‘irrational’ moves are made. One must either 
then conclude that in fact a different game is being played, because hypothetical rationality (in 
the sense of consistent utility maximization) is to be assumed by definition for any behaviour325; 
or one must concede the possibility of irrational action within a game setting. This indeed often 
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happens in practice, insofar as error terms are a common representation of the possibility of 
accidentally selecting a suboptimal strategy in refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept.326 
But in such a case, the game can no longer be said to represent the hypothetical choices of an 
agent given in advance by the utility function of the individual.327  
Moreover, many such games suffer from systematic indeterminacy with regard to the best 
rational strategy, which limits their applicability for the purposes of explanation and prediction 
alike. Only with the strong assumptions of the common knowledge of rationality and the 
common alignment of beliefs, which is to say that each agent has the same beliefs about the 
world and each agent knows all other agents to be rational and that they know that agent to be 
rational, can many of these games have a single equilibrium solution at all. The reason for this is 
the interrelationship between beliefs and desires, which for the purposes of instrumental 
rationality must be kept separate. One must have beliefs regarding the state of the world, 
including the payoffs of the actions of other agents, whether a known state or a probability 
distribution. Instrumental reason then acts to maximize your expected utility given these beliefs 
and the preferences that determine your payoffs. However, when beliefs actually influence 
preferences directly, and preferences in turn interact with beliefs, games become indeterminate. 
One classic example is the game where your payoffs and those of other agents depend on their 
beliefs whether you will be brave or cowardly, which in turn determines whether your rational 
action is actually to be brave or cowardly. If ‘you’ do not know what the belief of the other 
agents is, the game is indeterminate: one can have a probability distribution of hypothetical 
rational responses, but no way of deciding which will actually emerge.328  
There exist refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept so as to account for risk, 
signalling, (Bayesian) learning, and uncertainty which to some extent mitigate this problem, but 
they do not solve it. There is simply no guarantee absent exogenously given specifications that a 
Nash equilibrium exists, and it is even not clear whether it is in a given case ‘rational’ to follow 
the strategy that obtains that equilibrium as long as there is no common alignment of beliefs. It is 
beliefs about others’ beliefs and preferences that generates indeterminacy, and therefore the 
separation of beliefs from payoff structures poses a major problem for any (instrumental) rational 
choice approach to spontaneous order that so easily invokes game theoretical concepts as 
North’s. The possible responses then are either to expand the concept of rationality beyond 
utility maximization; or to rely on evolutionary arguments as a justification of both rational 
choice itself and of the conventions it would give rise to; or to attempt somehow to reconcile 
beliefs and their effect on preferences with an instrumental interpretation of the function of 
institutions. North chooses the latter two. This creates, I believe, a tremendous tension in his 
approach to the rationality of agents, and even more so when combined with his treatment of 
beliefs and their role in his contractarian view of institutions. I will argue that his turn to 
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evolutionary explanations and his ‘cognitive turn’ are responses to this problem with his 
contractarian approach. 
Before doing so, however, a last word on the status of conventional (or classical) game 
theory in the context of liberal contractarian thought may be useful. One of the reasons for the 
influence of conventional game theory, despite its limitations and indeterminacies, is that it 
further extends the technical tools for modelling individual behaviour by the twin criteria of 
utility maximization and the strict separation of structure and action.329 These twin criteria 
impose on the effects of any structures on individual behaviour the nature of constraints: 
externally given limits on a choice set, given by rules, the actions of others, or even your belief 
structure (usually depicted probabilistically). But within those constraints, the agents are seen as 
maximisers of utility. Even if in principle such utility need not be monetary or even self-
interested in nature, for such analysis to be practically useful their interests need at least be self-
regarding, i.e. the pursuit of one’s own passions, whatever they may be. This, in turn, has often 
been how the contractarian position has interpreted the role of institutions. The Nash equilibrium 
concept is important for this tradition because it “can be seen as the only sustainable outcome of 
rational negotiations in the absence of externally enforceable agreements” (which would 
themselves need explanation).330 Rational choice analysis, in the form of conventional game 
theory, therefore has an elective affinity with the contractarian quest to explain institutions out of 
rational action. It does so in two ways. Firstly, by explaining the origins of institutions out of the 
rational pursuit of self-regard (and often self-interest) by individuals with given beliefs and 
preferences; and secondly, by interpreting the persistence of institutions as constraints on 
individual choice, without affecting fundamentally the nature of self-regarding rationality within 
them. As Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis put it: “You want to win and the game simply 
constrains how you go about it.”331  
So let us return to North once more. We have seen that North does not use formalized 
game theory much at all, but he does refer to concepts whose working out has been made explicit 
in the form of game theory. To the extent that, however, neither the origin nor persistence of 
institutions and the way ‘history matters’ for them can be explained in a realistic way in these 
terms, as the indeterminacies of instrumental rationality in game theory show, one must add 
more content to the model. That is to say, one requires specifications of the utility function, or a 
separate theory of the emergence of beliefs or preferences, or indeed a broader theory of 
rationality than instrumental self-regard. Yet each of these choices will affect the approach as a 
whole, and risks being ad hoc if the framework is otherwise left unaltered. This problem, 
inherent in rational choice analysis, can be seen directly in North’s ambiguous observations 
about the rationality of agents. On the one hand, North sees institutions frequently as 
‘constraints’, claims agents pursue self-interest within institutional settings, and talks about 
                                                          
329 Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis 1995, p. 30; cf. Giddens 1979 on ‘structuration’. 
330 Hargreaves-Heap et al. 1992, p. 102. 
331 Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis 1995, p. 30-33. 
105 
 
‘players’ of the ‘game’. On the other hand, he strongly criticizes rational choice analysis and sees 
it as one of the main flaws of neoclassical economics. And what role does experimental 
economics, with its tests of the implications of utility maximization in game theoretical settings, 
play in his work? Returning now to North, we will see in exploring these ambiguities that there is 
a permanent tension, not to say internal inconsistency, in his approach to rationality. This 
tension, I think, is the result of his desire to maintain the contractarian view of markets and as-if 
market institutions, while he simultaneously seeks to develop a much deeper view of human 
nature than rational choice allows. 
North’s ambiguities on rational choice analysis 
On the one hand, we are told that ideology has the function of enabling social identification and 
thereby group formation332; that economic policy in the Soviet Union was path-dependently (co-
)determined by Marxist ideological principles333; that ideology functions to reduce the costs of 
enforcement of informal institutions by encouraging conformism334; and we are repeatedly told 
with emphasis that strong belief systems matter because of the way they shape choices and lead 
to expectations about the world, such as the medieval world-view, and in a way not immediately 
amenable to confirmation or disconfirmation so that it can persist regardless of the economic or 
political choices made.335 These claims suggest that the nature of rationality and irrationality 
itself is at issue, and that the incorporation of belief systems – including in their ‘incarnation’ as 
informal and formal institutions – should fundamentally alter the behavioural premises about the 
economic and political behaviour of agents.336  
On the other hand we are told that institutions, which are expressions of beliefs or 
ideologies, “impose severe constraints on the choice set of entrepreneurs when they seek to 
innovate or modify institutions in order to improve their economic or political positions.”337 Path 
dependence induced by institutional stability plays the same role of constraining the choice set, 
with “the nature of the limits to change that it imposes” left undefined.338 These statements 
suggest rather something different, that self-interested (or at the least self-regarding) behaviour 
conforming to conventional norms of rationality as defined in economics remains the premise of 
understanding the actions of agents, but that their choice set is modified by ideological and 
normative concerns: an important specification of self-regarding utility maximization but not a 
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deviation from it. On yet another occasion in the same work North says that “the complex blend 
of ‘rational self-interested behavior’ (the foundation of economic models) with ideological 
beliefs stemming from the self-awareness of humans poses a major challenge to political 
scientists”.339 This statement in turn suggests that some unspecified combination of (qualified or 
specified) rational choice and some other form of intentionality is used.  
One may agree with North that rational self-interested behaviour remains the foundation of 
economic models, indeed defines what an economic model is as opposed to those of other 
sciences; but if so, it merely illustrates North’s difficulties in deciding when traditional economic 
models are relevant for him and when they are not. Clearly this “complex blend” North identifies 
poses a major challenge to New Institutionalist economic historians as well. The vagaries of 
rationality assumptions in his work are some of the clearest examples of how his NIEH approach 
threatens to fall into a methodological gap: insufficiently orthodox to use the methods - and 
therefore the justifications of those methods - of economics, yet insufficiently distant from the 
practice of economists to let go of the implications and theorems that economists have 
traditionally taken as the strong results of their discipline.  
One example of this may be given in North’s discussion of results from economic 
experimentation, often taken to have sufficiently significantly affected the standard behavioural 
assumptions of rationality that it has given birth to a separate (and possibly rival) subdiscipline 
of behavioural economics. Noting the divergence from classic rational choice accounts, North 
summarizes the results from experimental economics as follows, in a statement significant 
enough to quote in its entirety: “People invoke reward/punishment strategies in a wide variety of 
small group interactive contexts. These strategies are generally inconsistent with, but more 
profitable than, the noncooperative strategies predicted by game theory. There is, however, 
consistency with the game theoretic folk theorem which asserts that repetition favors 
cooperation, although we observe a substantial use of reward/punishment strategies and some 
achievement of cooperative outcomes in single play games. Non cooperative outcomes are 
favored, however, where it is very costly to coordinate outcomes, in large groups, and even in 
smaller groups under private information. In large groups interacting through markets using 
property rights and a medium of exchange, and with disperse private information, non-
cooperative interaction supports the achievement of socially desirable outcomes. Experimental 
studies have long supported this fundamental theorem of markets. This theorem does not 
generally fail, however, in small group interactions because people modify their strict self-
interest behavior, using reward/punishment strategies that enable some approximation of surplus 
maximizing outcomes. Seen in the light of evolutionary psychology, such behavior is not a 
puzzle, but a natural product of our mental evolution and social adaptation.”340  
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Two things are going on here. Firstly there is the appeal to game theoretical models of 
agent interaction put to the experimental test. Although North notes that the observed behaviour 
does not quite conform to what rational behaviour in such settings would lead one to expect, he 
suggests this is a consequence of small group interaction and low transaction costs. I will return 
to this point in my discussion of evolutionary themes in North. Here I want to draw attention to 
the second point, emphasized in the quotation: here he explicitly connects noncooperative 
rational behaviour with the achievement of ‘socially desirable outcomes’ as long as such is 
mediated by market exchange. This sounds very similar to the claim that the ‘Smithian result’ of 
(relatively) harmonious cooperation will result from the creation of free markets low in 
transaction costs and barriers to entry, discussed previously. On this occasion, the claim takes the 
form of a ‘fundamental theorem’ of economics resulting from the operation of individual 
rationality in strategic settings. Noncooperative rationality, that is to say self-regarding forms of 
strategic rationality, are now in larger settings sufficient to achieve such aims - as long as one 
gets the institutions right. North’s forays into realms of intentionality far removed from 
conventional economic premises have here clearly come to an end: we are back at the market 
contractarian view North (dubiously) associates with Smith, where it is simply a question of 
private vices, public benefits; except now with institutions to mediate the two. This serves as 
another illustration of the ‘two steps forward, one step back’ character of North’s attitude to 
conventional economic behavioural microfoundations. 
The problem in my view is not straightforwardly that North has the wrong unit of agency 
(individuals instead of classes, say) but rather how North explains the behaviour of these agents 
– bounded rationality. I have now said enough, I trust, to describe the inconsistency in North’s 
use and rejection of this behavioural assumption. Far from the problem being solved by reference 
to cognitive science, as North himself seems to suggest, it is only magnified. No amount of 
cognitive science is in the foreseeable future likely to present us with a theory of sufficiently 
predictive precision to know where and how human choices (economic or otherwise) can be 
derived from initial conditions. It is precisely this fact that forces social scientists into 
nonpredictive forms of explanation, such as functionalist and interpretative explanation; rational 
choice theory, in the sense of the utility maximization postulate, is one example of the latter. 
Even a general prediction such as knowing “the direction of change” of institutions, predictively 
or retrodictively, will not be derivable from cognitive theory itself, and this is one of North’s 
ambitions for his NIEH.341 This is clear from his own discussion, for if understanding cognitive 
processes of acquiring and storing information were enough, why would we need an analysis of 
beliefs and preferences, i.e. of intentionality, as he insists? The purpose of cognitive science for 
North is to learn how ideas emerge and why they do, but this cannot be related to historical 
observables except through institutions, beliefs, and preferences. 
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As North himself acknowledges, rationality postulates cannot be avoided.342 Any theory of 
individual behaviour requires behavioural foundations. This raises therefore the question of what 
justifications he provides for his particular choices: understanding this may shed more light on 
the inconsistency identified above. However, in my view these justifications are just as 
inconsistent as the behavioural premises they are supposed to justify, and this strengthens my 
impression of the reason why: North wishes to reject neoclassical economic methods for 
economic history, but he wants to preserve the centrality of the ‘economics approach’ when it 
suits him. His critique of the former does not seem to affect his commitment to the latter. Put 
crudely: he wants to have his cake and eat it too.  
North’s own (few) discussions of justifications are revealing of this ambivalence. His 
justification for his repeated reliance on conventional choice theory (rational choice) is its greater 
testability, rather than its likelihood of accurate description.343 Yet simultaneously, he dedicates a 
great deal of his latest works to systematically rejecting rational choice assumptions, which he 
associates with neoclassical economics – on the grounds that it will lead to more accurate 
description. This indicates that at least some of the internal inconsistency in rationality concepts 
for North derives from his inconsistent use of justifications for those concepts. North wants his 
theory to be founded on conventional choice theory because of its (alleged) greater ability to 
produce testable propositions, but he also rejects strong rationality assumptions because they are 
unrealistic and unsuitable for historical analysis.344 Equally, he accepts results from experimental 
economics insofar as they point to the apparent refutation of utility maximization, at least insofar 
as the expected utility is specified in monetary terms; but he also insists on the assumption that 
institutions are changed because of, and individuals and organisations act on, the pursuit of the 
agents’ expected advantage. Although cognitively constrained, the latter is still a form of utility 
maximization.  
North on the cognitive sources of institutions 
This helps us understand the odd role that cognitive science plays in North’s account. We may 
here use Herbert Simon’s own distinction between procedural and substantive rationality. 
Traditionally neoclassical economists are uninterested in procedural rationality, i.e. the actual 
process through which choices are made, as long as the choices in question adhere to substantive 
rationality, i.e. the logical criteria of rational utility maximization.345 (These criteria include 
transitivity, completeness, and monotonicity.) As Alexander Rosenberg points out, the usual 
justification in neoclassical economics for ignoring procedural rationality is that the substantive 
form of rational choice has sufficient explanatory power that further knowledge is irrelevant.346 
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Indeed, in some interpretations the point of rational choice is to remove all consideration of what 
happens inside the mind: rational choice provides a set of axioms which are necessary for this 
kind of behaviourist analysis of human behaviour.347  
In the case of the former justification, the obvious problem is that the rationality criteria 
have often been shown to be violated in practice, and moreover that whether explanatory value 
of rational choice in economics is sufficient to overcome such problems is, to say the least, 
controversial. It is against this justification that North appears to aim his criticisms. Yet on the 
latter justification, utility maximization is irrefutable because true by definition; any behaviour 
can always be redescribed as maximizing some property. The only relevant criterion, then, is 
whether this assumption leads to testable predictions and so to improvements in knowledge, 
which is again controversial.348 From this perspective, North’s emphasis on investigating the 
sources of procedural rationality (and its possible failure) only makes sense if he had already 
rejected the assumption that humans can be usefully modelled as if they conform to substantive 
rationality and the claim that they actually conform to it, at least sufficiently for theoretical 
purposes. North often seems to indicate that this is in fact his view. But if that is so, it is not clear 
how he can insist that testable predictions should be derivable from his theory and that the 
traditional justifications of microeconomic choice theory, or the language of game theoretical 
modelling, provide him with this.349 The processes of learning and cognition are to give content 
to human intentionality, but the more content it has, the less any choice theoretical framework 
recognizable from conventional microeconomics will work, and therefore the less its 
implications or justifications are available to North. This is precisely why most orthodox 
economists reject any venture into cognitive science, neuroscience, or developmental biology. 
Of course, it also fulfils another function for North: namely to account for individual 
choice under uncertainty. In standard economics, this is the job of expected utility theory. With 
actually observed behaviour (choices) and beliefs about probabilities held constant, expected 
utility theory can work backwards to obtain a preference structure that would explain that 
behaviour. Nonetheless, this is only a more general version of utility maximization and no more 
allows for refutation of the expected utility maximization assumption than does its more specific 
variant with perfect information.350 Again, North seems to seek explanations in cognitive theory 
to account for the pervasiveness of uncertainty, attributing great importance to the historical shift 
that the greatest danger to survival is now attributable to uncertainty about other individuals 
rather than to uncertainty about the (physical) environment.351  
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But this use of cognitive science can at most explain how imperfect information came 
about; it does not (yet) provide us with sufficient knowledge to know, in given environmental 
conditions, what choices individuals will make. For this we are left once again with some theory 
of rationality. This, in turn, leads us back to the strong assumptions and their interpretation, 
according to which utility maximization is either wrong or by definition true, and in both cases 
of questionable use. Hence North’s recourse to ‘bounded rationality’, a solution that, as we have 
seen, isn’t one. This explains North’s hesitation when introducing the chapters on cognitive 
science: “The rationality assumption is not wrong, but such an acceptance forecloses a deeper 
understanding of the decision-making process in confronting the uncertainties of the complex 
world we have created.”352 We are not told what kind of ‘deeper understanding’ this is, and 
whether it should affect the rationality assumption or not, the same one he has called 
“devastating for most of the major issues confronting social scientists and is a major stumbling 
block in the path of future progress”.353 He wants us to recognize the importance of uncertainty 
and its implication that we must study beliefs and institutions. But while cognitive science is 
tasked with giving us beliefs, nothing connects beliefs and preferences other than a final resort to 
bounded rationality. Bounded rationality in turn consists of an application of rational choice 
under strong constraints, which is why North calls institutions and beliefs constraints. But 
rational choice must take, holding tastes constant and for a given cognitive capacity, beliefs and 
preferences as given. 
That these justifications are not compatible with each other does not appear to occur or 
matter to North. In each case, he accepts one or the other of these claims because they provide 
justifications that are convenient relative to other theories. The anti-rational choice perspective is 
justifiable for North when used against neoclassical and neoinstitutionalist ‘efficiency’ models, 
and the rational choice perspective is justifiable when it confirms the validity of the conclusions 
of conventional microeconomics. These conclusions are in particular the explanatory power of 
assuming utility maximization of some sort and its contribution to testability and prediction; as 
well as the normative desirability of ‘free and efficient’ markets as modes of social cooperation, 
and that such markets are a necessary but - given the problem of getting the institutions right - 
not sufficient condition for achieving lasting economic growth and/or ‘adaptive efficiency’. 
Another reason why North might put so much stress on human cognitive processes is 
because of the role of beliefs in his most mature NIEH approach. Precisely in contradistinction to 
the ‘unrealistic’ rational choice views he attributes to the neoclassical economists, for North 
beliefs must play an independent causal role in history. This has several implications for him. 
Firstly, the independent role of intentionality precludes a simplistic evolutionary account, by 
which he mainly refers to memetics: cultural evolution is decidedly different from ‘Darwinian 
evolutionary theory’ because of this.354 I postpone discussion of this point to the next chapter. 
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The second role of the independent causality of beliefs is more important: beliefs are shapers of 
the preferences of individuals and constitute the stock of knowledge, i.e. the technologies for 
institutional change available to a society. In this way, they are both constitutive of the 
constraints on individual action and of the aims of that action, on North’s account. Since beliefs 
depend on learning processes, cognitive theory (North seems to hope) will help us elucidate the 
process of the formation and inheritance of culture: “Culture not only determines societal 
performance at a moment of time but, through the way in which its scaffolding constrains the 
players, contributes to the process of change through time. The focus of our attention, therefore, 
must be on human learning—on what is learned and how it is shared among the members of a 
society and on the incremental process by which the beliefs and preferences change, and on the 
way in which they shape the performance of economies through time.”355 
This dual role of beliefs, however, puts North in a difficult position. As we have seen, 
standard approaches to strategic interaction between rational self-regarding individuals have 
difficulty dealing with beliefs in this double role, due to the strict difference between structure 
and action. And yet, as North (surely rightly) puts it, “beliefs… are both a positive model of the 
way the system works and a normative model of how it should work”.356 Where North initially 
had beliefs be part of the institutional structure, they are now functionally equivalent to 
institutions (as additional constraints) and sources of institutions (as an important part of the 
normative structure of society) and sources of the preferences agents pursue within the 
institutional framework. North is not to be accused of lack of profundity here: the difficulties he 
grapples with are surely the right ones, and the relationship between ideology, rationality, and 
social structure is at the heart of debates in social and historical sciences for more than a century. 
The problem for North is rather that he attributes these complex roles to beliefs while 
simultaneously, at other times, assuming or suggesting a much more simple (and more tractable) 
agency based on self-interest and/or instrumental rationality. He does not, in other words, 
correspondingly broaden his rationality concept in a consistent manner, and especially not to go 
beyond the self-regard (though not self-interest) of the individual. 
His bounded rationality is, insofar as he maintains this approach, a form of rational choice, 
but one adjusted for greater realism of assumptions. The restriction on rational choice is then, 
following Herbert Simon’s pioneering work on ‘satisficing’, a question of cognitive limitation, 
but this does not imply a rejection of the fundamental instrumentalism of rational choice or its 
foundation in a self-regarding agent.357 Yet we have equally established that this is not always 
true for North. Philip Pettit points out the problem for rational choice theory, well-established in 
behavioural economic theory at this point, that “the mind postulated in rational-choice theory is 
that of a relatively self-regarding creature. But the mind that people display towards one another 
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in most social settings… is saturated with concerns that dramatically transcend the boundaries of 
the self.”358 Indeed, institutions and shared normative frameworks, ideologies and beliefs, whole 
cultures, practices, and habits would appear to have this characteristic, and here North is keen to 
include these as essential modifications of rationality for understanding actual historical events. 
This ambiguity has been noted by other critics as well. In two articles on North’s 
rationality concept and its status in North’s work, Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis have 
criticized his approach on just this point, since the increasing importance of beliefs is something 
that sets him apart even within the NIE tradition. As they observe: “The new and newer 
economic histories can in principle explain anything on the basis of rationality by pushing out 
the boundaries of the endogenous/rational, one by extending the scope of the as-if-perfect 
market, the other by appeal to market imperfections. By contrast, North has retained a continuing 
commitment to the role of ideology which occupies an uncomfortable position in straddling the 
rational/irrational divide.”359  
They rightly observe that North’s theoretical trajectory has seen him shift away 
increasingly from neoclassical approaches (in North’s own terms) towards a theory of norms and 
institutions interacting with the objective dynamic of transaction costs. Yet, building on Daniel 
Ankarloo’s critique, they argue that in his trajectory from Cliometrics to the transaction cost 
approach he has moved from (as the paper title suggests) ‘the principle of pricing to the pricing 
of principle’. As they argue: “there is one essential mechanism that straddles all of the analytical 
levels— individual pursuit of self-interest with an as-if market mechanism prevailing throughout 
society. This is already explicit in the gains from behaviors such as cheating, but for institutional 
impediments. But it penetrates everywhere, even to the determinants of ideology, with every 
principle having its price”.360 The result is, for them, that “ideology becomes a truly marvelous 
and powerful explanatory factor. For it encompasses whatever is not explained by rationality 
(which has itself been extended by appeal to market imperfections). This is a point of departure 
from the newer approach, certainly as promulgated by economists, for whom only rationality 
exists, and appeal to any other form of behavior is arbitrary and unacceptable… There must not 
only be incentive but conception”.361 
This is an interesting observation that dovetails with my objections to North’s inconsistent 
or unclear use of bounded rationality and its lack of consideration for the meaning and content of 
intentionality, despite North’s frequent appeals to the importance of such considerations. Fine 
and Milonakis put it as follows: “Otherwise, with frequent reference to the work of Herbert 
Simon, and others working on (ir)rationality from the perspective of the individual’s cognition 
and system of beliefs, North is most readily interpreted as always reconstructing social theories 
of ideology through the prism of methodological individualism, of agents making sense of their 
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external environment by interacting with, and internally contemplating it… As it were, ideology, 
etcetera, is complicated; we do not have a complete theory; so the focus will be on one effect 
alone.”362 Although not based on a close reading such as I have attempted here, Fine and 
Milonakis rightly observe that on certain occasions, North is liable to see individual gain or self-
interest as the determinant of ideological ‘choices’, however much he on other occasions 
emphasizes the value orientation inherent in belief systems. The connection between the two is 
best exemplified by a conclusion to IICEP, which they cite: “The agent of change is the 
individual entrepreneur responding to the incentives embodied in the institutional framework. 
The sources of change are the changing relative prices or preferences. The process of change is 
overwhelmingly an incremental one.”363 
Fine and Milonakis’ critiques have certain limitations, from my perspective. Like much of 
the secondary literature on North, the timing of their works means they concentrate their 
discussion on his works of the 1980s and 1990s. Perforce, they did not have access to UPEC or 
Violence and Social Orders, which show developments such critiques should address: North, 
Wallis, and Weingast have now supplied North’s NIEH with a model of power and conflict as 
well as with a story of the origins of ideology and sociality, while UPEC demonstrates a 
deepening of the ‘cognitive turn’ and a frequently more subtle and sophisticated restatement of 
the NIEH framework proposed in what I have for that reason called the ‘second stage’.364 It is 
not a coincidence that North begins the discussion in UPEC by asking “why do rules, norms, 
conventions, and ways of doing things exist? What induces the mind to structure human 
interaction in this way?” and that for him the NIE and its theory only “takes us partway”.365 In 
this sense then I do not think so much that North wants to concentrate on one effect alone - at 
least no longer - as that, faced with the contradictions involved in his shifting conceptions of 
rationality, he tends to fall back on received wisdom from more conventional economic theories, 
neoinstitutional or neoclassical. As with his approach to markets, the logic appears to be that 
‘when in doubt, assume rational choice.’ His ambition is clearly the contrary, as most 
pronounced in UPEC, where the emphasis is on a broad conception of rationality, the 
incorporation of the ‘irrational’, and the need for interdisciplinarity in understanding these 
problems. It is rather that North’s practice lags behind his theoretical aims. 
Conclusion: Why would North hold an inconsistent theory? 
James Buchanan, one of the main theorists of public choice, once usefully distinguished 
‘orthodox economics’ and ‘constitutional economics’. For him, orthodox economics is about 
explaining in a Walrasian or Marshallian framework the rational interactions of agents. 
Constitutional economics, on the other hand, “attempts to explain the working properties of 
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364 E.g., Milonakis and Fine 2007 is largely concerned with critiquing Structure and Change, a work by then mostly 
rejected in North’s own presentation. 
365 North 2005, p. 11. 
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alternative sets of legal-institutional-political rules that constrain the choices and activities of 
economic agents, the rules that define the framework within which the ordinary choices of 
economic and political agents are made… it examines the choice of constraints as opposed to the 
choice within constraints.”366 North’s intentions in the later stages of his NIEH are clearly in the 
former category, a species of constitutional economics in this sense. More specifically, I have 
suggested that the ambiguities found in North make most sense if they are seen as a conflict 
between on the one hand his liberal contractarian views of social evolution and his attachment to 
the concepts of Humean instrumental rationality that underlie them, fitting the constitutional 
economics tradition of the NIE; and on the other hand his ambitions to achieve a more complete 
and realistic economic history in which the world outside private contracting, including its 
‘irrational’ components like belief structures and its imperfect markets and information, play the 
large role that they deserve.  
Before concluding, let me expand a little on this. As many critics of mainstream economic 
thought have observed, in its historical origins as well as its methodological practices there is an 
intimate connection between utility maximizing general equilibrium models and the political 
philosophy of the market as social contract. North’s ‘Smithian result’, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, is not just a series of claims about the harmonizing role of the market, but in 
some respects at least the neoclassical tradition can also be seen as a formalization of this 
political idea.367 For Alexander Rosenberg, general equilibrium theory (which is in turn based on 
utility maximization) serves the ‘Smithian result’ paradigm in that it “is the formalized approach 
to the systematic study of this claim about how the unintended consequences of uncoordinated 
selfishness result in the most efficient exploitation of scarce resources in the satisfaction of 
wants.”368  
The tradition of constitutional economics then becomes the search for ‘incentive 
compatible’ institutional arrangements that best fit this allegedly ‘Smithian’ perspective. 
Orthodox microeconomics is then ipso facto justified by serving this aim. As Rosenberg puts it, 
“at a minimum the contractual arrangements justified must be compatible with the possibility of 
the operation of rational self-interest and the theory from which the arrangements are derived 
should enable us to predict what the generic consequences of self-interest will be… Adam 
Smith’s view was that the market provided an incentive-compatible mechanism.”369 One might 
add that in this context game theory might appear a useful method to appeal to precisely because 
in strategic rationality the parameters of this minimum condition are explored, and moreover, the 
famous existence proof of general equilibrium under highly restrictive conditions that underpins 
neoclassical theory is also a Nash equilibrium.370 
                                                          
366 Buchanan 1989, p. 64. I draw for this discussion further on Rosenberg 1992, 1994.  
367 Indeed it has been defended as such: Arrow 1974. Cf. Hodgson 1994a for a critical perspective. 
368 Rosenberg 1992, p. 219. 
369 Ibid., p. 225.  
370 For a critical evaluation of this line of reasoning, see: Mirowski 2002, p. 370ff. 
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Ultimately, therefore, in this chapter - as in this work as a whole - I try to show that where 
North is closest to mainstream economic concepts of rationality, albeit in bounded form, such as 
where he relies most on incentives, self-interest, or game theory, his interest in the origins of 
ideas and the evolution of cognition fall by the wayside. On such occasions, they are casually 
replaced by more market-centric, normative and contractarian ideas. His constitutional 
economics is, seen from this perspective, a branch off the main tree of economic thought. North 
clings to this branch despite his explicit ambitions to leave the tree and explore the wider forest. 
If my argument is correct, North’s rationality concept is inconsistent both in its definition and in 
the justifications offered for it. On the one hand, for North bounded rationality promises to 
liberate his NIEH from the unrealistic strictures of neoclassical (fully) rational choice models. 
On the other hand, his rationale for doing so extends much further, suggesting that postulates of 
utility maximization itself may not be useful and that substantive rationality is irrelevant for the 
study of economic behaviour in premodern cases. If so, there is no obvious way to reconcile this 
with the deployment of an unspecified concept of bounded rationality, of which we only know 
that beliefs are further specified as constraints on the choice set than is commonly done in 
mainstream economics. North emphasizes the importance of cognitive theory for giving us a 
better model of individual rationality and therewith explanation of behaviour, and even justifies 
the NIEH as a whole by its predictive capacities and testability. Yet cognitive theory does not in 
his work replace the operation of the usual extensions of self-regarding individuals acting under 
some formalization of folk psychology, as when they are ‘players’ of the ‘game’ acting to ‘line 
their pockets’ or to change institutional arrangements in their own interests. Incentive 
compatibility remains the main problem, rather than a substantively different view of human 
individual rationality that would give flesh to the centrality of ideas and ideology to his vision. In 
other words, North simply does not seem able to choose, and wants to have both the critique of 
(mainstream versions of) economic rationality where it suits him and simultaneously fall back on 
just those types of rational action where necessary. 
His Janus-like response on the first occasion in which he discusses experimental results in 
economics, of which I have observed that he saw this as supporting simultaneously his rejection 
of neoclassical economics and confirming his belief in the ‘fundamental market theorem’, I 
therefore interpret as follows: it reveals more strongly North’s commitment to the idea that ‘the 
Smithian result’ follows from the ‘correct’ political economy, i.e. the right combination of 
institutions, markets, and property rights, rather than to any particular rationality postulate. To 
paraphrase Deng Xiaoping: seemingly for North it does not matter whether a cat is rational or 
irrational, as long as it catches mice.371 The ‘mice’ are then the normative implications. To 
achieve the open access order, institutions must act as ways to reduce transaction costs and in 
                                                          
371 From the viewpoint of rhetorical analysis, it is interesting to note the frequency of economic metaphors in 
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this way economic and political life must be made as much like a neoclassical model of a 
competitive market as possible.  
North’s inconsistency derives to my mind therefore, at least partially, from the motivated 
cognition of his own research. By having set out in advance that his theory must confirm to 
certain favoured conclusions and theorems of conventional economics, he repeatedly introduces 
justifications that are inconsistent with the ambitions and methods he himself defends for 
reaching those conclusions. It is as if he says to his neoclassical colleagues: I will arrive at the 
same findings as you, and I will justify them in the same terms as you do, but I will reach them 
by means of methods and concepts diametrically opposed to yours. Such an approach is bound to 
lead to inconsistencies between the justifications for the theory and the theory actually deployed.  
This is illustrated by the persistent issue in North’s bounded rationality model: that we are 
not told in what way it is bounded, beyond the observation that ideology and mental models 
matter to understand intentionality. However true this may be, and however valuable a critical 
perspective on the neoclassical rational choice approach, it is not a sufficient departure from 
rational choice. There is an important distinction, conceptually and methodologically, between 
rational choice bounded by beliefs and norms, and an extension of the model of instrumental 
choice itself. Here we are confronted once more with the recurring problem in North – already 
encountered in the discussion of whether premodern economies were meaningfully ‘non-market’ 
or not – that what North says he wants to do with his theory at the level of methodology and 
philosophy of social science is one thing, and what he actually proposes at the more concrete 
level is another.  
However, this leaves one aspect unexplored. For North is not so Panglossian as all this may 
make him sound. He rightly insists that cooperation is difficult to achieve in actual societies, 
even if cooperation is conceived as the ‘Smithian result’. In Violence and Social Orders and 
elsewhere, he stresses the pervasiveness of violence and disorder. For him, institutional 
improvements that last are hugely difficult to achieve given the embeddedness of institutions in 
existing incentive structures and vice versa. Indeed, the (vast) game theoretical literature on the 
prisoner’s dilemma would suggest this, and when North refers to ‘players’ of the ‘game’ and the 
need for states and institutions to solve coordination problems, it is clear that the implications of 
this literature are also present in his thought. It has long been known that under conditions of 
bounded rationality and with certain minimum assumptions of self-regard, the provision of 
public goods will not be established to an optimal level by a fully competitive market in the 
absence of some extraneous force.  
Williamson’s ‘markets versus hierarchies’ perspective is a recognition of this, as is indeed 
much of the New Institutionalist literature. It should not be surprising then that for North 
cooperation remains a central problem within his market contractarian framework. Often, 
economists have argued that state coercion should play the role of enforcing provision of public 
goods; at other times, the ability of individuals to contract given the right informational 
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incentives has played a key role. North’s question where the institutional underpinnings of all 
this come from, how the normative structures and indeed the human orientation towards sociality 
and political commitment arise in the first place, should in my view be seen as a major step in 
research beyond these rather simple solutions. The contractarian perspective, the reliance on 
explanations based on strategic rationality, and the emphasis on institutionally supported market 
solutions do not disappear with this question. But insofar as the prisoner’s dilemma makes their 
easy achievement through individual self-interest unlikely, North has to answer it by introducing 
a different dynamic to link all the levels of his theory together: cultural evolution. To this I will 




Chapter 4: North’s theory of cultural evolution 
Introduction: towards adaptive efficiency 
In the previous chapter I have argued that North’s work, not least in the most recent phase of his 
theoretical development, is characterized by a fundamental ambiguity or contradiction in terms 
of the rationality of agents. I have examined this through the lens of his game theoretical framing 
of economic historical agents as ‘players’ of a ‘game’, as well as through the lens of the relation 
between individual rationality and collective cooperation, especially in the form of market 
exchange. The latter, I have argued, remains for North the primary desideratum, and his often 
‘orthodox’ views on the intrinsic merits of free competition in economics and politics thereby 
exist in some degree of tension with his critiques of rational choice and other methodological 
niceties that have hitherto (often) served as foundation for justifying those same views in 
mainstream economics. 
This is not to reduce North’s work to a simplistic laissez faire analysis. In North’s work the 
developmental economics implications revolve around the difficulties of achieving the ‘correct’ 
institutional framework, including frameworks of belief, that would allow an ‘open access order’ 
to function as it should. But it does mean that there exists for him some combination of the 
‘correct’ underlying institutional order with (more conventionally) a regime of strong property 
rights and free markets, whose necessity and desirability is given as the ‘Smithian result’ 
(discussed in chapter 2). I have argued in the previous chapter that North lacks a convincing 
account of the interaction between agents and institutions, of the origins of institutions 
themselves, and of how these result in determinate forms of behaviour. Without such an account, 
North must rely on the contractarian tradition and its examination of when individual self-regard 
does and does not allow for the collectively harmonious results the ‘Smithian result’ implies.  
In contemporary economics, conventional game theory, especially the many explorations 
of the prisoner’s dilemma, offer the most promising route for examining these problems. 
Unfortunately, as I have argued, the methodological limits of game theory often lead to 
indeterminacy of its results. To some extent this is due to the restrictive rationality assumptions 
required to achieve a (subgame) Nash equilibrium in many conventional games. Moreover, many 
explorations of the prisoners’ dilemma and its variants demonstrate that lasting cooperation is 
only likely to be achievable under those very restrictive conditions (for example via tit-for-tat 
strategies). An obvious approach would be an extension of the rationality concept of individual 
agents to a more realistic and broad conception of rationality, one that does not rest solely on 
‘common alignment of beliefs’ and perfectly informed self-regard. But as Shaun Hargreaves-
Heap and Yanis Varoufakis show, such extensions of rationality only make conventional game 
theory less determinate and applicable.  
Indeed North himself in his various critiques of neoclassical economists seems to insist on 
such broadening of rationality, on the importance of beliefs and ideologies beyond mere 
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Bayesian probability, and on the limitations of the perfect information and perfect competition 
tradition. Yet at other times, he is equally keen to emphasize self-interest as the guiding motive 
of agents in interaction with institutions ‘at the margin’ and his game theoretical rhetoric serves 
to underpin his contractarian presentation of the function of institutions. This ambiguity cannot 
be easily solved, because it rests on his desire to preserve what I suspect are mutually 
incompatible things. On the one hand North wants to preserve the ‘Smithian result’ as the 
idealized outcome of free societies, implied by the tradition of the ‘economics approach’ and its 
contractarian heritage, and on the other hand he insists on the necessity of accepting Polanyi’s 
challenge, with its implications of taking the different institutional and belief frameworks of 
different historical societies as fundamental to the analysis of their economies. These may appear 
at first glance to be compatible, but they founder on the rocks of inconsistent rationality concepts 
and inconsistent approaches to the market, as the last two chapters have argued. For this reason, I 
suggest he must choose between critiquing rational choice and conventional ideas of self-
regarding agency and maintaining the idea that the ‘economics approach’ will, via New 
Institutionalist Economics, safeguard the ‘Smithian result’ and its contractarian political 
economic heritage. 
However, in having said this North’s theoretical framework is not yet fully explored. For I 
have postponed a discussion of evolutionary game theory, experimental economics, and their 
implications to the present chapter. This is because North has yet another mechanism up his 
sleeve to make ‘history and institutions matter’: namely his theory of cultural evolution, by 
which means he moves from the rationality of individual agents to the macro-historical dynamics 
of institutional change he ultimately wants to describe. This mechanism, then, joins together the 
micro-level described in chapter 3 with the meso-level markets-and-hierarchies dynamic 
described in chapter 2, and adds to this a transhistorical macro-level dynamic. This last dynamic 
is sociocultural evolution and its effect on ‘economic performance’, an effect North describes 
with the term adaptive efficiency.372  
Fitting what one might call the ‘turn to biology’ (rather than physics) as source of inspiration for 
the social sciences, and with North’s stated admiration for Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution 
and its importance for economics, North seeks to do with evolutionary arguments what his 
indeterminate choice theoretical approach cannot: explain the origins and function of institutions 
and beliefs in terms of their effect on efficiency of economic cooperation.373 As North describes 
it, “put simply the richer the artifactual structure, the more likely are we to confront novel 
problems successfully. That is what is meant by adaptive efficiency; creating the necessary 
artifactual structure is an essential goal of economic policy.”374 The natural mechanism 
guaranteeing adaptive efficiency, it turns out, is essentially a classically liberal society: a 
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legitimate government, with limited powers, strong property and individual rights, and credible 
commitments against expropriation by government.375  
All these in turn must be underpinned by strong social norms that enable this structure to 
function, and this causes the difficulties policymakers face in simply proposing (as in e.g. the 
‘Washington consensus’) that poor or developing countries transform their political and 
economic structure into a liberal one. Oftentimes, North argues, the ideological commitment is 
missing due to long periods of ‘disorder’, and then the results will disappoint: “Because this 
cultural conditioning of a society usually takes place over generations it is fundamentally 
difficult to establish stable consensual order in societies that have experienced persistent 
disorder. In such cases authoritarian order may very well be preferred by the members of that 
society.”376  
In Violence and Social Orders, the link between adaptive efficiency, competition, and 
cultural evolution is clarified. Open access orders, the ideal types (so to speak) of the classical 
liberal polity defined above, have the greatest degree of adaptive efficiency because they have 
the greatest degree of market competition in them, in both the economic and political markets (as 
one will recall from chapter 1). This, in turn, has two beneficial effects for such adaptivity. 
Firstly, competition enables more ways of solving problems to be proposed and tested, which 
strengthens a society’s flexibility and therefore survivability in the face of a changing 
environment. Secondly, political competition means governments can offer more credible 
commitments in negotiation, which in turn allows for more conflict resolution without internal 
violence or ‘disorder’. In addition to these core benefits, North and colleagues also mention the 
beneficial economic effects of market competition, by allowing more market goods as well as 
more public goods to arise; the latter (perhaps a surprising claim) is seen as enabled by the 
impersonal nature of liberal government.377 All this creates, via market competition in the liberal 
and economic spheres and via liberal beliefs underpinning their legitimacy, a “virtuous circle of 
open access and competition”.378 
I will not at this stage go further into the political normative claims involved in this picture 
of idealized liberal society. I have alluded previously in this work to the particular classical 
liberal content of North (and colleagues’) normative framework, and I will have occasion to 
contextualize North’s work as a whole within this context in the final chapter. Here, I am more 
concerned with the evolutionary dynamic imputed to competition-as-adaptive-efficiency. I want 
to clarify more precisely what for North the relation is between the evolution of human cognition 
and sociality, the origin of institutions, and his narrative of economic history as the search for 
competitive institutions backed by commitment and belief. In the process, this will also allow me 
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to ask how North’s ambiguous approach to rationality discussed previously asserts itself in 
dealing with the cognitive and evolutionary sources of institutions, and the question of what 
room exists for human other-regard and altruism in his work. Finally, I will make an evaluation 
of his claims regarding cultural evolution, both for the origin story of human social institutions 
and the transhistorical classical liberal narrative of competition and efficiency. 
Section I. Examining North’s theory of cultural evolution 
The evolutionary dimension of North’s NIEH 
First off, we have to observe the peculiarities of the term ‘adaptive efficiency’. We know that 
North abandoned the ‘efficiency view’, the approach which functionally explains institutions as 
efficient responses in a given environment, long ago. North’s understanding of what makes for 
efficiency in the case of a whole artifactual framework would then need some explanation, which 
the claims about competitiveness and commitment would provide. More importantly, however, is 
the term ‘adaptive’. This term is unmistakably a reference to such efficiency coming about as the 
result of an evolutionary process: adaptations and adaptive are terms of art in evolutionary 
biology to describe how the unit of selection adjusts to its environment such as to increase its 
‘fitness’.379 If the efficiency of institutional arrangements as a whole is part of an evolutionary 
process, as the term suggests, this would imply that societies as a whole are, for North, units of 
selection in cultural evolution.  
There is evidence that North indeed sees things in this way. Although North begins UPEC 
by explicitly disavowing an immediate analogy between “Darwinian evolutionary theory” and 
the process of institutional change he sets out to describe, he attributes this difference not to the 
absence of selection (say), but to the intentionality of agents in bringing about institutional 
arrangements.380 This intentionality makes the process of change one of unintended 
consequences and path dependences at macro-level, produced by the peculiar “blending” of 
beliefs and preferences (as discussed in the previous chapter) North sees as the bedrock of choice 
at the micro-level.381 It is not obvious, however, why this intentionality should ipso facto prevent 
the operation of a process of cultural evolution. North repeatedly asserts that his difference with 
a ‘Darwinian’ approach and with evolutionary economics rests on the importance of 
intentionality (likely especially beliefs, given their important role in North’s theory) of 
                                                          
379 The concept of a ‘unit of selection’ is contested, and has given rise to considerable debate: see Sober and 
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individuals.382 But he provides no argument why or how this should qualify his own evolutionary 
account elsewhere. 
We must therefore consider to what extent North’s appeal to evolutionary reasoning is to a 
Darwinian-type process, and to that extent, how well it succeeds as such. But this requires also 
considering his objection to that identification: namely the importance of intentionality. By no 
means all evolutionary approaches to economics use an explicitly Darwinian type reasoning, as 
for example Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter did not do (see below for a further discussion of 
their work in the context of North).383 Indeed the use of Darwinian evolutionary thought is by 
some associated with the Old Institutionalist tradition in direct contrast to the New 
Institutionalists’ insistence that the purposeful action of agents makes a difference to the 
evolutionary mechanism.384 
But North gives no explicit argument why the centrality of intentionality to his account, as 
he sees it, should mean that his evolutionary argument cannot be compatible with a Darwinian 
account. Indeed, as a commonly held notion, that the intentionality of human beings falls outside 
the purview of Darwinian reasoning and invalidates the application of such reasoning to the 
production and evolution of culture, it is simply false. Indeed, the purpose of a Darwinian theory 
of cultural evolution is to explain this intentionality, both in its evolutionary origins and in the 
evolutionary effects of its operation. To assume human intentionality may be valid, but to 
consider it a point of disjunction with Darwinian evolution is not. As Hodgson and Knudsen 
note: “Darwinism does not take intentionality as given. It holds that intentionality and other 
human mental capacities must have evolved from similar but less developed attributes among 
our prehuman ancestors. It insists that intentionality must be explained rather than simply taken 
for granted.”385  
This is all the more striking because North’s subsequent argument does not actually imply 
any such disjunction. Far from seeing intentionality and its product, culture, as some form of 
irreducibly ‘thick’ social process that cannot be meaningfully explained in evolutionary terms, as 
some social scientists do, North himself undertakes his discussion in UPEC by rather suggesting 
the contrary. Firstly, he observes that human culture, including knowledge, beliefs, and learned 
habits, are a cumulative residue of past experience of members of a society, one that is inherited. 
This heritage not only “constrains the players” (here we are back at instrumental rationality), but 
in fact straightforwardly “determines societal performance at a moment of time”, elsewhere 
called the “performance characteristics of societies”.386 But there is more. North subsequently 
rightly points out that such cultural-institutional frameworks as make up societies are themselves 
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possible due to human evolution: partially the “genetic architecture of humans” that enables the 
cognitive and social behaviour so as to have culture, and partially “cultural evolution such as the 
development of institutions to favor larger group cooperation”.387 The origin of institutions (or 
culture) themselves is clearly evolutionary in nature. Finally, the process of path dependence, 
and other factors that tend to create continuity between generations of a culture despite ongoing 
change, operate analogously to heritability even in North’s own description. He describes long 
periods of incremental changes interspersed with brief periods of rapid change as a case of 
“punctuated equilibrium change”, and the temporal factor of economic history is explicitly 
mentioned as a reason to take inspiration (be it with the above reservation) from evolutionary 
theory.388  
It is clear that North is at times hesitant to commit too strongly to one or another position 
in the fraught debates on cultural evolution and evolutionary economics, but his account of the 
origins of institutions and of ‘adaptive efficiency’ are equally clearly meant as building on those 
ideas – not least on Hayek’s view of knowledge and traditions as heritable traits in a process of 
spontaneous cultural evolution.389 Similarly, North builds on the view of democracy as an 
evolutionary method developed in political science.390 Finally, the first six chapters of UPEC, 
roughly half the book, are dedicated to explaining adaptive efficiency, and of that, at least three 
chapters (3, 4 and 6), and arguably chapter 7 too, are specifically about evolutionary processes in 
the most literal sense.  
Of course, there have often been suggestions that evolutionary theories do apply to the 
process of culture and institutional change, but not a Darwinian one; for example in the appeals 
to the theory of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. There is something of a tradition of such appeals in the 
history of evolutionary approaches to institutions, including authors that North took inspiration 
from, as in the work of Friedrich Hayek, of Nelson and Winter (mentioned above), and even of 
Herbert Spencer.391 But as has been understood in evolutionary biology for a considerable time, 
no Lamarckian inheritance mechanism can exist independently of the Darwinian: if there is a 
Lamarckian form of inheritance, “the Lamarckian theory can explain adaptive improvement in 
evolution only by, as it were, riding on the back of the Darwinian theory.”392 And North is happy 
to invoke such a Darwinian product as the ‘genetic architecture of humans’, without which the 
intentionality so important to his approach could not have come to exist, and could not persist, in 
the first place. There can be no doubt then that whatever North’s reservations about what he calls 
Darwinism and intentionality or his hesitations to wade into this minefield, a full discussion of 
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North’s work requires investigating his account as a theory of cultural evolution that at least 
should meet criteria comparable to the Darwinian framework. Of course, this leaves open the 
question whether it is a consistent and complete evolutionary framework by such criteria, which 
is what I will now discuss. But it is worth noting that for a theory of cultural evolution to 
conform to Darwinian criteria, it need not be a complete Darwinian theory. In fact, no Darwinian 
evolutionary approach is complete on its own: it provides mechanisms, but these always need 
application in specific empirical contexts and using auxiliary theories for the specific case. It 
does however, at least in its modern form, define these mechanisms and the criteria for their 
operation with some degree of precision.393 
In order to proceed with understanding this account, we have to divide the discussion 
according to the two aspects of cultural evolution I have mentioned: the evolution of institutions 
as a problem of their origins, and the evolution of institutions as a problem of their dynamics 
over time and economic effects, i.e. of their persistence. Put differently, the first question is how 
and why an ‘artifactual framework’ comes into being in the first place, and the second question 
is how it works and changes once it is there, and what this means for its adaptive efficiency over 
time. North’s approach gives us sufficient means to discuss both aspects as part of an integrated 
process of cultural evolution that, if it is to succeed at all, must succeed in Darwinian terms, 
despite his own reservations. Although there are many different usages of the term ‘evolution’, it 
is generally agreed that for a Darwinian type process of evolution by means of natural (or 
artificial) selection to take place, all that is required is (high accuracy) heritability or 
reproduction, variability, and differential fitness (or competition, which is the same thing). 
North’s approach gives us these: we have cultural inheritance and path dependence (heritability), 
we have differential fitness (adaptive efficiency), and we have variation (“the immense variation 
in the performance characteristics of societies” North observes has its source in different 
institutional ‘traits’394).  
Using North’s own examples and ideas, I will explore his view of each of these in turn. 
Note that even given the possibility of an evolutionary account of these processes, as the above 
allows, it does not necessarily mean that such an account is the best or most plausible 
evolutionary account, or that the three criteria are rightly identified. In this chapter the task is 
therefore to evaluate how well North’s account works as a description of a process of cultural 
evolution, whether North has taken his inspiration for this account in the right places, and having 
identified problems with the account, to suggest a better way of conceptualizing cultural 
evolution and its relation to economic history. 
North and the origin of institutions 
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While North’s elaborate attention to theories of human cognition and its evolution may seem at 
first glance rather curious in a book on economic history, the evolutionary dimension of North’s 
work makes the importance of this subject for his approach more understandable. We have seen 
that beliefs are an important complement to more explicit institutional arrangements in North’s 
account, and the correct beliefs are essential in his view for an open access order – the ideal in 
adaptive efficiency - to come into being. Since beliefs emerge from the interaction of cognitive 
processes in the human brain with an uncertain and ergodic environment, as North ever 
emphasizes, that alone would suffice to pay some attention to what happens at this interface. But 
more than this, beliefs are also the source of institutions in the first place, despite their 
ambiguous instrumental role in North’s theory, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Since 
institutional frameworks as a whole are his preferred unit of selection, it stands to reason that he 
would be concerned with how beliefs arise and how they affect the translation of many 
individual rationalities (bounded as they are) into shared institutional orders and belief structures. 
Or as North puts it: “the beliefs that humans hold determine the choices they make that, in turn, 
structure the changes in the human landscape… We begin with exploring the mind of the 
individual as a necessary condition to understanding societal beliefs.”395 
North presents his account of the evolution of cognition as a necessary complement to 
standard accounts because of the inadequacy of rational choice equilibrium reasoning, i.e. 
neoclassical economics. Here we are on familiar ground, with North presenting his favoured 
approach as a necessary consequence of the inadequacy of neoclassical economics’ rationality 
concept (despite the internal inconsistencies discussed in chapter 3). Because beliefs matter, as 
North rightly insists, the acquisition of beliefs from the environment matters too. He surveys 
briefly theories of pattern recognition and the limited cognitive reasoning abilities of human 
minds. Then he observes how this contextualizes rational choice in a larger institutional 
framework, without doing away with it. This larger institutional framework is itself the process 
of evolutionary competition as a whole, and emerges from imperfect feedback on imperfect 
information and limited cognitive abilities. As he puts it: “the implication… for social science 
theorizing is that much of what passes for rational choice is not so much individual cogitation as 
the embeddedness of the thought process in the larger social and institutional context.”396 We 
again see here that the evolutionary dimension contributes to the continuous rethinking of what 
rationality means in North’s work, without an obvious solution to problems of indeterminacy 
presenting itself. In this sense, the evolutionary focus on learning and cognition almost acts as a 
‘backup’ reasoning for the problems North encounters in theorizing the interface between 
individuals and institutions in other works.  
But of course our own cognition is the result of biological evolution, and this raises the 
sociobiological problem of what this means for human sociality and culture. It is I think a 
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striking fact that North treats this in only a summary way, and mainly with the aim of 
emphasizing the importance of producing culture for human behaviour. The main antagonist here 
is the sociobiological school of ‘evolutionary psychology’, represented by John Tooby, Lana 
Cosmides and others, who have long asserted that the adaptive landscape of the Pleistocene has 
shaped a strongly modular human brain in such a way as to render much of our behaviour only 
explicable as adaptations to a prehistoric context long gone.397 North accepts that such 
‘universals’ may operate still, as maladaptations from a bygone era in the period of human 
civilization, but questions how far this can take social science given the vast variation in cultural 
traits displayed by human societies in history. Culture matters in an evolutionary picture, he 
rightly emphasizes, and it is not obvious how this school of evolutionary psychology can account 
for that in terms of institutional variation. As he insists, “the immense variation, however, in the 
performance characteristics of political/economic units over time makes clear that the 
Lamarckian characteristics of culture must also be central to the understanding of the process.”398 
Note again the use of evolutionary terms to describe cultural development and change 
(“Lamarckian”): North is not arguing against cultural evolution as such, merely the account of 
this branch of sociobiology.399  
Returning then to how culture emerges from “the link between the mind and the 
environment”, Hayek again looms large for North. Most important is Hayek’s observation from 
The Sensory Order that “the apparatus by means of which we learn about the external world is 
itself the product of a kind of experience. It is shaped by the conditions prevailing in the 
environment in which we live, and it represents a kind of generic reproduction of the relations 
between the elements of this environment which we have experienced in the past.”400 This is 
another cue for North to insist on the holistic nature of learning, its dependence on the 
experience of the world as mediated by the human environment (the society) as much as by the 
natural. Rather strikingly, he cites Edwin Hutchins to the effect that “we cannot adequately 
understand cognition without accounting for the fact that culture, context, and history . . . are 
fundamental aspects of human cognition and cannot be comfortably integrated into a perspective 
that privileges abstract properties of isolated individual minds.”401 (Again, one wonders how this 
squares with the account of agents in institutional change and the assumption of individual, 
instrumental rationality of such ‘players’ of the ‘game’ seeking to ‘line their pockets’ that we 
saw in the previous chapter.)  
The upshot of this is to see, with Hutchins and Hayek, learning as “adaptive reorganization 
in a complex system”, and institutions as cognitive instruments forming adaptations to present 
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(or past, in the case of path dependence) environments.402 These institutional frameworks and 
their greater or lesser ability to generate adaptive efficiency are then the subjects of selection. In 
other words, learning operates at group level as much as at individual level, because of the 
importance of social context to individual learning processes. Because of widespread uncertainty 
and continuous change, human learning and retention of knowledge is an essential evolutionary 
development towards culture. Institutions allow individual learning to proceed from an 
inheritance of culturally stored knowledge. These learning processes cause this larger whole, the 
institutionalized society or group, to act as the unit of selection of cultural evolution. These 
societies as a whole act so as to maximize their fitness (i.e. they adapt intentionally). He cites 
approvingly the work of Andy Clark, who writes that “when the external scaffolding of policies, 
infrastructure and customs is strong and (importantly) is a result of competitive selection, the 
individual members are, in effect, interchangeable cogs in a larger machine. The larger machine 
extends way outside the individual, incorporating large-scale social, physical, and even 
geopolitical structures. And it is the diffused reasoning and behavior of this larger machine that 
traditional economic theory often succeeds in modeling.”403 In other words, whether or not 
individuals act according to conventional models of rational choice, due to selective pressure, 
societies (institutional frameworks) as a whole do. But these processes are imperfect and it is 
difficult to achieve adaptive efficiency in such institutional arrangements, something only 
maximizing individual free competition under conditions of legitimizing beliefs and believable 
commitments to property rights can do.  
North makes this connection between the evolutionary origin of institutions in individual 
and collective learning and the macro-level evolutionary process explicit in a paragraph worth 
quoting in full: “When we move from Hutchins’s dynamic social group … to the larger 
implications for the structure, functioning, and process of change for a whole society we can see 
that the cultural heritage provides the artifactual structure—beliefs, institutions, tools, 
instruments, technology—which not only plays an essential role in shaping the immediate 
choices of players in a society but also provides us with clues to the dynamic success or failure 
of societies through time. In essence, the richer the artifactual structure, the greater the reduction 
of uncertainty in making choices at a moment of time. Over time, the richer the cultural context 
in terms of providing multiple experimentation and creative competition, the more likely the 
successful survival of the society. These generalizations require careful elaboration and 
qualification, but they are a foundation of this study.”404  
Macro-level evolution in North’s account 
At the macro-level, North moves from this cognitive framework to the unfolding of competitive, 
impersonal exchange as a mechanism making large-scale cooperation possible. This historical 
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process is not predetermined to succeed. Indeed, on North’s account, none other than the 
Western world have achieved it. The means of achieving such cooperation is a change in the 
payoffs in the game theoretical matrix such that cooperation becomes a dominant strategy. But 
because in North’s theory the choice set of institutional arrangements depends on beliefs and 
previous institutional arrangements, in other words because path dependence matters, this is not 
something that can be arbitrarily willed into being: “the shift from personal to impersonal 
exchange has produced just such a stumbling block both historically and in the contemporary 
world. Personal exchange relies on reciprocity, repeat dealings, and the kind of informal norms 
that tend to evolve from strong reciprocity relationships. Impersonal exchange requires the 
development of economic and political institutions that alter the pay-offs in exchange to reward 
cooperative behavior. The creation of the necessary institutions requires a fundamental alteration 
in the structure of the economy and the polity which frequently is not in the feasible set given the 
historically derived beliefs and institutions of the players.”405 Nonetheless, North is explicit that 
impersonal trade, the competitive market benchmark discussed in chapter 2, is the sine qua non 
of evolutionary success: “successful evolution has entailed radical alteration in economic 
institutions in order to make such long distance and impersonal trade viable.”406 
What needs clarification then is the connection between evolutionary processes, the by 
now familiar Northian notion of cooperation as market exchange, and adaptive efficiency. As 
one might expect, the missing link is the theory of transaction costs. Disclaiming any simplistic 
laissez faire views, North insists that because the evolutionary environment is constantly 
changing, the institutions necessary to maintain adaptive efficiency must do so too. There is 
therefore no simple, one-size-fits-all recipe. Rather, the lower the transaction costs in a given 
market situation, the more efficient market exchange and therefore the more cooperation. The 
constant adjustment of institutions required to maintain a low level of transaction costs is the 
process of evolutionary adaptation.407 Because of this, a simple Washington consensus 
development policy will not suffice, because there is simply insufficient knowledge among all 
the agents concerned to achieve the aim of efficient markets (one North otherwise shares).408 
North’s macro-level historical account, with its characteristic combination of viewing 
beliefs and institutions as constraints on instrumental reason and its evolutionary concern with 
path dependence and adaptivity, is then perhaps best summarized in his own words. “In a 
Coasian world the players would always choose that policy that maximized aggregate well-being 
with compensation for any losers; but the real transaction costs are frequently prohibitive 
reflecting deep-seated beliefs and prejudices that translate into such prohibitive transaction costs. 
It is more than two hundred years since Adam Smith explained the underlying sources of the 
wealth of nations but the extent to which such views are embedded in the decision-making 
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process of those shaping political/economic change is problematic.”409 In other words, we have 
known since Adam Smith that we need competitive markets to achieve wealth, and we need 
institutions protecting property and liberty to make such markets work, as well as a set of beliefs 
compatible with their maintenance. Moreover, such a competitive free market society also has 
the great virtue of being more adaptive than any other, and thereby able to produce a virtuous 
circle of self-perpetuation, the sign of its evolutionary fitness. The problem is that the ideological 
belief in or commitment to such competitive markets is often missing, in addition to the correct 
market incentives and secure property rights.  
The developmental recipe North proposes then has ‘evolutionary’ flexibility, in that it 
concentrates on ability to adapt rather than simply ‘getting the prices right’. But the recipe itself 
is much the same as that of classical liberal economics, albeit with a renewed emphasis on 
cultural and ideological factors.410 This is illustrated by the case study North uses to support his 
idea of adaptive efficiency in historical practice, namely the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. On 
North’s account, the Soviet system worked well for a while, but when confronted with a novel 
environment failed to adapt, lacking the institutional means to effect such change. As a result, its 
structure became mismatched with the present conditions, and the system collapsed – not unlike 
the extinction of organisms strongly adapted to a particular niche who fail to adapt to a changing 
environment.411 This dovetails with his endorsement of Hayek’s classic Austrian school 
argument against socialism, namely the way the price system carries dispersed and tacit 
information that the survival of an economic system cannot do without. From this viewpoint, 
market exchange, based on prices responsive to their environment, is the ‘Smithian’ solution to 
the adaptivity problem.  
But for North prices are not the only such carriers of intentional knowledge; institutions are 
too.412 The story of economic history is then the story of achieving (or failing to achieve) open 
access orders, which is to say, the right combinations of beliefs, institutions, and competitive 
markets in politics and economics to achieve adaptive efficiency. In Violence and Social Orders 
this account is complemented by an account of violence and the state. After all, North has not yet 
shown how social life is possible in the first place, i.e., how institutions arise in a durable 
fashion. For North and colleagues, the root of human cooperation is the limitation of violence.413 
This approach deepens cooperation beyond the ‘Smithian’ functions of market exchange. So in 
addition to the functions exercised for achieving cooperation by the market price system and by 
institutional norms, cooperation now also consists of the maintenance of durable social ties in 
larger groups itself. These are then a prerequisite, chronologically and analytically, for the 
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‘Smithian result’ and indeed any other institutional arrangement. (As we shall see, this emphasis 
makes sense, since the origins of sociality is one of the main points of debate in sociobiology and 
its economic implications.)  
The control of violence requires rent creation in addition to beliefs and institutions that 
maintain order, posing an additional obstacle to the evolutionary transformation of such ossified 
structures to a competitive and therefore more adaptive one. “Understanding social change in 
actual historical events requires separating institutions, organizations, and beliefs, as well as 
violence, in order to track their interrelated development over time… the transition [to open 
access orders] provides citizens with new tools, fewer restrictions, and greater scope for 
impersonal relations, all of which dramatically increase the gains from specialization and 
exchange while reducing the risk of expropriation.”414 Rule of law and democracy then appear as 
the correct institutions for competitive political markets as in UPEC strong private property 
rights and rules favouring efficient impersonal exchange are for competitive economic 
markets.415 This argument is in my view best seen as complementary to that of UPEC and the 
evolutionary process it describes, not as a substitute. Arguably, Violence and Social Orders does 
for a cultural evolutionary account of ‘political markets’ what UPEC does for a cultural 
evolutionary account of economic markets. Both are therefore complementary in the larger 
economic historical narrative that constitutes North’s NIEH.  
Section II. Evaluating North’s theory of cultural evolution 
Before moving on to an evaluation of this set of arguments, allow me for convenience to sum up 
my reading of North’s evolutionary account. Evolved intentionality – mediated by limited 
cognitive abilities - gives rise to beliefs and institutions of social life as heuristics in conditions 
of uncertainty. These beliefs and institutions shape and change the ‘human environment’, so that 
there is a constant changing interaction between these two domains. But the durable maintenance 
of social groups (on a larger scale) requires also the reduction of pervasive violence, as per a 
Hobbesian account, so that the institutions of the ‘natural order’ give rise to elites who can create 
and distribute rents in order to reduce this violence. This institutional whole gives rise to a 
particular incentive structure within which agents (individuals and organisations) pursue their 
aims in a boundedly rational fashion.  
This pursuit of preferences is presented as an ambiguous and indeterminate mixture of 
rational pursuit of self-interest given incentives and constraints imposed by slowly changing 
beliefs. Norms and values, self- or other-regarding, are part of the institutional structure insofar 
they are translated into rules enforced in society. However, although the enforcing body need 
perhaps not be the state, states or other elite controllers of violence and their subsidiary 
bureaucracies are usually presented as the main enforcers of institutions. I.e., political 
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enforcement is the main concern.416 Since institutions are constraints on action, these norms 
cannot affect the nature of rational action as such, although different institutions may produce 
different payoff matrices for cooperative or noncooperative behaviour. Conventional forms of 
utility maximization appear to be still the operating assumption, albeit in an indeterminately 
bounded manner.  
Agents seek to preserve or (incrementally) change institutions in pursuit of their own 
interests, a process which, being both imperfectly predictable and path dependent, further 
develops the non-ergodic nature of the human environment. Institutions are expressions of 
cultural learning and are inherited as social wholes, so that piecemeal adjustment is not easily 
achieved and so that cultures as a whole act as evolutionary replicators. Insofar as rent seeking 
and inefficient institutions and/or beliefs prevail, transaction costs will be high, thereby hindering 
the achievement of a competitive society geared for economic growth. As a result, many 
societies become locked into particular combinations of suboptimal institutions, political orders, 
and/or beliefs, which over the longer run become maladaptive in light of changing environments. 
Such societies then fail, as the Soviet example illustrates. Only insofar as institutions, beliefs, 
and political orders align to reduce transaction costs and to make economics and politics alike as 
impersonally competitive as possible can the (alleged) prediction of Adam Smith regarding the 
efficiency of market exchange be realized. This is what appears to be meant by economic or even 
‘societal’ performance. Moreover, only through competition will a society adapt to changing 
circumstances and therefore survive the selection process of cultural evolution. This is what 
appears to be meant by adaptive efficiency. 
North’s cultural evolutionary account in theoretical context 
One of the most striking aspects of North’s cultural evolutionary approach is how little it 
engages with existing relevant literature in either economics or sociobiology. Besides the brief 
dismissal of ‘Darwinian evolution’ as lacking in intentional explanation and an equally brief 
dismissal of the school of evolutionary psychology, North seems to have little interest in 
integrating his approach with existing evolutionary theories of culture or economic behaviour, or 
at least in explaining how this is to be done.417 Of course, Hayek is an exception to this; but 
Hayek’s work mostly predates the post-war revival of evolutionary economics as well as the rise 
of sociobiology, and itself does not much engage with other works along these lines, so that this 
rather underlines the problem. The question is, based on the analysis I have offered, whether this 
evolutionary approach in North is founded on more than the two somewhat opportunistic 
functions I have identified so far: namely, to give an account of how the set of institutions and 
beliefs associated with classical liberalism can be better than other sets of institutions, an account 
not based on the approach of neoclassical economics, and to circumvent his difficulties with the 
rationality question by moving from evolved cognition to beliefs and from beliefs to institutions 
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and their macroeconomic effects. In any case, for North’s account, the emphasis on beliefs and 
the analytical steps from bounded cognition to beliefs to institutions is clearly central.418  
These are absolutely legitimate and plausible areas of interest, and North is surely to be 
commended for his awareness of the problem where institutions come from and how they relate 
to beliefs, a problem that plagues the analytical separation between beliefs, preferences, and 
behaviour needed for rational choice approaches to work. (We have seen this problem already in 
the context of the discussion on game theory in the previous chapter.) But it is only a small part 
of the relevant problems in evolutionary economics, and an even smaller part of what is needed 
for a plausible and sufficiently complete sociobiological account of cultural evolution. Moreover, 
North’s political economic assumptions (most notably the virtues of the competitive society) 
produce a certain ‘motivated cognition’ in his evolutionary account that causes him to skate over 
some weakly developed points: his choice of units of selection, the nature of competition 
between societies that would cause differential survival, and the integration of his account with 
the evolution of intersubjective rationality, i.e. the interaction and cooperation between 
individuals that makes a society and its institutions possible in the first place, to name but a few. 
The first of these are important for the coherence of his account of an evolutionary mechanism, 
whereas the latter is perhaps the classic problem of integrating his contractarian view of 
cooperation and rationality, the topic of chapter 3, with what is known (or theorized) in 
sociobiology.  
Illustrative on this point is his one engagement with behavioural economics, namely one of 
the various game theoretical experiments testing rationality assumptions and their results 
undertaken in recent years. As we have seen before North cites Vernon Smith, Elizabeth 
Hoffmann and Kevin McCabe in an important summary of their work in this domain: “People 
invoke reward/punishment strategies in a wide variety of small group interactive contexts. These 
strategies are generally inconsistent with, but more profitable than, the noncooperative strategies 
predicted by game theory. There is, however, consistency with the game theoretic folk theorem 
which asserts that repetition favors cooperation, although we observe a substantial use of 
reward/punishment strategies and some achievement of cooperative outcomes in single play 
games. Non cooperative outcomes are favored, however, where it is very costly to coordinate 
outcomes, in large groups, and even in smaller groups under private information. In large groups 
interacting through markets using property rights and a medium of exchange, and with disperse 
private information, non-cooperative interaction supports the achievement of socially desirable 
outcomes. Experimental studies have long supported this fundamental theorem of markets. This 
theorem does not generally fail, however, in small group interactions because people modify 
their strict self-interest behavior, using reward/punishment strategies that enable some 
approximation of surplus maximizing outcomes. Seen in the light of evolutionary psychology, 
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such behavior is not a puzzle, but a natural product of our mental evolution and social 
adaptation.”419 
These observations are extremely significant for the integration of theories of ‘social 
adaptation’, the sources of cooperation, and the deviations of observed rational behaviour from 
the expectations of conventional game theory, which I consider among the central problems 
faced by a Northian approach. And yet North seems little concerned or interested by this; he has 
no difficulty, as we have seen, pursuing conventional game theory approaches to agents’ 
rationality while simultaneously appearing to endorse these conclusions. The connection with the 
evolution of cooperation as the central problem in accounting for the emergence of 
institutionalized society is not made; North simply observes that sociobiology has discussed this 
before, drops the subject, and moves on to the importance of the cognitive sources of 
‘nonrational’ beliefs.420  
In my view, North’s neglect of essential inputs into any cultural evolutionary theory is 
damaging for his account; but more importantly, it is a significant missed opportunity for 
discussing precisely this core area of overlap between problems in cultural evolution, in theories 
of rationality, and in evolutionary-institutional economics. I shall therefore in this section try to 
develop some of these points, both to show the limitations of North’s account in UPEC and 
elsewhere and to suggest directions in which, in my view, it could be fruitfully developed. This 
entails placing North’s cultural evolutionary theory in the context of wider debates in 
evolutionary economics and sociobiology. To limit this task to manageable proportions, I will 
not here review the whole of literatures in either of these fields, but restrict myself to a 
consideration of (respectively) some core problems with the nature of evolutionary mechanisms 
in economic structures and the sociobiological issue of the origins of cooperation and its 
implications for evolutionary accounts of institutions. Each of these I will discuss in a limited 
way, mainly seeking to draw out implications for North’s joining of evolutionary and New 
Institutional Economics and to show the importance of these debates for developing such an 
approach further. As I will show, as with North’s partial rejection of conventional 
microeconomic assumptions, his exploration of evolutionary dimensions of institutions is not 
flawed because such an approach is unnecessary, but rather for the opposite reason: North does 
not take his own logic to its theoretical conclusion. As before, I believe the most plausible 
interpretation of this phenomenon is North’s attachment to a contractarian view of cultural and 
economic institutions and to an idealized competitive market society as the ideal institutional 
arrangement. 
The context of evolutionary economics 
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The application of evolutionary arguments to the analysis of the modern economy, in particular 
that of the capitalist firm, goes back to at least the work of Thorstein Veblen.421 In more recent 
times, the work of Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter did much to put the identification of 
evolutionary dynamics in the economics of the firm, and by extension microeconomics in 
general, back on the agenda.422 In their work, Nelson and Winter applied the theory of natural 
selection to the interaction between firms in an economy over a longer period of time, 
emphasizing the effects of competition on the differential economic survival of such firms. 
While the idea of economic competition as akin to the ‘survival of the fittest’ was nothing new 
(already a favourite metaphor of Spencerian liberalism in the Victorian age), more significant 
was Nelson and Winter’s identification of the units of replication and selection. Emphasizing that 
firms were not necessarily fully profit maximizing, nor the market necessarily in a state of 
equilibrium, they concentrated on the internal organization of the firm as the heritable equivalent 
to the genotype. The firm itself being the phenotypical expression of routines and habits of 
organisational behaviour within it, such routines were, for Nelson and Winter, replicators that 
had both the necessary stability and heritability and the necessary potential for random or non-
random variation required for a process of selection. These are then the units of selection.423  
In this way, Nelson and Winter could identify within the domain of industrial organisation 
and modern market competition an evolutionary process by observing how it fulfilled the 
necessary criteria: the existence of sufficiently stable, but mutable units, of their heritability, and 
of a process of differential survival. For the moment, the point is not whether Nelson and Winter 
were right to identify routines as units of selection in this manner, but simply to realise the 
significance of this argument. In Nelson and Winter’s account, the interaction between the 
organisation of firms and the competition between firms is identified as an actual process of 
natural selection, not merely a politically convenient metaphor or analogy as in the Spencerian 
tradition. Indeed, as Marcus Becker notes, the analysis of routines became very influential in 
reviving the promise of an evolutionary economics precisely because “the great promise that the 
concept of routines holds for evolutionary economics is that it might enable the application of an 
evolutionary explanation in economics”, that is to say, it would be “a cornerstone of an 
evolutionary theory of economic change”. With the identification of a gene equivalent, suddenly 
the prospect of actual Darwinian selection, not just metaphorical Darwinism, became possible in 
the economic sphere.424 
The affinity of such approaches with institutional economics is easy enough to see. 
Evolutionary explanations serve to explain change, and rather than the static equilibrium 
approaches of perfect competition neoclassical economics, they are easily combined with 
imperfect markets and imperfect information assumptions. The behaviour of economic agents 
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under uncertainty is an important area of study of institutional economics, as we know, and 
therefore the two go together very easily. One early example is Armen Alchian’s evolutionary 
analysis of competition under uncertainty, where the main theoretical innovation was to 
substitute survival (fitness) for profit maximization per se in the model of firm interaction and 
market change.425 (This paper was an inspiration for Nelson and Winter’s work as well.) 
Moreover, the element of heritability and the constraints on incremental change as a result of 
random or constrained mutability of the unit of replication both imply the importance of 
historical trajectories of change, i.e. path dependence. In North’s account, we have already 
encountered the importance of Alchian’s emphasis on uncertainty and the role of path 
dependence; indeed North’s NIEH is in part so interesting precisely as an exemplar of the joining 
of certain strands in (new) institutional economics and in evolutionary economics. 
The foundation of this merger are two insights, already incipient (but not explicitly stated 
in these terms) in Nelson and Winter’s work: that Darwinian selection is a generalizable theory 
not limited to the sphere of nonhuman biology, but directly applicable in reality (rather than 
metaphorically) to certain sociocultural human systems; and that understanding an economy 
means understanding economic change in an ‘embedded’ fashion, that is to say understanding 
the role of the institutional structure of an economy and its social context, and that such 
institutions must exist to complement markets in any economic structure not possessed of perfect 
competition and perfect information. The generalization of Darwinian theory simply follows 
from the nature of Darwinism itself: it is a process that applies if and only if the criteria of 
variation, selection (through competition), and heredity apply, although its application to the 
social sphere requires identification of evolutionary units beyond the genetic, ‘cultural’ units 
such as habits or institutions. The viewpoint of generalized Darwinism is defended by Howard 
Aldrich, Geoffrey Hodgson and colleagues when they observe that although “cultural selection 
processes are different from biological selection processes”, it is nonetheless the case that where 
these criteria can be identified, “the  expression  of  the  underlying  core  Darwinian  principles  
of variation,  inheritance  and  selection  differ  in  important  ways,  yet  the  overarching general 
principles remain.”426 Indeed, Darwinian selection is a general theory, describing the nature and 
operation in abstract terms of a particular algorithmic process. For this reason, it is not limited to 
the description of the operation of particular biological mechanisms alone, but applies generally 
wherever the algorithmic process operates on relevant entities.427  
The point of contestation should not be, therefore, whether Darwinian selection can in 
principle be generalised, but rather where in human sociocultural life it can fruitfully be applied 
and to what units of selection. This also entails, however, recognising the warning of these 
economists that Darwinian theory, precisely because of its generality, is incomplete. It is all too 
easy to apply the language of selection to any given sociocultural process; it is quite another 
                                                          
425 Alchian 1950. 
426 Aldrich et al. 2008, p. 580. 
427 See e.g. Dennett 1995 for an animated elaboration of this point. 
136 
 
thing to demonstrate its real (rather than metaphorical) applicability. As Aldrich et al. rightly 
write: “Darwin’s principles of evolution do not themselves provide a complete explanation. 
Darwinism does not provide a complete theory of everything, from cells to human society. 
Instead, these principles are a kind of ‘meta-theory’, or an over-arching theoretical framework 
wherein theorists place particular explanations. Crucially, explanations additional to natural 
selection are always required to explain any evolved phenomenon… Selection is a general 
principle, but it operates in different ways in different contexts. Likewise, the general Darwinian 
principle of variation applies, but it does not itself explain how variation occurs.”428 North is then 
certainly defensible when he proposes a theory of cultural evolution, but the use of evolutionary 
language is not sufficient on its own to constitute an appropriate explanation. We must keep this 
in mind when evaluating North’s particular theory of cultural evolution. Moreover, the precise 
operation of natural selection in a sociobiological context is also controversial, even if the 
applicability in principle is not, as we shall see further below. 
The interesting properties of Darwinian selection, well explored in evolutionary biology 
since the post-war period, lend themselves to the ‘elective affinity’ with institutional economics 
discussed above. A discussion of this affinity must be undertaken with some care. As we have 
seen, the NIE is divided into more neoinstitutional and more ‘heterodox’ strands, and they have 
different definitions of institutions. Moreover, as Jack Vromen has pointed out, there is an 
important difference between those evolutionary approaches concentrating on the evolution of 
market competition in capitalist economies, as exemplified by Nelson and Winter’s work (but 
arguably also that of Veblen and Commons), and those approaches interested in the more 
sociobiological question of cultural evolution as a whole, within which economic evolution is a 
(central) special case, as exemplified by Hayek and North.429 This division has much in common 
with the distinction between neoinstitutionalism and NIE(H) proposed by Eggertsson. In both 
cases, the former tends to take the given ‘allocation system’ for granted and focuses on 
competition and markets in modern economies, whereas the latter is interested in a more macro-
level perspective. In the Hayekian tradition of North, this includes larger historical dynamics, 
potentially spanning various allocation systems and cultural-institutional frameworks. However, 
the analogy is not complete. Much of the neoinstitutional tradition itself, as exemplified by the 
work of Williamson, Coase, and others, still hews too closely to the neoclassical model of the 
agent as rational contractor. It allows only for change and learning in a static, probabilistic way. 
Although markets are imperfect and transaction costs persist in such models, they do not allow 
for the role of uncertainty, nor for understanding learning and innovation as ongoing processes of 
finding local efficiencies. This, in turn, means that they lack a natural affinity with the blindly 
searching algorithmic selection process that Darwinian natural selection represents.430 
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Keeping this in mind, the affinities between the generalised Darwinian approach and at 
least some institutionalisms are worth restating. Darwinian selection is blind, thereby not 
inherently requiring any particularly sophisticated rationality nor informational acquisition on the 
part of its ‘phenotypes’ and none at all on the part of its ‘genotypes’. Even where no obvious 
equivalent to genotypes and phenotypes exists, it can still operate just fine without requiring any 
intentionality on the part of the replicators, pace North, as long as the criteria of generalised 
Darwinism apply. This lends itself well to its use in contexts where less than perfect rationality is 
assumed, and where uncertainty prevails and information is scarce. Moreover, Darwinian 
selection searches only for local ‘efficiency’, and defines such efficiency purely in terms of 
differentiated survival – contrary to popular belief, no actual implications of improvement, 
progress, or ‘optimality’ are implied by natural selection. This makes for a natural fit with 
approaches to economics that emphasize the contingency and limits of efficiency in markets (or 
other economic modes of organisation), such as institutional economics. Finally, the core of 
modern evolutionary theory is the interaction between a population subject to selection pressures 
and its environment, and in an economic analysis this readily evokes the relation between 
economic agents and a social-institutional context.  
North’s most recent works illustrate, as we have seen, all of these elective affinities. For 
this reason the evaluation of his work must have implications for assessing the utility of 
approaches in the general theory cluster one might call ‘institutional-evolutionary economics’ 
(involving both the Veblen-Alchian-Nelson/Winter school and the Hayek-North school), of 
which one could argue his NIEH is an important part.431 This perspective can help us understand 
better North’s emphasis on the cognitive operation of learning processes beyond simple Bayesian 
probabilistic models and why this emphasis is combined in the same work  with the introduction 
of evolutionary (if, according to North, ‘Lamarckian’) mechanisms into his theory.  
What evolves?  
It is clear then that North’s approach belongs in a more ambitious and historical form of cultural 
evolutionary theory than the evolutionary study of firms and market competition. The latter 
school has, as we have seen, to some extent converged on identifying routines and/or habits as 
replicators and units of selection.432 That is to say, this approach to Darwinian sociobiology uses 
David Hull’s influential division between ‘replicators’ (those entities that are stable and 
preserved in the hereditary process) and ‘interactors’ (the relevant units of the population subject 
to selection pressure) – the generalised theory of which the genotype-phenotype distinction is the 
biological special case.433 In the case of the evolutionary theory of the firm, the routines act as 
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replicators and the firms themselves constitute the population, as mentioned. The advantage of 
such an approach is that it contributes to clarifying one of the central problems in the application 
of generalised Darwinian theory to a specific sociocultural case. This is an ongoing debate within 
philosophy of biology, and involves a number of different problems in a given case: what the 
unit of selection is, what it is that is doing the adapting, what it is that is subject to variable 
survival (i.e. what the replicator is), and what is the ultimate agent that ‘benefits’ from ‘success’ 
in the process of natural selection.434 I will not review all these here, although in returning to the 
potential contribution of sociobiology to historical theories of cultural evolution we will 
encounter them again.  
For my purposes, what matters is that in the specific case of the evolution of the firm, the 
advantage of the identification of routines and the subsequent literature theorizing its 
evolutionary mechanisms is that it can to some extent successfully answer these questions in a 
precise way. Moreover, the answers can be linked directly to empirically observable phenomena 
in the economic entities and behaviours in question. While this does not guarantee the theory is 
the most fruitful description of competition and change between and within firms in a modern 
market economy, it does give the evolutionary approach sufficient grounding to be more 
plausible than a mere ‘just so’ story. But unlike the tradition of Nelson and Winter, Alchian, and 
others, North is not primarily interested in an evolutionary explanation of market processes and 
organisational change themselves. In fact, if my argument in the previous chapters is right, he is 
so to speak consistently inconsistent in whether to take a more neoinstitutional approach to this 
domain – focusing on rational pursuit of maximum payoffs when confronted with transaction 
costs – or to adjust, in some indefinite manner, the model to account for a different form of 
rationality. North’s evolutionary mechanism is not in fact located at the meso-level of the short 
to medium term operation of markets, hierarchies, and organisational and institutional structures 
within a given historical society’s economic formation. It is located at the micro-level, in the 
importance of cognition and other human genetic heritage as products of evolution; and more 
importantly, it is located at the macro-level, in the evolution and adaptation of whole institutional 
orders, indeed whole societies and cultures, over the long run. As he himself has indicated, it is 
the tradition of Hayek, not of Veblen or Nelson and Winter, that is the most important for 
North’s account.435 This presents two daunting challenges. If, for the sake of argument, we 
accept the replicator-interactor distinction conventional in evolutionary economics as useful, at 
each level the relevance and plausibility of the evolutionary account then has to be justified in 
terms of the four questions posed above. Since these are more closely connected, despite their 
different scopes and levels of abstraction, they require an integrated evaluation. I will begin this 
by concentrating on the macro-level role of evolution in his account, since it is arguably the most 
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controversial, but this soon brings us to problems in North’s micro-level evolutionary account as 
well.436 
A helpful start is to show the points of contrast between North’s approach and that of 
Hayek. There are two major differences between Hayek’s evolutionary account of spontaneous 
order and North’s account of adaptive efficiency. The first is that for Hayek, the rationality and 
intentionality of individuals was given, and not in need of explanation. Culture in Hayek’s view 
was strictly reducible to the cumulative outcome of the choices of individuals, and the nature of 
these choices as such was not in question.437 In North, however, the problem of the formation of 
beliefs and their interactive dialectic with the human (institutional) environment is a central area 
of concern. Unlike the Austrian tradition of Hayek, North has no difficulties per se with 
admitting psychology into the model of individual behaviour. This leads to the second major 
difference, which is that for Hayek, the “selective evolution” of rules “by imitative learning” he 
identified was undertaken according to the requirement of the fitness of a particular individual or 
group adopting the rule.438  
In the functionalist account that evolutionary explanations always entail, one can have an 
efficiency view such as this, or a non-efficiency view, in which the phenomenon in question is 
explained by its function within a larger system but without the assumption of this function 
contributing to the fitness of that system. The rational choice tradition and Hayek adopt the 
former view, and North, in the later stages of his work (where evolution makes its appearance) 
seems to reject such a view, given his overall rejection of efficiency explanations of institutions 
and his emphasis on beliefs and irrational elements of human intentionality.439 These are easily 
interpretable as distancing his view of institutional evolution from the contradictions in Hayek’s 
approach identified by Geoffrey Hodgson: namely between Hayek’s functionalist and fitness-
maximisation based explanation of institutions as products of conscious choice and his equally 
evolutionary appeal to the unconscious operation, via routines and habit, of inherited cultural 
norms and traditions.440 These need not inherently be contradictory, but require a consistent 
explanation connecting the two. Hayek’s refusal to specify how the psychology of the individual 
relates to a group, and how the relevant psychology or rationality of either is defined when 
‘choosing’ institutions or when following habitual norms and routines, makes him – as Hodgson 
points out – incapable of explaining either the formation of institutions or the evolutionary 
process that supposedly generates spontaneous order.441 
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Yet North’s attempt at escaping these contradictions ends up generating analogous ones. 
Firstly, as I have argued in the previous chapter, North is inconsistent in his explanation of how 
individuals relate to institutions. Explanations in terms of self-interest clash with explanations in 
terms of potentially irrational belief systems, and simultaneously game theoretical models 
relying on fairly strict criteria of common rationality and beliefs are joined with explanations in 
terms of indeterminate and undefined constraints on individual choice sets. In light of Hodgson’s 
critique of Hayek’s evolutionary theory, North’s inconsistency in models of rationality can now 
also be better understood. Tellingly, in North the problem of efficiency in functionalist 
explanation also recurs. While North has argued for a long time against the neoinstitutional 
assumption he once shared, that institutions are necessarily economically efficient or the result of 
the pursuit of gains in a market-like setting (although without achieving full consistency in his 
rejection of this view), he nonetheless identifies an ideal type of society (the open access order) 
which has maximally adaptive properties, and so is both economically and evolutionarily 
‘efficient’ in that sense (although he occasionally admits this is difficult to define442).  
It is no coincidence that North’s most frequent references to Hayek are just on this point. 
Hodgson points out that for Hayek’s evolutionary free market argument to work, there must be 
evolutionary selection by means of the market, but not between the market and other economic 
forms, for in that case the market itself as an allocation system is no longer ‘guaranteed’ to be the 
most adaptive process in a given case. Hayek (rightly) denies on the basis of the blind nature of 
cultural evolution that one could determine one society to be ‘good’ as opposed to another, but 
simultaneously argues that the ideal type classical liberal society (which Hodgson, after Hayek, 
dubs the ‘Great Society’ vision) is the yardstick of evolutionary progress.443 North engages in a 
similar double denial. While rejecting simplistic ‘free market’ arguments as insufficiently 
mindful of the suboptimality of most institutions and beliefs and the difficulty of moving away 
from such low level equilibrium traps, he does maintain that the ideal type classical liberal 
society – not a Great Society but an open access order – is objectively a society with the highest 
level of evolutionary fitness: it is most adaptively efficient. But by what criterion could North 
decide this? He asserts this, but can only justify it on the basis of the claim that market 
competition (in the economic and political sphere) equates to evolutionary competition. As with 
Hayek, this claim is not itself defended, nor is the possibility of evolutionary selection between 
markets and other arrangements permitted to play a significant role: at this level, as I have 
argued, North suddenly falls back onto ambiguous game theoretical argumentation.  
I submit that only by violating his own assumption of a real evolutionary process in 
cultural evolution - which is blind, amoral, and knows only local optima - and substituting for it 
a metaphorical evolutionary process of the Victorian classical liberal (Spencerian) type can 
North defend this view. It is rather striking then that the maximally adaptive society turns out to 
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be that of the contemporary Western world. North’s claim regarding the Western world can not 
be saved by the argument that economic growth – serving as a measure of ‘economic 
performance’ – is the relevant measure of fitness for competing access orders, for economic 
growth in the Western world has been laggard and declining for decades in contrast to many 
societies described as ‘natural states’.  
Although there is no space here to pursue the argument systematically, the Eurocentric 
dimensions of North’s historical account become clear when one considers how the achievement 
of the open access order is entirely credited to transformations internal to a small number of 
European (and European settler) societies. The impressive growth rates relative to these societies 
of e.g. the Soviet Union throughout much of its existence, or of the Asian tigers in more recent 
years, and the acknowledged irrelevance of economic growth at all in most of economic history; 
none of these prevent North from resuscitating a rather old-fashioned account of the ‘rise of the 
West’, be it now in terms of the evolution of adaptive efficiency.444 But competition is not per se 
a measure of economic growth, economic growth is not an obvious analogue of biological 
fitness, and North’s argument does not give us reason to believe in these identifications and 
analogies, for he never explicitly defends them. It is therefore hard to take this view seriously as 
more than a historically oriented justification of Whig (if not quite laissez faire) politics and of a 
development economics oriented to imitating Western institutional orders.  
North differs strongly from Hayek in not believing that the price system itself is a 
sufficient mechanism to achieve the idealized adaptivity of the ‘Great Society’; as he frequently 
avers, he differs with Hayek in that North sees ‘social engineering’ as necessary and therefore 
changes in institutions, political structures, and even belief systems as necessary for making 
societies more adaptively efficient (something Hayek denied was either possible or desirable).445 
But this difference, despite initial appearances and North’s own rhetoric, turns out to be mostly a 
difference of preferred policy. The problems and inconsistencies in their respective theories of 
cultural evolution are fundamentally similar. Compare this to Hodgson’s description of Hayek: 
“While Hayek rejects the suggestion that evolution automatically leads to progress, he also has a 
clear criterion by which advance may be judged: to the extent that rules consistent with the Great 
Society emerge, function, and overcome the assumed atavistic and collectivist instincts of 
humankind, then progress is deemed to be made.”446  
North, contrary to Hayek, is not so negative about the ‘collectivist instincts’, seeing them 
as indispensable: even suboptimal, rent-seeking political institutions and structures are better 
than none, in the face of uncertainty and pervasive violence. Moreover, North continuously 
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stresses that they are the results of the choices of intentional individuals and organisations whose 
choice and learning processes are themselves evolved; so that, contra Hayek, the possibility of an 
evolutionary explanation of institutional orders inherently requires an acceptance of the 
malleability of societies. This I think is what North means when he says we cannot do without 
social engineering, and also what he might mean by contrasting intentional evolution with 
Darwinian evolution.447 But he is for that reason all the more worried about how difficult it is for 
them to make the desired form of social cooperation, a competitive market order, possible. 
Humans are certainly often enough in North’s account far from the self-interested rational actors 
he criticizes in neoclassical ‘anthropologies’, but North is equally uncertain about whether they 
can really be sufficiently innately cooperative or even altruistic to make enduring large-scale 
cooperation and reduction of violence a likely result. So North hovers uneasily in between, 
condemned to a ‘pessimistic anthropology’ and unstable contractarian solutions. He is more 
aware of, and more worried by, the possibility of collapse and disorder or enduring illiberal and 
‘inefficient’ economic and political systems than Hayek, and this colours his approach.448 
The source of this problem is therefore not just the ideological and political component of 
classical liberalism and ‘Smithian results’ in North’s work. As Hodgson rightly points out in the 
case of Hayek, this ideological argument is buttressed by a lack of specification of the required 
evolutionary mechanisms themselves: for example, in terms of answers to the four questions 
about replication, competition, and selection described above. In North’s account, societies as 
such seem to appear and disappear depending on their adaptive efficiency in the longer run, as 
illustrated by his account of the decline and fall of the Soviet Union.449 In this argument, whole 
institutional orders/artifactual frameworks are interactors, in some senses analogous to 
phenotypes, whereas North appears to suggest that their success or failure depends on the 
“evolution of beliefs”, which would make the latter the replicators.450  
But when we ask further questions, troubling ambiguities creep in. In the classic account of 
the ultimate beneficiaries of evolution supported by the work of Richard Dawkins, the salient 
fact of evolution is that those lineages which differentially survive and whose causal effect on 
the nature and continuity of further generations are the beneficiaries of evolution.451 In the 
Northian case, this would mean we should expect in the Soviet case that as replicators, the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the selection process should be lineages of beliefs, ones that would give 
rise to subsequent ‘types’ of societies. North is quite sceptical of the idea that beliefs will change 
easily or rapidly in the face of changing environments.452 We would therefore expect North to 
argue that the process of cultural evolution he describes is ultimately about the variable 
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frequency of particular belief systems among the larger ‘population’ of societies or economic 
systems. But for North, the point of the Soviet illustration is to show that the Soviet Union was 
too internally rigid to adjust to the ‘environment’ when it changed: “Adaptive efficiency entails 
an institutional structure that in the face of the ubiquitous uncertainties of a non-ergodic world 
will flexibly try various alternatives to deal with novel problems that continue to emerge over 
time. In turn this institutional structure entails a belief structure that will encourage and permit 
experimentation and equally will wipe out failures. The Soviet Union represented the very 
antithesis of such an approach.”453  
This does not suggest that the differentiating frequency of belief lineages throughout 
human history serves as the measure of evolution, i.e. that surviving belief lineages are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of evolution – as would be implied by his discussion of the ‘evolution of 
beliefs’ and how the survival of whole societies depend on it. Rather, this suggests that in 
addition, there is a different selection process going on where internal “failures” are “wiped out”, 
supported by a belief system that allows such selection to take place: here belief systems are not 
subject to selection, but determine whether selection takes place. This implies (although does not 
explicitly state) that we return rather to the Hayekian view of market competition as a process of 
selection, as is also suggested by North and colleagues’ discussion of the advantages of open 
access orders.454 In such a selection process, the entrepreneurial firms, organisations, or 
individual agents or whatever the relevant competing units may be in political or economic 
markets are the interactors, and the replicators the societies (i.e. integrated artifactual 
frameworks of institutions and beliefs) that survive or ‘die’ by the ability of such ‘entrepreneurs’ 
to adjust to changing circumstances in well-functioning markets.  
The point here is not to resolve this conundrum, but rather to point out that North is 
conflating two different levels at which selection takes place. Each has different units of 
selection and different replicators and interactors implied in the argument. North does not appear 
to be clearly aware of the importance of such identifications to the success of an evolutionary 
description of institutional change. It is certainly forgivable that he says little about the internal 
structure of organisations in economic markets (although more about political ones) and their 
role as replicators within the evolution of such organisations, as this is well covered by extant 
literature in evolutionary economics. It is less forgivable that he should, for the sake of joining a 
Hayekian argument about markets to a less Hayekian argument about the importance of beliefs 
and instituted orders so conflate various elements and levels of an evolutionary mechanism. But 
this is not yet all. For the foundation of each of these mechanisms, whether mutually compatible 
or not, is the evolved human individual and their ability or inability to achieve cooperation on a 
larger scale: the very possibility of a human ‘order’ under conditions of pervasive uncertainty, 
limited information, and the prisoner’s dilemma’s pessimistic implications for the achievement 
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of cooperation on the basis of self-interest. This is arguably the central problematic underlying 
Violence and Social Orders, even if most the discussion in that work concentrates on the 
operation of states and markets and their interaction, rather than on the origins of human sociality 
or cooperation per se. 
This is where the link between North’s Hayekian macro-level evolutionary theory and the 
implications of sociobiology must be made. For Hodgson, if we want to take the evolutionary 
account of the emergence and change of allocation systems seriously, we must see ‘the market’ 
itself (in all its varieties) as one of the possible outcomes of the process of selection, and as itself 
subject to whatever selection processes may operate in cultural evolution. 455 This point, already 
alluded to above, moreover implies that we must also be able to account for the origins of such a 
system in terms of its evolutionary ancestors, and explain how those ancestral forms could and 
did lead to those particular outcomes. Such reasoning is the bread and butter of much ethology 
today, and is equally important in applications of evolutionary theory to social life. This means 
we must be able to trace North’s evolutionary subjects or agents at the macro- and meso-level - 
crudely put, societies and markets respectively – to their own origins in a consistent way. We 
must move now to evolution at the micro-level. 
There may be no appeal to original creation: the story must be Darwinian all the way 
through. North seems to realize this insofar as he tries to derive institutional orders from beliefs 
that generate them, and equally market processes from institutional orders. The ambiguous 
“complex blend” of an individual’s beliefs and interests I have discussed in chapter 3, jointly 
constituting North’s model of rationality of the individual agent insofar as they determine or 
explain behaviour, is in this sense also the evolutionary microfoundation of North’s NIEH 
theory. But it itself must be explainable in evolutionary terms, and all the problems of North’s 
approach to rationality threaten to recur if he does not have an adequate account at this micro-
level either. We must therefore now, finally but perhaps most fundamentally, take a critical look 
at how North treats the origins of human sociality (cooperation, altruism, and selfishness 
combined) in the context of cultural evolution/sociobiology, and how he selects from the 
arguments and evidence in this literature the model of human rationality – both in analytical 
isolation and interaction – he considers most appropriate.  
Interpreting North’s comments on sociobiology and cooperation 
I will argue here that North’s account has the merit of rightly identifying one of the central 
problems in the sociobiological literature on the evolution of cooperation among humans, 
namely how such cooperation is possible and sustainable in larger groups where most will not be 
kin or even regularly interact, given limited information. North, I think rightly, seems to suspect, 
although this remains rather implicit, that this problem requires a solution in a better 
understanding of the conditions for the evolution of altruism and other-regarding behaviours and 
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attitudes among humans. He also is keen, for example in his discussions of the evolution of 
cognition, to take human individuals seriously as evolved organisms and to examine the 
implications of this for the nature of human cooperation.  
However, North does not develop this point particularly far. He does not pay sufficient 
attention to the implications this debate has, or rather should have, for his view of individual 
rationality and for his contractarian account of institutions. In the contractarian tradition he 
remains unduly pessimistic about the ability of cooperation to emerge in other ways than through 
instrumental reason, at least in larger groups, and views cooperation in a Hobbesian framework 
as dependent on power and institutions that will restrain violence and self-interest even within 
given societies or groups. As we have seen in my discussion of alternative models of rationality 
in the previous chapter, while his sophisticated approach to beliefs is laudable, his approach to 
preferences is more conventional. A rounded evolutionary picture also requires a re-examination 
of preferences. I will argue that the revisions to North’s view of rationality I have defended in the 
previous chapter can better be reconciled with recent literature on the evolution of cooperation 
and altruism than North’s own approach can – or rather that those parts of North’s account that 
still assume individual rationality to be fundamentally self-regarding, non-altruistic, and only 
instrumentally cooperative be jettisoned in favour of those incipient tendencies in his work that 
take altruism and cooperation to be more fundamental. However, in order not to explain away 
the problem of cooperation, one must then place an explanation of such cooperative tendencies 
on a strong evolutionary and empirical footing. 
Additionally, North’s inadequate larger-level evolutionary theories prevent the necessary 
joining of such a macro-level theory of cultural evolution to the sociobiological foundations I 
believe the recent literature makes possible. To round off the substantive and to some extent 
immanent critique of North’s work of the middle three chapters of this work, then, I will propose 
that the sociobiological school of gene-culture coevolution can show how such an integration 
between micro- and macro-level evolution, based on multi-level selection theory, might be 
possible in a more plausible manner. This would not quite form a theory of cultural evolution in 
its own right, a school still much in its infancy despite great advances in sociobiology over the 
last three decades or so; but it would point the way to how one might get past the aporias 
generated by North’s muddled treatment of the units of selection problem and his Hayekian view 
of markets and competition. 
I can here only point in the direction of an alternative approach to the problem of 
cooperation to the one North uses, partially complementary to some (but not all) of his 
statements on the subject. In a larger sense this would require the integration or application of 
two literatures. One is the empirical literature on cooperation and altruism from behavioural 
economics, often based on experiments in testing the predictions of conventional game theory.456 
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The other is the sociobiological literature, often reliant on evolutionary game theory, on the 
origins and nature of altruism and cooperation in the human species.457 As in the previous 
discussions, I intend no general overview of sociobiology nor of experimental economics, and 
the literatures in both areas have, in the three or four decades of their existence, already grown 
much too large to do even a cursory justice. All I can do here for now is sketch a discussion, 
prompted by North’s own comments on the origins of cooperation and its implications for his 
work; as Hodgson and Knudsen point out, the application of generalized Darwinism is still very 
much a work in progress and depends on particular case studies. It is the overarching theory, the 
foundations, that have become increasingly well established.458 Describing where North’s work 
is a step in the right direction from this meta-theoretical viewpoint, and what larger theories 
might aid it where it goes wrong, is just one small contribution to this project, and thereby to its 
application to economic history. 
North’s theory of the evolution of cooperation can be summarized fairly effectively 
without too much loss of relevant detail as follows. For North, as pointed out before, Hoffman, 
McCabe and Smith’s 1998 summary of experimental economics demonstrates that in small 
groups cooperation is relatively easily achieved because of the adjustment to conventional self-
interested rational action in such settings. However, in large groups or under private information, 
such cooperation is not the game theoretically plausible outcome.459 This constitutes, by my 
knowledge, one of only two occasions (the other I will discuss shortly) in any of his theoretical 
work that North explicitly discusses experimental economic evidence testing game theoretical 
specifications of rational choice. But this is not his only observation on the subject in general. On 
several occasions, North refers also to an innate ability or tendency of humans to cooperate in 
small groups. This and the reference to evolutionary psychology following the discussion of 
Hoffman et al. suggests that North’s explanation of individuals’ “modification of their strict self-
interest behavior” is based on an evolutionary argument: humans as evolved to cooperate in such 
(and only such) settings. His repeated references to this innate small group cooperation makes it 
clear that this innate cooperativeness, however, is only relevant to such cases.460 In larger 
settings, however, North seems to suggest that institutions, beliefs, and incentives, i.e. more 
conventional (non-evolutionary) models of rationality plus the normative power of culture, must 
do the job.461 As an illustration of the latter kind of argument we need but observe the claim in 
Violence and Social Orders that, in the absence of third party enforcement, “cooperation by an 
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adherent organization’s members must be, at every point in time, incentive-compatible for all 
members”.462 
Finally, North also makes a single but important observation about the implications of 
experimental economics in testing the rationality assumptions formalized in game theory, a little 
after his discussion of Hoffman et al.’s findings. Here he twice cites verbatim the results of the 
work of Joseph Henrich and his colleagues, who undertook experiments across a wide range of 
small scale societies with very different cultures to measure empirically the degree of 
correspondence to predicted utility maximizing behaviour in game theoretical settings. (This is 
the other such discussion in North’s theoretical work I mentioned.) I will not cite these in their 
entirety again here, but the upshot is as follows: “the canonical model of the self-interested 
material payoff-maximizing actor is systematically violated. In all societies studied, [ultimatum 
game] offers are strictly positive and often substantially in excess of the expected income-
maximizing offer, as are contributions in the public-goods game, while rejections of positive 
offers in some societies occur at a considerable rate. Second, preferences over economic choices 
are not exogenous as the canonical model would have it, but rather are shaped by the economic 
and social interactions of everyday life.”463  
As intimated in the previous chapter, empirical violations of canonical rationality in a 
systematic way suggest the need for a revision of the specification of rational action involved in 
such choice behaviour; if not in terms of some form of reconsideration of utility maximization, 
then at least its realignment to allow for more other-regarding preferences and utility beyond 
maximizing money returns (or indeed any returns) than is normally allowed. This should also 
change the way incentives and interests are represented in more general models of (economic) 
cooperation, something suggested by Henrich et al. themselves, but which we have seen North 
does not consistently do. Expanding the discussion about alternative rationality models of 
chapter 3 to our present concern with North’s explanations of cooperative behaviour, we must 
note they also have consequences – as a corollary of the above – for the contractarian perspective 
of how cooperation can (and cannot) be achieved through conventional incentive models. It is 
therefore all the more striking that these conclusions do not seem to warrant any further 
discussion on North’s part; he simply concludes they illustrate his point about the importance of 
learning and beliefs, and leaves it at that.464 
Given this rather feeble treatment of the problem of cooperation, whether seen from 
behavioural economics or sociobiology, on the part of North, I will now try and sketch how the 
literature in these fields can present an alternative reading of this problem. As mentioned, this 
entails no more than a brief further exploration of the implications of research in these two 
domains than North has engaged in: i.e. the testing of the behavioural assumptions underlying 
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conventional utility maximization and the evolutionary (especially evolutionary game 
theoretical) literature on other-regarding preferences and altruism, their evolutionary origins, and 
implications for human rationality. Finally, I will suggest that the most obvious way to integrate 
these perspectives into a theory of long-term cultural evolution in the sense that North has 
proposed, the most promising approach is not evolutionary psychology but gene-culture 
coevolution. North dismisses evolutionary psychology on the grounds of vast observed cultural 
variation465. Whether or not this is a fatal objection to the school of evolutionary psychology 
most associated with the work of John Tooby and Lana Cosmides, it is certainly not a problem 
for gene-culture coevolution-based approaches.466 I think that this reappraisal is in principle very 
compatible with some of North’s own lines of argument in his NIEH: particularly North’s own 
desire to formulate an evolutionary theory in which institutions and cultural traits matter, as well 
as those instances where he is most critical of rational choice approaches and searches for 
alternatives beyond even Simonian ‘bounded rationality’. But it does, to my mind, also imply 
jettisoning some of North’s more Hayekian notions, as well as distancing us further from those 
aspects of North’s work closer to neoinstitutional and self-regarding models of choice behaviour. 
The central question here is: based on the discussions in UPEC and Violence and Social 
Orders, is North right to take as premise for his evolutionary account that humans have evolved 
to adjust their self-regarding rationality to allow small-group cooperation; but that in larger 
groups the free rider problem combined with the pervasiveness of violence will make 
cooperation (or ‘order’) only possible by means of a mixed Hobbesian-Lockean social contract, 
i.e. by means of the formation of elites with control over violence who distribute rents to create 
incentives for obedience? I submit that he is not, and for two reasons. The first is that based on 
recent literature in evolutionary game theory, there are strong reasons to suspect that no 
evolution of human sociality would have been possible at all – even in realistic small group 
settings - under ‘contractarian’ premises, that is to say, on the basis of evolutionary incentives to 
maximize fitness evolving only self-regarding behaviour. Therefore, the only possible 
evolutionary explanation for the observed reality of human cooperation and sociality in small 
and large groups is that at least to a significant extent humans have evolved as being from our 
earliest behaviourally modern beginnings as, in the words of Herbert Gintis and Samuel Bowles, 
‘a cooperative species’.467 This implies that the contractarian perspective, in which human 
cooperation is explained on the basis of the interests of self-regarding actors to cooperate given 
correct incentives, is in all its forms implausible or at least radically incomplete.  
Secondly, the results of game theoretical experiments demonstrate, as North himself briefly 
acknowledged, that the behavioural predictions of self-regarding utility maximization are not 
borne out in reality. Unlike North, however, I believe that these results significantly affect the 
plausibility of a (primarily) incentives-based account of the origins of institutions. While North 
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also modifies this account substantially by ascribing a major role to the formation of beliefs, he 
gives no consistent evolutionary account of how such beliefs interact with Darwinian 
evolutionary pressures or with the operation of ‘rational’ behaviour. In chapter 3, I have 
suggested alternative models of rationality that could incorporate other-regarding behaviour and 
group identification in more plausible ways. Here, I will suggest that such models can be more 
readily integrated into an evolutionary account of long-term change that takes culture seriously 
than North’s own reliance on incentives and transaction costs. Put briefly, I think gene-culture 
coevolution and group rationality is more promising as an account of institutions and their 
sociobiological role than North’s reliance on exogenously given beliefs and New Institutional 
models of bounded rationality.  
I do not wish to suggest that they are wholly mutually exclusive, for many of North’s 
theoretical tools remain useful: this is no argument against his definition of institutions, his claim 
that they matter for economic history, or his use of evolutionary concepts or path dependence, 
say. For a Northian evolutionary account to succeed, however, they need complementing by a 
gene-culture coevolution approach and a much closer attention to the functional role of ‘culture’ 
(in the broad sense of institutions, self-identifications, and cultural markers) in an evolutionary 
process of inheritance as well as in intentional behaviour. Jointly, these two claims suggest that 
we need to greatly expand rationality to include other-regarding forms of utility maximization as 
well as the role of emotions, identities, and other non-maximising aspects of choice behaviour, 
and that we must go beyond contractarian accounts of the origins of social institutions to a more 
rounded perspective of humans as ‘always already’ cooperative. Finally, cooperation – even 
altruistic - is not itself sufficient. The content of culture, including the role of commitment and its 
moral and emotional component, also matters, and this can perhaps lend a new perspective to 
North’s intuitions about the role of beliefs. To put it rhetorically, a Northian type evolutionary 
account needs more Hume and Darwin and less Locke and Coase. I will now expand on each of 
these arguments in order. 
Social contract or cooperative species? 
As Alexander Field has pointed out in various critiques of New Institutionalism and similar 
approaches, any explanation of the emergence of institutions in terms of conventional models of 
rationality runs into serious problems of infinite regress. One can either explain institutions in 
terms of previous institutions, in which case these need explaining in turn. Or one can turn, as in 
the contractarian tradition, to a ‘state of nature’ in which the interaction between individuals will 
cause, spontaneously, the emergence of a particular original institutional order.468 The latter is 
how I have interpreted, in part, the approach of North to the origins of institutions. In Violence 
and Social Orders, any society grown beyond the ‘small scale’ hunter-forager society will likely 
turn into a natural order. From the ‘foraging order’ where each individual knows all others, and 
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to which presumably Hoffman et al.’s findings apply, to the natural order is “a long process of 
development”. Based on the work of Allan Johnson and Timothy Earle, North and colleagues 
argue that the transition from foraging orders to natural state orders takes place by a sort of 
Hobbesian process where ‘chieftains’ start controlling violence, a solution based on “the threat of 
coercion” and “by mutual interests”.469 The combination of coercion and incentives is what I 
mean by a Hobbesian-Lockean contractarian theory, and it is expressed, as I have argued in 
chapter 3, by North’s reliance on game theoretical language (though not formalization) to 
suggest the operation of this kind of incentives in the formation of institutions.  
Yet crucially, conventional game theory and state of nature contractarianism also fall afoul 
of Field’s objections. As I have argued, one cannot have any conventional game theoretical 
presentation of the operation of individual interaction without already knowing the rules and 
payoffs applicable to that game. And these must therefore be given in advance. As Field points 
out, what this amounts to is that contractarian approaches to institutions, popular in economic 
theory, effectively smuggle the very institutions they seek to explain in through the back door, 
often implicitly.470 The infinite regress remains in operation. For this reason, New Institutionalist 
approaches must depart, as some of its theorists have recognized, from a given combination of 
institutions and individuals; it cannot explain the origins of human sociality per se.471 Indeed, no 
social theory can do so except by appeal to evolutionary models of the emergence of culture in 
behaviourally modern homo sapiens; and therefore any model of the path dependent inheritance 
of such institutions (and all ‘culture’ more broadly) must begin with well formulated 
evolutionary premises rather than contractarian assumptions about the emergence of institutions 
from incentives, including incentives to reduce violence. 
Recent literature on the evolution of human cooperation has done just that, by studying the 
emergence of altruism in evolutionary game theoretical models. I will not review the 
methodology of evolutionary game theory here, but it is important to note the distinction 
between conventional game theory and evolutionary game theory in one respect. While the 
formal aspects are much the same, the difference is that where conventional game theory 
assumes payoff maximization on the part of individuals, and is therefore subject to critiques of 
the plausibility of this assumption based on Field’s arguments as well as the testing of this 
assumption (described below), evolutionary game theory is based on fitness maximization 
assumptions in natural selection. This assumption is much more robust, since it is supported by a 
vast amount of empirical evidence from the field in evolutionary biology, and it is a central 
component of the dominant explanatory approach in ethology, which has been called 
‘adaptationism’.472 Evolutionary game theoretical models therefore have the distinct advantage 
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that their maximization assumptions give a solid explanatory grounding of a kind that 
conventional game theory, reliant as it is on rational choice analysis, does not.473  
Now to return to altruism. Altruism is here defined as behaviour by an individual of a 
species enhancing the fitness of another individual at a fitness cost to the first individual.474 The 
importance of altruism and prosocial dispositions in explaining human cooperative sociality is 
enormous, because (as the prisoner’s dilemma would demonstrate) under normal circumstances a 
strong selection mechanism like natural selection would be expected to select against behaviour 
that favours others at the expense of oneself. If helping others at the expense of oneself by 
definition diminishes fitness, it will diminish ceteris paribus the likelihood of procreation, and 
therefore genes favouring such behaviour should not survive. Over evolutionary time, prosocial 
behaviour should not occur. For this reason, E.O. Wilson has called altruism “the central 
theoretical problem of sociobiology”.475  
In sociobiology, for a considerable time the most common explanation of the emergence of 
cooperation was twofold: ‘inclusive fitness’, also called kin altruism, and reciprocal altruism. 
Kin altruism as a concept was developed by William Hamilton to explain the altruistic behaviour 
of many organisms observed in nature. Hamilton pointed to the fact that maximization of genetic 
fitness would favour altruistic behaviour by individuals towards kin, i.e. other individuals that 
carry substantially similar genes. Even if the individual with altruistic genes is selected against, 
the fitness benefits accruing to the kin may outweigh this and in this manner selection may 
permit the emergence of altruistic behaviour within kin groups as an evolutionarily stable 
strategy.476 Reciprocal altruism, in turn, is based on an idea similar to the tit-for-tat strategy 
discussed in chapter 3: namely, that in indefinitely repeated games cooperation rather than 
defection can be a winning move, as long as cooperation can be expected from the other player. 
To simplify somewhat, if the probability of reciprocation is high enough, selection will favour 
genetic makeup that behaviourally expresses itself as altruistic, since cooperating individuals in a 
species will then be cooperated with down the line, and so outcompete the selfish defectors who 
cannot expect assistance at a later point.477 
As explanations of human cooperative sociality, however, these have not proven to be 
adequate. Kin altruism does not suffice because even in small bands of hunter-gatherer groups, 
groups are too large to sustain it: in groups over 10 or so people, most people will not be 
sufficiently genetically related to each other, and migration among humans has always been too 
common.478 Therefore, reciprocal altruism, and later refinements of the idea such as reputation-
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building (known as indirect reciprocity), have proven popular as explanations because they 
seemed the least bad of the possible alternatives: they fit well within the parameters of 
evolutionary game theory, and did not require departures from the ‘selfish gene’ model of natural 
selection, like group selection arguments did.479 As at the time group selection was consigned to 
the scientific oblivion of heterodoxy, this was a strike in favour of reciprocal altruism. Indeed, 
evolutionary game theory and reciprocal altruism were often presented as alternatives to group 
selection, because in evolutionary game theory it was thought selection on individual phenotypes 
in a population sufficed to explain cooperation and no group selection arguments were needed. 
Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson even argue that the emphasis on using ‘cooperation’ rather 
than ‘altruism’ as the term for the relevant explanandum of human sociality is because the 
former sounds more contractarian, more a matter of self-interest.480 Similarly, Anatol Rapoport, 
who invented the tit-for-tat strategy, has commented on how odd its interpretation as a matter of 
self-interest appeared to him.481 
However that may be, group or multilevel selection has since made a comeback, not least 
due to the efforts of Sober and Wilson themselves.482 Indeed, it has become an important 
component of more sophisticated approaches in contemporary evolutionary game theory – as 
Sober and Wilson point out, the difference is “a matter of perspective, not process”.483 Moreover, 
it is a central component of gene-culture coevolutionary approaches to cultural evolution, as I 
will describe below. It is therefore indispensable for contemporary evolutionary alternatives to 
the contractarian-institutional approach. So what is multilevel selection theory, and how does it 
matter? Owing its origins to George Price’s equations describing the interaction of selection 
pressures at different levels of populations, multilevel selection describes the insight that 
selection does not just take place between genes in an individual (meiosis aside) and between 
individuals in a population, but also between groups (sub-populations) in a global population.484 
This higher order selection among groups affects selection within groups and vice versa, and 
their relative strengths depend on the relevant specifications of the model. A group is simply 
defined as “a set of individuals that influence each other’s fitness with respect to a certain trait 
but not the fitness of those outside the group”.485 However, since within-individual selection is 
extremely limited due to the already ‘cooperative’ nature of our genome, the relevant units are 
generally individuals in a population or group and groups in a population, allowing populations 
themselves to evolve in that sense.486 
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The significance of this insight rests in the observation that selection pressures between 
groups can outweigh selection pressures within groups under particular circumstances. This 
means, in turn, that as long as groups are relatively stable (vis-à-vis migration, for example), 
certain traits – such as altruistic ones – can be evolutionarily successful in particular groups by 
their effects on that group’s fitness relative to other groups. This provides an obvious way to 
think about the advantages of e.g. altruistic sacrifice by individuals of a group for the benefit of 
that group’s competitiveness with other groups in the (relevant) global population of a species. 
This behaviour is observable, and therefore in need of explanation, in a wide range of species 
from ants to humans. However, this is not sufficient to explain altruism. After all, ‘selfish gene’ 
selection also still takes place, and even if group selection can favour altruism by its ability to 
enhance competitiveness against other groups, over the long run in-group competition would 
select against altruism and it would disappear, unless it could be shown to be stable at the level 
of individual selection also. As Sober and Wilson point out: “If groups remain isolated from each 
other, the global increase in the frequency of altruists will be transient and individual selection 
will ultimately run its course within each group. Altruistic groups must somehow export their 
progeny to other portions of the landscape for altruism to evolve.”487 The classic argument for 
the evolution of altruism within groups is then, as we have seen, reciprocal altruism. 
But reciprocal altruism has serious difficulties of its own: there is little evidence of its 
operation among any other species than humans.488 This would point to the need for additional 
hypotheses in the human case. Moreover, in larger scale human societies, or if information is 
private and imperfect, or if migration levels are high, it is unlikely that reciprocal altruism can be 
evolutionarily stable as an explanation of cooperation, as the likelihood of repeat encounters with 
the same player would be low, fitness costs would be high relative to benefits, and it is sensitive 
to error rates. So a community of reciprocal altruists would be vulnerable to ‘invasion’ by rare 
individuals with genes ‘coded for’ defection.489 It is therefore by no means clear that reciprocal 
altruism suffices as an explanation for observed behaviour, except if there is already strong 
assortment between reciprocal altruists (i.e. they form groups that interact more often with one 
another), just as kin altruism depends on assortment.490 Finally, it is unclear how altruistic 
reciprocal altruism really is. As Bowles and Gintis point out, reciprocal altruism is often really 
“self-interest with a long time horizon”.491 So while it therefore may account in part for 
cooperative behaviour, it is not a sufficient explanation for the many kinds of altruistic and self-
sacrificing behaviours observed among humans, although it may be a useful tool when seen in 
the light of anthropology (about which more in the final chapter).492 
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One solution to this problem has been a focus on indirect altruism, where reputation-
building plays the main role. In such cases, long-term cooperative benefits may result from 
‘reciprocal’ altruism even when individuals do not interact repeatedly with the same other 
individuals (as is likely in large groups), because altruistic behaviour signals a prosocial attitude. 
This prosocial attitude then invites cooperation on the part of strangers, and allows reciprocal 
altruism to be maintained despite the absence of a repeated game type situation.493 Empirical 
studies confirm the relevance of such signalling in human interactions.494 However, as with 
reciprocal altruism, the theory is not very robust to more restrictive assumptions. Under limited 
and/or private information, defectors may free ride on the effects of reputations by falsely 
acquiring a prosocial reputation at lower fitness cost than the actual co-operators would pay. In 
such situations, simulations indicate that indirect altruists are too vulnerable to invasion by 
defectors and it is therefore not a sufficient explanation for observed cooperative behaviour.495 
Returning then to multi-level selection, we must see how this provides the possibility for a 
different approach to altruism than these more ‘individualistic’ accounts. The work of Bowles 
and Gintis, on which I here rely, is a fruitful investigation of these possibilities. Recall that group 
selection can work by producing ‘positive assortment’, i.e. altruists being likely to interact with 
other altruists, via the effect of group competition on competition between individuals. As 
Bowles and Gintis explain, “members of predominantly altruistic groups have above-average 
fitness and thus contribute disproportionately to the next generation… The same model applies 
to any process of selection based on the differential replication of traits over time.”496 This is 
necessary because, as Hamilton’s Rule points out, selection can only favour altruistic traits if its 
bearers are more likely to interact with other bearers of this trait than chance.497 In group 
selection models, as opposed to reciprocal ‘altruism’ models, altruists benefit from interactions 
with other altruists because of the positive assortment of altruists into groups and non-altruists 
into others. Such explanatory models are called models of inclusive fitness, and Bowles and 
Gintis helpfully distinguish them from ‘mutualist’ models such as reciprocal and kin altruism. 
Such positive assortment is particularly likely in human communities because of the assortative 
aspects of cultural markers and of communication through language, something I will discuss 
further below under gene-culture coevolution.498 For now it is worth noting that positive 
assortment can take place genetically, but also culturally, by the intentional adoption through 
learning of favoured behavioural traits. The latter process is of course much faster. 
What Bowles and Gintis have demonstrated is that applying more realistic, but therefore 
also more restrictive, constraints on the standard evolutionary game theoretical arguments for 
                                                          
493 Sugden 1986; Alexander 1987; Panchanathan and Boyd 2004; Milinski, Semmann and Krambeck 2002; Binmore 
2005. Ideas of signaling go back to Spence 1973 and Zahavi 1975. 
494 Smith and Bliege Bird 2000; Bliege Bird and Smith 2005. 
495 Engelman and Fischbacher 2009. 
496 Bowles and Gintis 2011, p. 52-53. 
497 Ibid., p 48; Hamilton 1964. 
498 E.g. Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza 1982. 
155 
 
‘mutualist’ reciprocity, they find that such models cannot account for the evolution of human 
cooperation. As they argue, this is because “even presupposing extraordinary cognitive 
capacities and levels of patience among the cooperating individuals, there is no reason to believe 
that a group of more than two individuals would ever discover the cooperative Nash equilibria 
that the models have identified, and if it were to hit on one, its members would almost certainly 
abandon it in short order. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes 
identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent.”499 It is known that in the case of 
indefinitely repeated games, if information is sufficiently perfect or public, error terms are 
sufficiently small, and the discount factor less than one, even amoral self-regarding players can 
achieve cooperation for any set of payoffs above a certain minimum – possibly the ‘folk 
theorem’ referred to by North allegedly supporting the role of markets.500  
However, as Bowles and Gintis show, the corollary of this also holds: when groups are 
very large, error terms large, information private or very imperfect, or no common alignment of 
beliefs exists (i.e. the choices of other players are not known in advance), the folk theorem fails. 
Indeed, this finding is simply an implication of the observation, discussed in chapter 3, that 
except for the simplest types of games, no Nash equilibrium is likely to be found absent the 
criteria of common knowledge of rationality and common alignment of beliefs.501 While some 
solutions have been found to resolve this problem, such as a learning mechanism for games, or 
resolving a monotone dynamic (that is to say, an evolutionary dynamic where higher payoff 
strategies increase their frequency in a population relative to lower payoff ones), none of these 
solutions can overcome the unrealistic assumption of common alignment of beliefs. Given 
North’s constant emphasis on the importance of beliefs and the difference they make, it is 
certainly in North’s spirit to agree with Bowles and Gintis that the Nash equilibrium is 
exceedingly improbable under realistic conditions such as disparate beliefs and private 
information.502 
A more relevant and generally accepted solution is the correlated equilibrium, a suitable 
substitute for a Nash equilibrium in evolutionary models. What this essentially means is that 
some external and commonly known ‘agent’ interacts with the actual players of the game such as 
to coordinate their actions, by sending signals in such manner that if all players accept the signal, 
no player can improve their payoff by switching strategies.503 The interesting thing for our 
purposes is that for human players, the most obvious form of the correlating device in concrete 
terms is the social norm, i.e. an institution. As Bowles and Gintis explain, a “cooperative 
equilibrium supported by social norms is one in which not only is the equilibrium evolutionarily 
stable, but also the social norms are themselves an evolutionary adaptation, stable against 
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invasion by competing norms”.504 This is necessary because otherwise the contractarian’s infinite 
regress would operate again: a norm may not be evolutionarily assumed without explaining away 
the problem. This means that individuals in a group that shares a norm must learn what the norm 
is (what behaviour it demands), learning that most in the group know the norm and follow it, and 
learning that the norm is common knowledge among those (i.e. that they all know this about each 
other as well).  
For Bowles and Gintis, this role of social norms must be analytically prior to any 
explanations in terms of self-regarding individuals finding a cooperative solution, since absent 
such coordinating functions no evolutionarily accessible and stable cooperative solution can be 
found under realistic conditions. As they argue, this finding explicitly refutes the contractarian 
and ‘invisible hand’ approaches to the folk theorem, since such approaches are not robust to 
realistic restrictions on common alignment of beliefs and on the likelihood of error. Again, given 
the importance North rightly places on the role of varying beliefs and their independent 
explanatory role in behaviour, it is justified to conclude that to pursue a realistic evolutionary 
account of the emergence of institutions, North cannot resort to any ‘invisible hand’ or 
contractarian type explanations. Nor does the recognition of cognitive limits and bounded 
rationality suffice to compensate for that: the explanation must begin with seeing human 
individuals as already prosocial.505  
As they argue: “The failure of the models underlying both the folk theorem and the 
fundamental theorem [i.e. welfare economics, MK] is hardly surprising, for they sought to 
explain cooperation among large numbers of self-regarding strangers without recourse to pre-
existing norms and cooperative institutions, something that most likely never occurred in the 
history or prehistory of our species… the economic models of cooperation that assume pre-
existing solutions to these problems thus do not accomplish their goal, namely explaining 
cooperation among amoral and self-regarding individuals… Economic theory, favoring 
parsimony over realism, has sought to explain cooperation without reference to social 
preferences, and with a minimalist or fictive description of social institutions. This research 
trajectory… may have run its course.”506 This, then, requires a new microfoundation. But what 
kind of prosociality? And how is this to be integrated into a cultural evolutionary account such as 
North’s? 
We know that evidence of prehistoric societies, such as can be deduced, is unlikely to be 
favourable to reciprocal or kin altruism as explanation of the emergence of prosocial behaviour 
and institutions.507 In any case the paleontological evidence is controversial, and extrapolation 
from present-day hunter-gatherer groups is no less so. Bowles and Gintis, building on Boyd and 
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Richerson’s theory of gene-culture coevolution (which I will turn to shortly), therefore applied 
simulations based on parameters deduced from both sources of evidence and varied these within 
that range, so as to obtain realistic and robust, if not guaranteed, results. On this basis, they have 
proposed a theory for the origins of what they call ‘strong reciprocity’, which consists of two 
components: a predisposition to cooperate, i.e. a form of innate altruism, and a willingness to 
punish noncooperators.  
Where North sees the problem of violence as central and its reduction as the natural aim, 
the ‘constructive’ importance of violence in the form of punishment – physical, social, or 
emotional in nature – to the evolution of cooperation and institutions is equally paramount. 
Punishment is the key means by which the costs to free riders can be reduced, as North himself 
observes in the context of the problem of enforcement. Even wholly self-interested individuals 
may cooperate when punishment for not doing so is sufficiently likely and severe. But 
enforcement is not without costs, as North also observes; and this applies to evolutionary 
contexts also. In simple evolutionary models, the fitness costs of punishing to the punishers and 
the possibility of error selects against the likelihood of its evolution, just as with altruistic 
cooperation. But there is one core difference: the cost of punishment declines as more 
individuals engage in it, because the frequency of punishment will reduce cases of defection and 
thereby reduce the frequency with which the costs of punishment actually have to be incurred.508 
Because of group selection, more cooperative groups are likely to outcompete others; if 
punishment is therefore evolutionarily stable and ‘accessible’ over a wide range of parameter 
values, sustained by group selection, as Boyd et al. argue, this is one foundation stone for the 
evolution of institutions. Moreover, empirical evidence supports the observation that punishment 
can solve the free rider problem also due to its ‘quorum’ quality: individuals often punish as a 
group, only undertaking it if sufficient are disposed to punishment, and so solve the internal free 
rider problem among the punishers.509 Finally, a major role is played by the punishment of 
nonpunishment. Once punishment can become stable and common, second-order punishment 
also becomes possible. As we shall see in the discussion of gene-culture coevolution, this is 
important, because second-order punishment, once common, can stabilize any norm.510 
But one problem remains. For the quorum model of punishment to succeed, some degree 
of public information is required, otherwise coordination becomes impossible. Bowles and Gintis 
argue therefore that such mechanisms must be complemented evolutionarily by another: the 
development of the social emotions. The internalization of social norms into preferences, oughts 
into wants, takes place via the social emotions, particularly shame. For this to be a realistic 
evolutionary process, the process of socialization, i.e. the acquisition of norms, must be a 
stronger factor than the within-group selection against the fitness-reducing prosocial norm. This 
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process is aided by the evolution of social conformism among humans, which I will discuss 
shortly: those very same cognitive properties North identifies as essential for understanding 
bounded rationality, namely those that serve as heuristics under conditions of uncertainty, also 
favour conformism with regard to the behaviour of others, by reducing the likelihood of making 
costly errors. The social learning processes of individuals can allow the internalization of norms, 
Bowles and Gintis show, under a wide range of realistic parameters for these reasons, since 
adopting the shared behaviour and beliefs of the group is more likely than not to be fitness 
enhancing. Given this fact, as long as the norm is not excessively fitness reducing, a fitness 
reducing norm may be adopted and internalized through the same processes that are used to 
acquire beliefs and to become ‘socially adjusted’ in the first place. The social emotions may have 
evolved to aid in this process, by overriding self-regarding intentionality in favour of anger, 
shame, guilt, and the like, which steer behaviour towards the individually fitness reducing but 
group fitness enhancing norms in question. Since the inducement of such emotions in defectors 
is likely to be cheaper in fitness terms than the use of physical punishment in each case, and 
since the internalization of such emotions saves on enforcement costs, groups in which shame 
and guilt evolve are likely to outcompete those in which this does not happen.511 
The upshot of all these arguments is to demonstrate that the most likely evolutionary 
explanation for the evolution of institutions and the emergence and persistence of cooperation is, 
to a considerable degree, strong reciprocity or “genuine altruism: a willingness to sacrifice one’s 
own interest to help others, including those who are not family members, and not simply in 
return for anticipated reciprocation in the future”.512 The experimental evidence, so quickly 
dismissed by North, gives substantial support to this view. Such experiments across a wide range 
of societies and cultures show that responses to various standard games, such as the ultimatum 
game and the dictator game, fluctuate wildly and (most importantly) in strong correlation with 
the institutional and political economic structure of the societies in question. In no case 
whatsoever was the postulate of maximization of expected returns actually observed.513 There is 
considerable evidence to suggest that humans are strongly inclined to participate in collective 
projects and to punish free riders even at their own cost. Collective action problems are solvable 
(and solved) by the operation of group enforcement mechanisms that are not in the individual 
interest of any members but that depend on strong reciprocity and prosocial forms of rational 
action, i.e. forms of group rationality and identification that are stronger than individual utility 
maximization (at least of the conventional kind); and such mechanisms go beyond the markets or 
hierarchies dichotomy of the NIE tradition.514  
These findings must be incorporated into any cultural evolutionary theory of economic 
history. More importantly at the methodological level, the salience of group level selection and 
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of the interaction of norms, strong reciprocity, and punishment mechanisms as evolutionary 
stabilizers must be part of any explanation of how culture fits into models of rational action in 
history-writing. Finally, we must take the moral content of norms and emotions seriously, and 
this, too, suggests going beyond utility maximizing individuals. I will now expand briefly on 
these observations. 
Gene-culture coevolution and the role of institutions  
Arguably there is a natural affinity between multi-level selection theory and gene culture 
coevolution, in that the latter builds on the methodological developments of the former and in 
turn has aided the evolutionary game theoretical advances represented by the work of Bowles 
and Gintis. Although the idea that selection pressures at phenotypical level and cultural dynamics 
interact via the mechanism of group selection goes back to Charles Darwin himself, 
contemporary gene-culture coevolution theory originates in the 1970s-1980s with the revolution 
in sociobiology. This revolution revived the evolutionary study of social life and culture and 
placed it on a more scientifically secure footing than the speculative or metaphorical 
evolutionary approaches of the Victorian age.515 Here, I will draw on the works of Robert Boyd 
and Peter Richerson, who have done more than perhaps any other researchers to develop gene-
culture coevolution into a potentially powerful explanatory framework to rival memetics, 
evolutionary psychology, and other sociobiological approaches – not least in emphasizing its 
flexible applicability to historical study.516 This applicability, combined with the lack of 
theoretical development of memetics and the empirical problems with the modular view 
suggested by evolutionary psychology, cause me to see gene-culture coevolution as the most 
promising school of sociobiology today for the purposes of historical explanation.517 
The core insight of gene-culture coevolution is that, as Boyd and Richerson put it, “cultural 
evolution is a population phenomenon”.518 Relying on multilevel selection theory, gene-culture 
coevolution allows the examination of the interaction between population-level phenomena and 
individual-level phenomena, just as we have seen in Bowles and Gintis’ arguments regarding the 
origins of human cooperation (which are consciously compatible accounts). The difference is 
that Boyd and Richerson concentrate on the effects of one particular evolved tool particular to 
humans, the ability to intentionally develop culture and to acquire existing cultural traits through 
social learning. The effects of such traits on the formation of groups and thereby on group 
selection, as well as on the fitness of individuals acquiring (or rejecting) a particular cultural 
trait, and the modelling of the evolutionary interaction of these phenomena at genetic and 
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cultural level is the domain of gene-culture coevolution. This, too, is an extension of generalized 
Darwinian thinking.519 
From the viewpoint of gene-culture coevolution, North is decidedly right to concentrate on 
the role of learning in accounting for the role of institutions. However, North’s discussion of 
learning processes emphasizes the cognitive limitations of rationality in a rational choice context, 
and the importance of uncertainty for the acquisition of (potentially ‘irrational’ or wrong) beliefs. 
Gene-culture coevolution on the other hand makes learning a central bridge between the genetic 
explanation for the origins of human sociality on the one hand and the function of institutions 
and cultural markers, once they exist, on the other hand. This requires a more sophisticated 
understanding of what learning functionally entails. Moreover, it requires a reconsideration of 
the function of culture within a Darwinian perspective – one that can address North’s objection 
to sociobiology that culture, being intentional in nature and highly variable, cannot be explained 
by generalized Darwinism. 
First we must define culture. For Boyd and Richerson, culture (at least as far as this theory 
is concerned) is “information capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from 
other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social 
transmission”. We are speaking here, then, of behaviourally visible traits that are acquired 
through learning processes, although the ‘information’ need not be (fully) conscious.520 Culture 
is an evolved ability of humans as a species, and it performs powerful functions in this way 
indirectly shaping our evolved behaviour – functions we require social cooperative skills to 
perform, such as we have seen we have acquired through the processes described by Bowles and 
Gintis. Culture is adaptive because the behaviour of other humans can be acquired by learning, 
and it provides valuable information about the environment that need then not be independently 
rediscovered, over and over again, by individual reason. This is the major advantage culture (in 
particular via language) provides humans over every other species.521 Culture is therefore, as 
North rightly emphasizes, an important proximate explanation of human behaviour, but a 
thoroughgoing Darwinism requires that its ultimate explanation always remain evolutionary in 
nature – and so does a consistent theory of cultural evolution. Even so, once culture is evolved in 
humans (as happened early on in our behavioural modernity) and the forces operating on its 
population statistical properties are understood, as I will summarize shortly, it plays an 
independent role in interaction with the effects of selection at the genetic level. Culture is not 
reducible to genes. Nor is culture simply part of ‘the environment’ with which our genes interact 
via our ‘extended phenotype’. Knowledge, traits and beliefs are not part of the environment, and 
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are not acquired from it in one go; moreover, in very similar environments there can be vast 
differences in cultural traits, beliefs, and technologies.522 
The next step is to realise that culture has the required attributes to be subject to a process 
of Darwinian natural selection: it is heritable with sufficient stability, there is variety, and there is 
differential survival from one generation to the next. However, there is a major difference with 
genetic evolution, as North rightly intuited (with most social scientists, probably): intentionality 
plays a key role in cultural evolution. Variation in culture is not random, nor is retention. 
However, although the randomness of mutations plays a major role in evolutionary biology, it is 
not a requirement of Darwinian natural selection that the sources of variation be random. Nor is 
it inherently a problem that, pace Dawkins and Dennett, culture is probably not discrete nor 
faithfully transmitted. A suitably transformed theory of natural selection can cope with cultural 
descent with modification even if the modification is intentional, at least in general terms. In this 
sense it is somewhat similar to artificial selection, which is simply a special case of Darwinian 
theory. (Like all applications of Darwinian theory, gene-culture coevolution theory is general – 
auxiliary theories and data are needed for any meaningful results.) To the extent, moreover, that 
we accept North’s argument that institutional change is mostly incremental, the applicability of 
natural selection is strengthened.523 
What gene-culture coevolution can do for histories of the evolution of culture/institutions 
(economic in focus or otherwise) can be clarified by looking at the various forces that operate on 
its transmission. Drawing on Richerson and Boyd’s analysis, we can usefully divide these into 
two types: forces of random variation and forces of non-random (guided) variation and 
inheritance. The former consist of cultural mutation and cultural drift, which respectively refer to 
any unintentional changes to cultural traits (they use the example of misremembering) and 
effects caused by the emergence or dying out of rare (new) traits in a small population. More 
important are the forces of guided variation: changes made in the process of learning and 
innovation. Learning, in turn, can be subdivided into different functional types of ‘biased 
transmission’, concentrating on by what mechanism the trait is acquired by an individual – 
intentionally or unconsciously, as in the case of evolved learning processes in small children.524 
These are threefold. The first is content-based bias, which depends as the name suggests on the 
content of the trait, and is acquired either through cost-benefit analysis of a boundedly rational 
type (this one best corresponds to North’s model), or because of the attributes of the trait that 
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allow it to be better remembered or learned. The second is frequency-based bias, and refers to 
learning based on how common the trait is; this is also called conformist learning. Finally, there 
is model-based bias, in which a particular figure is treated as a ‘model’ for learning based on 
attributes that make them likely to be a good source of acquired information. A common form of 
such biased transmission is doing whatever the most successful or highest prestige figures do, or 
imitating those with traits marking them as similar to oneself.525 
So much for inheritance. But if such traits are to be subject to a process of natural 
selection, they must also have differential survival. This means the traits must, in a sense, be in 
competition with one another. Boyd and Richerson suggest this happens in two ways: through 
the opportunity costs of time spent learning (and the limits on what one can learn), and through 
control of behaviour. If one must act, one act or another will be chosen, and one can only obey 
the imperative of one cultural trait at a time: one can know how to speak multiple languages, but 
one speaks only one on a given occasion, even if one can switch in mid-sentence. Given this, 
how does natural selection operate on culture? The usual requirements can now be 
straightforwardly applied. People vary because they have acquired different beliefs, values, or 
habits through social learning. Their trait variation affects the probability that others will, 
through social learning, adopt their trait. And finally, many cultural variants compete with each 
other to some sufficient extent. In such cases, natural selection will operate at the level of these 
traits, even if it is difficult to identify precisely what they are in discrete terms.526 
The important implication of these forms of biased transmission and random change is that 
culture need not be adaptive in fitness terms, even though it is subject – as humans always are – 
to the processes of natural selection at genetic level. Unlike in the genetic case, but much like the 
case of rational choice, the process of descent with modification of cultural traits is therefore not 
inherently fitness maximizing.527 While the combination of guided variation (decision-making) 
and biased transmission (learning) must be evolutionarily stable and able to outcompete 
alternatives, no individual cultural trait need be fitness maximizing, and indeed many are from a 
strict biological fitness viewpoint ‘maladaptive’.528 (Boyd and Richerson argue that human 
socialization has exactly that overall evolutionary stability because the environment humans live 
in changes with just the right degree of slowness, but that argument need not concern us here.529)  
The final dynamic to understand is the effect of the interaction of these forces with group 
formation. Groups form among humans by cultural markers (which need not be behavioural in 
nature) and particular traits (which are). As long as guided variation is error-prone and biased 
transmission plays a considerable role, and in particular as long as there is sufficient conformist 
                                                          
525 Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 69. 
526 Ibid., p. 76. 
527 Boyd and Richerson argue for guided variation as utility maximizing, but this is not strictly necessary. See Boyd 
and Richerson 1985, ch. 5. 
528 Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 150-151. 
529 Ibid., p. 118. 
163 
 
bias and enforcement of norms through punishment, the amount of variation within groups will 
decline over time and the amount of variation between groups will increase. This, in turn, will 
strengthen the effect of group selection insofar as human groups compete with each other.530 
While the degree and dimensions of competition between groups is controversial, there is little 
reason to doubt that human groups historically often have competed, in particular if one defines 
groups as designated by the existing variants of the relevant cultural traits (language X vs Y, or 
Protestant vs Catholic, or whatever). Where this is relevant, the competition between groups will 
be competition between sets of cultural traits and markers, and the extinction of particular 
marker groups (physically, or by absorption into the winning group) means an increase in the 
frequency of the traits and markers of the more adaptive group. In this sense, there is a certain 
adaptive efficiency of culture, to put it in North’s terms – a classic example being the Nuer 
organizational structure favouring its competitiveness vis-à-vis the Dinka.531 There is some 
evidence that competition between groups, leading to ‘cultural extinction’, is common among 
small scale societies at least, although it is not conclusive.532 Even so, we must be careful – 
North never specifies what competitive process allows for differential variation in ‘efficiency’ or 
‘performance’ to make one society more adaptive than another, and this greatly weakens the 
claim to an actual selection process in his account. More than competition, diffusion from one 
group to another of group functional traits is a fast and plausible process through which 
differential variation of traits can operate on global populations (that is to say, supra-societal 
ones, not necessarily literally across the whole world). A salient example is the success of 
evangelizing religions in competition with non-evangelizing ones.533 
The interaction between genes and culture on this perspective is useful for historians to 
integrate into their accounts. A few examples may serve to clarify what use this viewpoint has 
for constructing a narrative of cultural evolution in practical terms. For example, cultural 
markers interact with genetic evolution (which is fitness maximizing) to cause groups that differ 
by markers to increasingly fulfil different evolutionary niches so as to make their markers 
determinate for different economic strategies, habitats, etc., a process of immediate interest to 
economic historians.534 The interaction between cultural traits and natural selection resulting 
from disease, or from famine, or other such forces, can play a potent role in the history of 
institutional survival and diffusion, although we must not simply assume that all traits are for that 
reason biologically adaptive. It has been argued this played a major role in the victory of 
Christianity over paganism in ancient Rome, insofar as Christians’ mutual aid during times of 
plague increased their survival rate notably over that of pagans.535  
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Of course, with such explanations the risk of multiplying speculative just-so stories is 
considerable. However this may be, what is more useful is to consider the tools that have been 
offered for cultural evolutionary history to succeed. Integrating strong reciprocity and its role in 
the origin of institutions with the persistence, change, and inheritance of institutions via gene-
culture coevolution gives us a powerful conceptual apparatus that is both flexible and 
methodologically well-founded in the most robust functionalist theory that the social sciences 
have available, Darwinian natural selection. The evolution of human complex societies and the 
ongoing significance of traits and beliefs need then not be explained (solely) in terms of social 
contracts, boundedly rational choice, or market(-like) competition. Culture – institutions, beliefs, 
and markers – and the evolution of strong reciprocity and prosocial instincts like first and second 
order punishment go hand in hand as tools to explain both origin and change of human societies. 
As Boyd and Richerson argue, “in the short run, cultural evolution, partly driven by ancient and 
tribal social instincts and partly by selection among culturally variable groups, gave rise to the 
institutions we observe. In the longer run, cultural evolutionary processes created an environment 
that led to the evolution of uniquely human social instincts.”536  
A word on morality and emotions 
Having discussed the evolution of strong reciprocity, the theory of gene-culture coevolution, and 
their significance for understanding the emergence and persistence of institutions, it is necessary 
to return for a moment to the problem of emotions. We have seen that Bowles and Gintis have 
offered an account of the evolution of the social emotions that saw them as evolutionarily 
advantageous in overriding self-regarding, but group fitness reducing behaviour, and as a time 
discounting heuristic. But what role should the emotions play in the model of rationality that 
emerges if we accept their account of strong reciprocity? To account for their evolutionary 
emergence is one thing, to explain their behavioural significance in economic explanation is 
another. Geoffrey Hodgson has argued that the emotions play an important role in morality, as 
opposed to altruistic behaviour. He distinguishes these along much the same lines as 
deontological and consequentialist ethics are distinguished in ethical philosophy: for him 
morality is about the rightness of the thing done, whereas other-regard is still utility maximizing 
insofar as it is about maximizing the effect of the thing done.537 For him, moral values, with their 
inherent universalizing and other-regarding (or perhaps one should say other-incorporating) 
claims, are an important part of human behaviour but not reducible to preferences or beliefs in 
the conventional sense.538 
Moral rules are therefore peculiar kinds of institutions: as Hodgson argues, moral rules are 
not “reducible to conventions. They become moral rules because many people believe in them as 
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such and uphold them as more than matters of convenience, self-interest, or convention.”539 In 
this sense they have something in common with the arguments for inclusion of commitments in 
rationality discussed in chapter 3. Hodgson’s main argument is that the point of morality, so to 
speak, is to act as a cultural trait akin to emotions, in that its purpose is to be different from any 
strategic or instrumental appeal to consequences, self-interest, or prudence, and to overcome the 
ability of humans as reasoning beings to override our learned behaviour when it is in our self-
interest to do so. The social emotions play a major role in this account because strong feelings, 
such as would override any strategic decision-making processes, are the best supports for the 
persistence of such moral systems and values.540 While I differ with Hodgson on the plausibility 
of founding this account on the strong modularity theory of the brain, as proposed by (some) 
evolutionary psychologists, the overall point is well-taken. Insofar Bowles and Gintis’ account of 
strong reciprocity is still consequentialist in nature, to some extent a consequence of the 
functionalist impetus of evolutionary accounts, it misses an important deontological dimension to 
human life that would overlook the powerful emotional drives and commitments involved in 
religion, patriarchy, or even notions of ethnê. These, too, are cultural traits that require 
incorporation into an account of institutional change, and these, too, are modifications to 
Northian transaction cost-reducing bounded rationality as much as to the neoclassical model. 
Conclusion 
After this extended discussion, let me recapitulate the general argument of this chapter. Having 
given my reading of North’s theory of cultural evolution, I have wondered what function it 
serves in his overall argument. While it appears mainly to serve as a kind of backup argument to 
justify the general claims for the virtues of market competition for economic performance and 
for achieving cooperation, at the same time the turn towards evolutionary foundations is a very 
important theoretical step in its own right. In chapter 2, I contested North’s account of markets 
and market competition and whether they really could carry the analytical burden he placed on 
them. In chapter 3, I discussed North’s ambiguities and inconsistencies with regard to models of 
rationality and his difficulties with incorporating the growing role of sui generis beliefs – 
including their other-regarding component – into his model of agency. The appeal to 
evolutionary microfoundations has the potential, at least to some degree, to resolve both, and I 
suspect this is its main appeal for North.  
An evolutionary account is both helpful and inevitable to overcome the infinite regress 
problem in joining instrumental reason and institutional structure in explaining social 
phenomena. Equally, an evolutionary account at the macro-level could provide North’s historical 
narrative with a powerful functionalist type of explanation, buttressed by the well-understood 
‘trinity’ of Darwinian natural selection. North’s theory of cultural evolution can be read as 
attempting to take both these steps. Yet here, too, North appears conflicted: he does not want to 
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give up the central role of intentionality and culture, which he fears sociobiological approaches 
such as the Tooby-Cosmides school of evolutionary psychology would entail. The evolutionary 
and neurological descriptions of learning and cognition processes, the basis for the formation of 
beliefs, on my reading loom large in UPEC and elsewhere precisely because they allow North to 
concentrate on intentionality under uncertainty. In this way, he can place bounded rationality in 
its more conventional forms at the heart of his account of institutions, while seemingly avoiding 
the infinite regress as well as the pitfalls of evolutionary reductionism. Moreover, he wants to 
preserve the centrality to his account of the dual mechanism of markets and institutions to 
overcome, respectively, inefficiency/inflexibility and uncertainty-cum-transaction costs. For this 
reason, it comes naturally to formulate his evolutionary account in Hayekian terms, where the 
inheritance of tradition fills the gaps, as it were, that the free market cannot provide for on its 
own.  
I applaud North’s turn towards evolutionary thinking beyond the evolution of organisation 
and the firm: the best aspects of the Hayekian tradition is precisely this willingness to integrate 
micro- and macro-level evolutionary perspectives with the historical and theoretical dimensions 
of economics. However, there are serious problems with this tradition and with North’s account 
as well, and these I have discussed at length in this chapter. I argue North cannot avoid the 
infinite regress problem merely by appeal to learning and intentionality, for he misunderstands 
the role of intentionality in a Darwinian account. He mistakenly believes that the importance of 
cultural variation and intentional action makes sociobiological theory less applicable. But this is 
not so, certainly not when other sociobiological approaches than the Tooby-Cosmides school are 
taken into account. Secondly, North’s account of natural selection operating on societies via the 
adaptive properties of market competition is both implausible and incomplete, failing to 
rigorously describe the necessary prerequisites of a Darwinian process. Thirdly, North still fails 
to account in a systematic evolutionary manner how the human sociality that gives rise to our 
particular institutionalised and complex forms of socio-ethical reason comes about. As Boyd and 
Richerson rightly emphasize, decision-making forces (as they call them) are derived 
mechanisms: they must in evolutionary terms have their origin in other forces of selection. 
Which account of such origins makes sense therefore matters a great deal for what account of 
rationality is most plausible.541 
Because he simply assumes away this central question in sociobiology, he also does not 
realize the significance the experimental economic evidence testing the relation between culture 
and utility maximisation has for his work, nor the full import of models of the evolution of his 
‘foraging orders’, which he leaves to the controversial work of Johnson and Earle. Generally, 
North misses the tremendous opportunity evolutionary thinking offers to place his account of 
institutions in economic history on more firm foundations. In all evolutionary writing on the 
origins and function of certain sociocultural phenomena, it is a question of competing plausibility 
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arguments: no account can be proven with any degree of certainty, the purpose of sociobiological 
modelling is to establish which accounts are the least implausible. In such arguments, it does not 
suffice to simply argue that a particular account is incomplete or overly simple, since one is 
always abstracting from certain things and much of the work is still in the stage of establishing 
basic parameters. Rather, it is necessary to point to specific mechanisms identified in the model 
as inadequate, and/or to point to missing dynamics that would matter for the account.542 I have 
therefore offered to substitute for North’s incomplete and often implausible account an indication 
of where one could find the theoretical resources for a less implausible and more complete one, 
both at micro- and at macro-level.  
To do this, I have sketched the integration of what I see as the two indispensable supports 
for such an approach, namely gene-culture coevolution and experimental/behavioural economics. 
The former allows for the integration of culture and intentionality with a Darwinian adaptationist 
account, so that the origin problem disappears and with it the threat of infinite regress. It also 
offers a way of viewing the relationship between historicity and functionalism in a more clear 
light. The latter, in turn, should be explored for its implications for sociality and rationality, i.e. 
the very Northian question of what institutions and choice behaviour have to do with one 
another. Since the predictions of utility maximisation and even minimum consistency of 
rationality are routinely violated in such experiments, and in such a way as to suggest that these 
violations are themselves derivative of sociocultural orders and the political economies over 
longer historical time of the various peoples studied, this evidence seems to me to point the way 
to how this Northian question might be answered.  
North himself could not find an internally consistent answer, because of his unwillingness 
to abandon classical game theory and Simonian bounded rationality with their reliance on 
conventional forms of utility maximisation. But the gene-culture coevolution approach coheres 
very well with taking seriously other-regarding and group rationalities as well as the role of the 
emotions. As evolved behaviours, these both give rise to and interact with the necessary forms of 
social life, which are historically path dependent, arbitrary, and also dependent on the content of 
the institutions and beliefs in question. Here, functionalism and contingency can quite 
comfortably fit together in a historical and evolutionary account. But there is a price to pay: 
major Northian themes, such as the adaptive ‘efficiency’ of market competition, the use of 
indeterminate forms of bounded rationality in games as a contractarian explanation of the origins 
of institutions, and the neglect of sociobiology and anthropology must be given up. The result, 
however, would be a less implausible and more consistently evolutionary economic history, and 
without sacrificing the centrality of institutions and beliefs. 
All this is of course not sufficient on its own, just as appeals to contracts or transaction 
costs are not sufficient on their own: specification by means of individual case studies is always 
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needed. Moreover, the evolutionary perspective does not avoid the problem of non-ergodicity 
North rightly draws our attention to: the role of norms, arbitrary conventions, and group markers 
in cultural evolution and the considerable room in institutional ‘design space’, to put it in Daniel 
Dennett’s terms, give rise to historical path dependencies and ‘runaway dynamics’ that cannot be 
predicted in advance. Nor can an explanation of such historical dynamics be reduced to the 
maximisation of either utility or fitness.543 But the larger scale, long-term view is aided by this 
perspective, one that is to my mind better grounded and more empirically plausible than the 
medley of social contract theory and evolutionary psychology offered by North. Finally, the 
sociobiologically integrated perspective has one additional interesting property: in emphasizing 
how second order punishment can evolve and be sustained, and how it can stabilize any norm, 
and in observing the importance of norms for the cultural evolution of societies, the gene-culture 
coevolution perspective paves the way for a more explicitly anthropological treatment of 
institutions in economic history as well as other historical accounts. Reconciling anthropology 
and economics also brings us back to the contribution of Polanyi. These themes I will take up in 
the next chapter. 
  
                                                          




Polanyi’s challenge revisited: historiographical and anthropological 
reflections on Douglass North’s NIEH 
Introduction: revisiting Karl Polanyi 
In the course of this work, I have sought to examine the origins of Douglass North’s NIEH and 
its development over time, concentrating on its historiographical and economic theoretical 
methods and their justifications. A guiding thread throughout my study of the various themes in 
North’s conceptual apparatus – e.g. markets, game theory, evolution, institutions, states and 
social contracts – has been North’s complex and often contradictory relationship to rival 
approaches. If my interpretation is plausible, North’s NIEH has a peculiar character. On the one 
hand, in its increasing emphasis on the institutional, cultural, and even cognitive context of 
economic rationality and choice behaviour within and without well-defined markets, it seeks to 
move the mainstream of economic theorizing about historical change into a direction much 
closer to that of the other social sciences. His extensive critiques of neoclassical economics and 
its straightforward rational choice analysis, his increasing emphasis on the importance of beliefs, 
and his rejection of efficiency interpretations of institutions make this clear.  
On the other hand, North is simultaneously unwilling to give up all of the analytical 
framework of the economic tradition from which he emerged. In particular, North’s 
reintroduction of neoclassical thinking about the function and effect of market competition acts 
as a force pulling him back to the other direction. He is keen to insist on the classic welfare 
economic implications of well-ordered markets, sees such markets as necessary (if not sufficient) 
prerequisites for economic growth, and therefore takes a good deal of neoclassical consumer and 
growth theory and its larger micro- and macroeconomic implications essentially for granted. In 
his framework, ‘the market’ can only function properly if complemented by transaction cost 
reducing institutions and by sets of beliefs that make such institutions possible in turn. But that 
the full unfolding of ‘the market’ in its competitive structure with low barriers to entry is 
ultimately the desideratum of economic policy is not in dispute for North – to the extent that he 
ascribes to it not just growth-enhancing, but even evolutionary adaptive properties.  
But beyond this, often North’s way of presenting the behaviour of individuals in their 
interaction with their ‘artifactual structures’, whose importance the NIEH has done so much to 
stress, shows that North’s thinking has not always gone much beyond the conventions of 
neoclassical theory. However much North outwardly rejects rational choice theory and insists on 
a bounded and constrained form of choice, even at times allowing preferences and beliefs to be 
intelligible and derivable only from a given social matrix, he equally when it suits him presents it 
as a matter of the ‘players’ of a ‘game’. Similarly, as I argued in chapter 3, North cannot decide 
when self-interest is a valid assumption for the understanding of economic behaviour and when it 
is not. As keenly aware as he is of the limitations of such an approach when it comes to 
170 
 
understanding the institutional layer ‘underneath’ a market (or non-market) setting, he 
nonetheless resorts to such behavioural assumptions when to do otherwise would limit the 
relevance of ‘the economics approach’. Indeed, this if nothing else remains of the ‘economics 
approach’ that North wished to defend against the Marxist and Polanyian rivals, as he outlined in 
the 1977 paper I took as starting point of my investigation. As Geoffrey Hodgson has argued, 
"the case for the conquest of other social sciences and biology by neoclassical economists rests 
on the presumed universality of such ideas as scarcity, competition, and rational self-interest".544 
North is clear about his rejection of neoclassical economics; it is much less clear whether he can 
do without such concepts. This makes it dubious whether he can therefore avoid being pulled 
back into the same ‘economistic’ reasoning that Polanyi decried, and which has made previous 
economists’ forays into the broader social-historical sciences so difficult for their colleagues to 
accept. 
In this concluding chapter, I aim to place my close reading of North’s NIEH literature in a 
wider context, in particular to highlight the anthropological and philosophical dimensions of his 
work and their implications. To this end, I will first clarify what I mean by the ‘pessimistic 
anthropology’ I have identified as underlying North’s NIEH project, and which I have alluded to 
in previous chapters. Secondly, I will discuss North’s confrontation with an anthropologically 
based approach – as opposed to an economic theory based approach – in the form of Karl 
Polanyi, his original foil. My critical observations about North’s incomplete turn away from 
what Polanyi would call the ‘economistic fallacy’ might make one think I am arguing for a return 
to a Polanyian perspective. But I will argue here why to my mind such an approach, while also 
providing valuable conceptual tools, is equally not sufficient for the purpose. To put it playfully, 
I am not convinced Polanyi himself fully answered Polanyi’s challenge either. In fact, at least on 
some interpretations of Polanyi’s work one may identify analogous problems to those of North, 
albeit from a reverse perspective: from a different point of origin Polanyi too takes conventional 
choice theory as foundational for understanding the ‘logic’ of markets, but limits the full 
operation of this logic in economic history to a particular institutional order. This ‘mirror image’, 
so to speak, can best be understood by placing the North-Polanyi encounter within the larger 
framework with which I began this study: the primitivism-modernism debate in economic 
history. A few words on this context are therefore in order before turning to Polanyi himself. 
Finally, I discuss some alternative approaches I believe to be in need of integration, or 
potentially helpful, for achieving the aims of the Northian research programme. With this I 
conclude the present study. 
North’s pessimistic anthropology 
In my reading of North’s NIEH works, I have tried to show both the strengths and weaknesses of 
this approach and in particular of its conceptual apparatus, of the tools his NIEH provides for 
economic thought (especially, of course, economic history). In order to tease out these apparent 
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contradictions, I have sought to go beyond North’s own programmatic statements alone, and to 
investigate what in practice becomes of his fulminations against neoclassical economics or 
against simplistic laissez faire development economics when put to the test of his own theoretical 
development. The difficulty of North’s project is, as I have argued, its indeterminacy owing to its 
ambiguous position between (1) a neoinstitutionalism that remains closely within the orbit of 
mainstream economics and (2) a quest for ‘successive endogenisation’, to borrow a term from 
Malcolm Rutherford, that converges with a Polanyian or other ‘substantivist’ approach.545  
North, as I read him, wants to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis, but as a result threatens to 
sail nowhere at all, remaining adrift in indeterminacy and internal inconsistency. This is not 
because of any demerits of his ‘endogenising’ ambition in institutional economics, but rather 
because of his inability or lack of will to carry through the task of severing his ties with 
conventional economic thinking about economic institutions, including those that constitute and 
give rise to markets. Partially this is due to what I view as ideological constraints on his thought: 
in particular his political commitment to a Hayekian, classical liberal perspective on the virtues 
of market competition, strong individual property rights and small governments, and a well-
developed civil society. To this I would add his commitment to the indispensability of taking the 
postwar framework of economic theory, with its well-developed microfoundations in choice and 
consumer theory and its extensive literature on the welfare implications of consumer choice in 
markets.546  
On the other hand, in the course of my close reading I have also tried to find different 
sources of this tension, in what I have called the ‘hidden anthropology’ of North’s approach. 
Here, I have pointed to the persistence throughout North’s work, albeit in different forms over 
time, of his ‘pessimistic anthropology’ of human cooperation. From the beginning North’s work 
has shown a decidedly contractarian view of the emergence of institutions. Initially explicitly so 
in his early work with Robert Paul Thomas, as in their discussion of the rules of the medieval 
manor547; later less explicitly so, but still observable in his discussions of the development of 
institutions and state (or elite) power as a response to pervasive violence and uncertainty.548  
In this view, the rule of rent-seeking but violence-reducing elites is a second best option, 
with the achievement of cooperation through individuals in well-ordered markets a decidedly 
superior approach – even if both require an appropriate institutional order to function properly. 
North, Wallis and Weingast summarize this contractarian interpretation of property, state, and 
institutions clearly: “Although they are less robust to shocks than open access orders, they 
generate internal forces that provide for two of the basic tasks of all societies: stability and order. 
Natural states may appear to be corrupt according to the norms and values of open access orders, 
but that corruption is an inherent part of the operation of the social order… The key feature of 
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development within the natural states is the coevolution of institutional supports for 
organizations inside and outside the formal structure of the government. Fragile societies are able 
to secure more order through the proliferation of public organizations. These organizations need 
institutions to support and protect them and their flow of goods and services from opportunism. 
Similarly, the range of sustainable private organizations is linked to institutions that provide 
services to these organizations – such as contract enforcement – but also that provide credible 
commitments by the state not to expropriate the value created by the organizations.”549 
It is telling that the discussion of human evolution and its significance for the formation of 
institutions also begins with the ‘fact of violence’: namely by a brief discussion of Johnson and 
Earle’s work on the high levels of violence among foraging (hunter-gatherer) societies.550 But it 
is too simple to see North’s anthropology as simply a reworking of Hobbes’ view that, of all 
forms of uncertainty, “worst of all [is] continual fear, and the danger of violent death”, and that 
this gives rise to ‘civil society’.551 Rather, North’s anthropology is more subtle: it is based on the 
difficulty of cooperation in large groups, and therefore much more concerned with collective 
action problems than the Hobbesian framework. Firstly institutions, and then the market, provide 
both the means of coping with a changing, non-ergodic environment, as well as providing means 
for making cooperation in large groups possible. This cooperation in turn reduces the need for 
violence, as it is to everyone’s individual interest to participate in the civil society, even one 
based on rent-seeking and elite rule. It is therefore the function of beliefs and institutions to align 
incentives in such a way that individually noncooperative behaviour can sustain cooperation in a 
socially desirable way: the ‘Smithian result’ of market orders. This is, as I have argued, also the 
main implication of North’s singular discussion of behavioural economics and its 
anthropological implications: “Non cooperative outcomes are favored, however, where it is very 
costly to coordinate outcomes, in large groups, and even in smaller groups under private 
information. In large groups interacting through markets using property rights and a medium of 
exchange, and with disperse private information, non-cooperative interaction supports the 
achievement of socially desirable outcomes. Experimental studies have long supported this 
fundamental theorem of markets.”552 
This contractarianism, with its emphasis on the transaction cost reducing – and therefore 
welfare increasing – benefits of even institutional orders based on exploitative elite rule (as a 
‘least bad’ option) has a decidedly more Lockean or Humean than Hobbesian flavour at times, 
but even so it is identifiably based on an underlying pessimistic set of assumptions about the 
difficulties of achieving lasting cooperation. Both North’s evolutionary argument and his 
argument for the cooperation-enabling (or incentive-aligning) power of markets rest on this dark 
view of the effects of uncertainty and violence on human societies and their potential for success 
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and survival. North’s final words in UPEC serve, I think, well as a summary of how his NIEH 
framework, with its ambiguities between economic theory and the social context of markets, fit 
within a larger evolutionary-anthropological perspective deeply concerned with the ability of 
human institutions to get us lastingly beyond the ‘state of nature’: “What I have termed adaptive 
efficiency is an ongoing condition in which the society continues to modify or create new 
institutions as problems evolve. A concomitant requirement is a polity and economy that 
provides for continuous trials in the face of ubiquitous uncertainty and eliminates institutional 
adaptations that fail to resolve new problems. Hayek made this condition a central part of his 
argument for human survival… Economists have the correct insight that economics is a theory of 
choice. But to improve the human prospect we must understand the sources of human decision 
making. That is a necessary condition for human survival.”553  
For North, not only are ‘open access orders’ good for growth, they are economically and 
evolutionarily necessary to permit human survival on an on-going basis. Choice theory is the 
foundation for understanding the success or failure of institutional orders in achieving this aim. 
But even so, nothing is guaranteed: human frailty is so great, our decision-making in the face of 
uncertainty so limited, that ‘even’ choice theory may not get us far enough, and that even pro-
market beliefs and institutions may fail. Viewed in this way, North’s pessimistic anthropology 
and his optimism about the efficacy of market competition (and the ability of an ‘economics 
approach’ to comprehend it) constitute, if you will, the two faces of his NIEH. Each sustains the 
other but also contributes to generating the internal tensions within the theory. 
North, Polanyi, and the primitivism-modernism debate 
Achieving North’s ambitions, an institutional and evolutionary analysis of long-term economic 
change such as to explain the Great Divergence and to understand the rise and fall of institutional 
orders, may then require a different anthropological perspective to overcome these tensions. One 
possible way of approaching this problem would be to suggest a (re)convergence with Polanyian 
substantivism. After all, in his 1977 paper North found much in programmatic terms to agree 
with, such as Polanyi’s emphasis on the longue durée, his acknowledgement that markets were 
absent or incomplete in many premodern societies, and his attention to the sociocultural context 
of economic behaviour and political structures.554 At the time North wrote the paper, he had to 
invoke the ghost of Polanyi under the assumption that his influence among economic historians 
had waned to a mere wraithlike remainder. However, since the 1980s there has been a veritable 
‘Polanyi revival’, with different interpretations and applications of Polanyi’s thought gaining 
influence in social theory, and with Polanyi increasingly taking his place as a fixed star in the 
constellation of reference points for discussions of markets, global history, and embeddedness. 
The first international Karl Polanyi Conference held in Budapest in 1986 signalled the 
rediscovery of his works, and since then there has been a considerable expansion of secondary 
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literature on his work as well as biographical material.555 Having discussed at some length the 
peculiarities and problems of North’s NIEH, how should we now consider his relationship to 
Polanyi and the meaning of his ‘challenge’ with which I began the present work? 
Recall how North acknowledges his debt to Polanyi several times in his early works. More 
than this, the importance of Polanyi’s approach rests precisely in its difference from a purely 
economics-based one: Polanyi’s anthropologism, so to speak, allows him to ask different 
questions than most economic historians did (or do), ones that North’s NIEH is designed to take 
up. This is most clearly formulated when he discusses the very purpose of his NIEH, in an essay 
on the place of economic history within economics. As he writes: “while the new economic 
historians were busy capturing the field of economic history, they left the really interesting 
questions to the historians, the sociologists and the anthropologists. It is scholars in these fields 
who have been concerned with the structure of societies, with non-market forms of economic 
organization and distribution and with economic growth and decline. We left them with the 
interesting questions but without the tools to produce interesting theory. The result is that the 
followers of Moses Finley, Karl Polanyi and Immanuel Wallerstein point to the irrelevance of 
economic theory in analyzing the past… Yet the failure here is not that of economics. The fault 
lies with economic historians who have not been willing to extend economic theory to make it 
useful…”556 Seen from this vantage point, it is clear that North is probably to be classified on the 
‘modernist’ side of the divide – and yet perhaps the most substantivist modernist yet seen. 
Perhaps more than anything else this is what gives the NIEH its creative tension and makes it 
such an interesting development within economic historical theory. To understand to what extent 
a Polanyian approach can therefore complement the NIEH, we must put this Northian critique 
within the framework of the primitivism-modernism debate. 557 
Takeshi Amemiya has distinguished within the history of the primitivism-modernism 
debate – which he traces from the German Historical School to the time of Polanyi and Finley - 
two sub-debates: one concerning to what extent premodern economies were market dependent as 
opposed to oriented towards (surplus-producing) self-sufficient household economies, and one 
concerning whether neoclassical type methods are adequate for modelling premodern economic 
behaviour or whether such economies were ‘embedded’. The former Amemiya describes as the 
primitivism-modernism debate proper, whereas the latter he identifies as an opposition between 
‘formalism’ and ‘substantivism’ (terms used here in this specific sense). The latter opposition 
Amemiya specifies as follows: “typically, a formalist presupposes the existence of a well-
developed market and assumes that consumers and producers seek only selfish interests [sic] and 
all the economic quantities are determined by the market equilibrium that equates supply and 
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demand. A substantivist, on the other hand, believes that economic decisions are influenced or 
constrained by sociopolitical considerations and institutions.”558  
Besides the primitivism-modernism opposition from economic history, this opposition uses 
‘formalism’ and ‘substantivism’ in a sense perhaps not familiar to most economists; it is drawn 
from the anthropological literature, taking direct inspiration from Polanyi’s attempt at 
synthesizing both aspects of the debate on premodern economies.559 Both of these oppositions 
are therefore recurrent aspects of the overarching debate I have given the name of primitivism 
versus modernism. Very crudely outlined, this debate originated with the German Historical 
School and the work of Karl Bücher, who argued – against his colleague Eduard Meyer – that the 
economy of ancient Greece was fundamentally based on householding rather than market 
exchange, and that this meant that the straightforward application of economic theories based on 
market society could not succeed.560 This primitivist position formed the conscious basis of the 
work of Polanyi, Finley, and colleagues, who added to it the notion of ‘embeddedness’, which 
denied in fact the existence of a separate sphere of the economic in the premodern (especially 
ancient) world. They argued, be it in somewhat different ways, that because the various modes of 
economic integration, whether exchange, redistribution, or reciprocity, and the various forms of 
economic life, such as money and trade, had such radically different meanings in the premodern 
world compared to modern market societies that conventional economic theory was inapplicable 
and that a new way of thinking about the integration of social and economic institutions was 
necessary to understand these societies.561 
Amemiya’s definition is not without its problems. For one, his definition of substantivism 
is here so broad that it is difficult to imagine who, outside the most die-hard proponents of 
rational choice economics, would not be a substantivist. Certainly Polanyi’s own definition of 
substantivism has been variably interpreted: the ambiguity of the concept is akin to the ambiguity 
of his closely related concept of embeddedness, in that in both cases one could provide a loose 
definition and a strict one.562 One weak version of the substantivist thesis interprets Polanyi as 
having argued that substantivism means recognising the embeddedness of premodern economies, 
insofar as our model of economic behaviour in those societies should depart from the 
institutional context rather than from a pre-given rational choice (‘formalist’) concept alone. On 
this interpretation, Polanyi’s substantivism and the premises of institutionalism in economics, 
Old and New, are virtually identical.563 A more strict definition is given in the interpretation of 
substantivism as implying additionally that each premodern economic system had its own inner 
logic, which must be drawn out by the means of economic anthropology and history. This 
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reading rests not just on the ‘fact’ of embeddedness, but also on strictly separating the logics of 
scarcity and subsistence in our understanding of ‘the economic’.564  
Both can be defended in Polanyi’s work. He himself put it in his famous essay “The 
Economy as an Instituted Process” as follows: “the substantive meaning of economic derives 
from man’s dependence for his living upon nature and his fellows. It refers to the interchange 
with his natural and social environment, in so far as this results in supplying him with the means 
of material want satisfaction. The formal meaning of economic derives from the logical character 
of the means-ends relationship, as apparent in such words as ‘economical’ or ‘economizing’. It 
refers to a definite situation of choice, namely, that between the different uses of means induced 
by an insufficiency of those means. If we call the rules governing choice of means the logic of 
rational action, then we may denote this variant of logic, with an improvised term, as formal 
economics. The two roots meanings of ‘economic’, the substantive and the formal, have nothing 
in common. The latter derives from logic, the former from fact… the current concept of 
economic fuses the ‘subsistence’ and the ‘scarcity’ meaning of economic without a sufficient 
awareness of the dangers to clear thinking inherent in that merger.”565  
We may say then that North certainly is committed to substantivism in the looser sense, the 
importance of institutional contexts for determining, in some sense, the nature and outcomes of 
economic behaviour. However, the stricter interpretation gives a less clear picture: North remains 
committed to scarcity and competition as facts about institutional orders and choice theory as the 
best way to model those social dynamics. Even so, he opposes the New Institutionalist way of 
interpreting choice in this context to the ‘instrumental rationality’ of neoclassical economics; 
with ambiguous results, as we have seen.566 Now if we accept for the moment Amemiya’s 
schema, it is worth noting (as he does) that while the two aspects of the larger debate have 
historically been closely related, it is not strictly necessary for an Amemiyan ‘formalist’ to also 
be a ‘modernist’ and a ‘substantivist’ to be a ‘primitivist’ in this sense. Indeed, as he rightly 
notes, “a formalist is more likely to be a modernist, but not necessarily so. For example, one who 
believes that even the modern American economy should not be explained by utility and profit 
maximization may be said to be both a modernist and a substantivist with regard to the American 
economy”.567  
Seen from this vantage point, the peculiarities and interest of North’s NIEH become 
clearer: because this perspective is of course precisely the one that North has been developing as 
part of his New Institutionalist critique of neoclassical economics. Without much explicit 
acknowledgement, at least after the papers of the late 1970s, North’s NIEH is a major new step 
in the larger debate Amemiya and others identify. Consider: North’s use of Polanyi as a foil for 
developing his own theory; the sometimes awkward, sometimes productive position of North’s 
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microeconomic methodology between ‘oversocialized’ and ‘undersocialized’ perspectives (to 
borrow Mark Granovetter’s terminology) and between neoclassical economics and abandonment 
of choice theory568; his emphasis on the importance of institutional contextualization for all 
economies, modern or premodern, but also his insistence on the difference between the 
functioning market societies of the West and the dysfunctional part-market societies of the rest; 
and finally his willingness to concede to Polanyi the relative insignificance of market exchange 
in many premodern societies (“other allocation systems”), but not to concede to him the ability 
of a new economic theory, based on the fundamentals of the ‘economics approach’, to 
understand all economic orders, old and new. What I have identified as the tensions in his work, 
originating in his taking up of Polanyi’s challenge, amount – following Amemiya’s classificatory 
scheme – to the search for a theory that is both modernist and substantivist in economic history, 
in his looser sense. But on the other hand the more strictly one takes Polanyi’s meaning of 
substantivism as opposed to ‘formalism’, in the sense of presupposing a different economic 
rationality than that based on postulates of scarcity and competition, the less deeply 
substantivism actually runs in North’s theory.  
North’s NIEH therefore from this perspective owes both many of its strengths and of its 
weaknesses to this new position in the historiographical debate that began with the German 
Historical School. Although space does not permit me an extensive discussion of this point here, 
it is worth noting that in this North’s closest commonality within the existing ‘highlights’ of this 
debate is to the work of Max Weber. The latter’s approach to the historical sociology of ancient 
societies also sought to combine, arguably, a ‘modernist’ acceptance of the applicability of 
mainstream economic theory with an institutional and premodern contextualization of the 
operation of economic rationality. This has been called a ‘third position’ in the debate, in 
between thoroughgoing primitivism à la Polanyi and equally thoroughgoing modernism as in the 
work of Meyer, or nowadays Morris Silver. In Weber’s approach, particularly in The Agrarian 
Sociology of Ancient Civilisations, the utility (or profit) maximizing rationality assumed in the 
‘formalist’ perspective (once more in Amemiya’s terms) is contextual, dependent on the 
operation of market exchange with a profit motive by the individuals in question; it is not 
generalizable (in premodern societies) beyond this specific social-institutional context, and 
therefore does not characterize the premodern economy as such.569 North does not often mention 
Weber in his work. But perhaps North’s ambiguity about the concept of rationality and his 
difficulties in operationalizing it in different institutional contexts, as I have shown in chapter 3, 
could at least in part be overcome by adopting this strength of Weber’s approach: a more 
historically specific and less indeterminate understanding of economic rationality, based on the 
presence or absence of profit-motivated market orientation in specific cases. Such an 
understanding could be implemented (or at least complemented) at the level of qualitative 
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modelling by the alternative approaches to rationality in microeconomics discussed in that 
chapter. 
Revisiting Polanyi’s challenge 
Having placed my critical interpretation of North’s work in the wider context of these debates on 
primitivism, modernism, and substantivism, one cannot avoid the question to what extent 
North’s original ambition – to address Polanyi’s challenge – was actually successful. It is 
difficult to evaluate such a claim as a whole, not least because the theoretical differences 
between them may appear so strong that any commensurable judgement becomes impossible or 
simply partisan. Moreover, North’s direct engagement with Polanyi fades into the background, 
not to say disappears, after the papers inaugurating the NIEH: his primary interlocutors are rarely 
anthropologically oriented, but rather other New Institutionalist economists, public choice 
theorists, and so forth. Yet on the reading of North’s work as constituting a new phase, and a 
new attempt at a Weber-like ‘third position’, in the modernism-primitivism debate, contrasting 
North’s strengths and weaknesses with Polanyi’s becomes perhaps a more fruitful endeavour.  
To some extent, the work of North and of Polanyi show definite complementarities. At the 
risk of repetition, I will briefly recapitulate them here. Where North has difficulty 
operationalizing the substance of a belief system in terms of its implications for economic 
behaviour and market structure in a particular case (other than open access orders), this has been 
the subject of extensive work by Polanyi, combining anthropology with economic history.570 
Both North and Polanyi propose a bifurcation in economic history expressed in terms of two 
fundamentally different institutional orders, each of which give rise to a fundamentally different 
operation of markets. For Polanyi, the difference was between premodern ‘embedded 
economies’ and the modern disembedded market economy; for North, the division extends into 
the present and is more geographically conceived, with Western (and perhaps Japanese) open 
access orders distinguished from natural state orders in all other cases, but the distinction is 
otherwise not so different from that between modern and premodern economies. (After all 
North’s 1977 paper is concerned in particular with justifying the study of long-term premodern 
economic change.) Both, significantly, rely on at least some fundamentals of mainstream 
economic theory to explain the workings of markets in the ‘modern’ case: while Polanyi, as 
mentioned, famously rejected the applicability of economic theory to premodern embedded 
societies, he accepted the marginalist perspective of Carl Menger and his heirs as the correct 
model of the economy of market societies.  
This is not to say there are no substantial differences as well. As I have mentioned, for 
North the fundamentals of choice theory, consumer theory and welfare economics remain 
applicable throughout economic history and regardless of institutional order, and must do, if we 
are to understand anything about economic change. Indeed, they come fully into their own in the 
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case of the open access order: North is quite explicit that neoclassical price theory is useful for 
describing capitalist markets, just not for historicity or for development purposes, and the more 
perfect the markets, the more relevant neoclassical economics is. It just does not tell you how to 
get there.571  
Polanyi’s critique of the fallacy of applying economic theory to what he viewed as 
societies based on other modes of integration than the market, and his definition of the ‘modern’ 
type of market as a price-making market, led him down a very different path of interpretation of 
premodern economic history than North. Polanyi was, if nothing else, a great exponent of the 
primitivist interpretation of premodern economies. By contrast North’s NIEH framework is still 
based on the kind of universalization of a logic of competition, scarcity, and (sometimes) self-
regard even within an institutional context – indeed in the formation of institutions themselves – 
that Polanyi, at least in the stricter reading of his substantivism, abhorred. It should be said that 
North does not explicitly support the main claims of the ‘modernists’, that markets were fairly 
developed in many premodern societies and that the standard economic categories and models 
apply to such economies equally as to present-day ones – although he is mostly silent on this 
point, his emphasis on differing institutional and belief systems and his acknowledgement of the 
limited nature of premodern markets is often more in line with Polanyi’s.572 But where Polanyi’s 
perspective is about a revolutionary qualitative change in the nature of the economy, originating 
in Britain in the Industrial Revolution, North’s marginalist-cumulative approach to institutional 
change goes so far as to deny the existence of political or social revolutions altogether.573 North 
does acknowledge the Industrial Revolution as a break, but more conventionally as a break in the 
growth pattern, rather than a fundamental qualitative differentiation. All this fits the pattern of 
what I have described as North’s combination of modernism with substantivism, in contrast to 
Polanyi’s explicitly primitivist orientation. 
So put briefly, they have much in common insofar as they are both institutionalists 
concerned with understanding the effect of institutions on economic behaviour and doing so 
from a longue durée perspective. Both also see competitive, price-making markets in liberal 
institutional orders as the natural domain of application of neoclassical thought, but insist on the 
importance of institutions to understanding the origins and direction of such societies. But in the 
context of the primitivism-modernism debate they take up fundamentally different positions. 
What makes their exchange so interesting is precisely that this commonality of ambition is joined 
to this major tension between them. So reinterpreted by North, Polanyi’s challenge becomes the 
challenge of ‘successive endogenisation’: i.e. to explain the shift from societies with limited 
markets and different political and social structures to the ‘open access orders’ of the West by 
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digging into the underlying sociocultural and institutional orders and their autonomous change. 
Polanyi’s theoretical starting point is economic anthropology; North’s is economic theory.  
All this is easily understandable from the context of the primitivism-modernism debate as 
outlined above. But what are the weaknesses of Polanyi’s own conception, and to what extent 
has North succeeded in overcoming them by his NIEH? In his 1977 paper, North rather grandly 
suggested that such theoretical differences could not be overcome at that level, and rather 
required testable propositions to demonstrate the efficacy of a transaction cost economics-based 
approach over the Polanyian.574 In this work, I have ignored this injunction, since North himself 
has ignored it. His work has produced little by way of immediately testable new hypotheses, but 
much by way of innovative new theorizing, and it is the latter that has established such influence 
as he has. We must therefore address this at the theoretical level: how does Polanyi’s approach to 
‘successive endogenisation’ compare to North’s? 
In my view, the weakness of Polanyi’s approach was his conception of markets and their 
embeddedness, where his case for primitivism rested on a too narrow foundation to be 
historically sustainable. Decisive for Polanyi was the difference between markets that operated in 
an embedded way, regulated by social convention and as instruments of political power, and the 
autonomous operation of ‘price-making markets’. This led Polanyi to extensive denials of the 
presence of market exchange on any significant scale in the premodern world, at least insofar as 
such exchange for him never (with the possible exception of the Hellenistic era) became 
sufficiently autonomous to allow the laws of supply and demand to determine the price level. In 
this way, and only in this way, he could deny for the premodern era the applicability of 
marginalist or neoclassical economics. As Gareth Dale summarizes Polanyi’s position on 
premodern markets: “Those who depended for their livelihoods on incomes generated through 
buying and selling on markets were greatly outnumbered by peasants whose self-sufficiency 
insulated them from any meaningful market dependence. Because their survival was not market 
reliant they were under no economic compulsion to conform to market standards… Except 
where prices were regulated by custom or decree, peasants were likely to accept virtually any 
price for their wares… As a result, the supply-demand mechanism could not be said to 
function”.575  
This strong primitivist position espoused by Polanyi has not fared well under criticism. 
Even a close colleague and fellow-thinker of his like Moses Finley already warned him against 
underestimating the relevance of market exchange in the ancient world576; contemporary 
formalist economic historians have taken great pains to establish that, contrary to the 
substantivist thesis, factor markets were common from antiquity onwards. Moreover, in these 
markets, they have argued, individuals of whatever status have shown 'price-responsive' 
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behaviour: in other words, the internal logic of supply and demand, profit and loss, and 
individual optimisation that forms an abstract market can be read from the historical evidence. 
Morris Silver has argued the case for ancient Egypt, where he assures us recent papyri "open a 
window to the kind of world with which economic historians are familiar. Private property, 
'economic man', money and coinage and markets for land and labor-power become visible, 
however dimly"; this as contrary to the substantivist position that "the postulate of wealth-
maximizing used by contemporary economists is said to be utterly inappropriate to the 
"irrational," that is, nonutilitarian, ancients.577  
Sheilagh Ogilvie's study of Bohemian peasants and their market behaviour has been 
equally keen to establish the relevance of utility maximisation and 'price responsiveness' as 
against - in this case - the substantivist view of peasant behaviour attributed to Alexander 
Chayanov. She reviewed peasant behaviour on the estate of Friedland in the 17th century and 
found all manner of price-responsive, profit-making activity. Quite in the style of the NIEH, she 
asks rhetorically: "In early modern Bohemia, as we have seen, markets were not very highly 
developed: prices and costs were hard to calculate, payments were often made in kind, 
information was imperfect, and risks were high. But when we observe such an economy, should 
we assume it is thus because its agents prefer to avoid money, markets, and gain? Or should we 
ask whether other, external constraints were preventing markets from working well? Markets 
perform poorly in the absence of supporting institutions... that disseminate information, prevent 
extortion, and enforce contracts."578 The central concern of her paper is to refute the claim, 
central to primitivism (in Amemiya’s classification), that "peasants make economic decisions in 
a way that differs from ours, and cannot be understood using standard economics".579 
One may doubt whether either Silver or Ogilvie, both of whom refer to Polanyi (among 
others) as representing the opposing tradition, fully addressed the latter’s thesis. Indeed Polanyi 
did not deny the existence of market exchange in antiquity as such, nor indeed the possibility of 
wealth-maximizing behaviour in such contexts – even aside from his view that the Hellenestic 
economic world was by his criteria practically capitalist. But however that may be, I think one 
can safely state that there is a long-established consensus that ‘independent’ market exchange 
and trade were more pervasive in the ancient world - and indeed even before the Bronze Age - 
than Polanyi's arguments would lead one to suppose, and that moreover it is not easy to sustain 
the radical claim that such markets were in every respect price takers or proceeding solely on the 
basis of customary prices and values, rather than determining relative prices through the process 
of exchange.580 Although the significance of customary and state regulated pricing as opposed to 
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‘laws of supply and demand’ increasingly seems to be a matter of degree rather than of kind in 
many premodern economic settings, one can certainly wonder whether the former aspect was as 
predominant, and as exclusionary of the formation of an independent motivational logic in 
market exchange, as Polanyi’s argument would seem to require. 
Indeed, within economic anthropology some have argued that the dualism of the 'market 
economy' and the economies based on reciprocity or redistribution does not help us understand 
the differentia specifica of markets and market behaviour in a wider context of what the 
economic is in a particular case. As Georges Dupré and Pierre-Philippe Rey critically observed, 
in Polanyian substantivism "the significance of the non-economic merely begs the question since 
the non-market economy is studied according to the criteria of the market economy... The 
relation between the two terms can be seen only as mutually exclusive... From the very moment 
when a single element of the 'essence' of the market is actualised in a non-market economy it 
then invades, at the same time destroying, the system in which it had manifested itself and 
replaces it by the market system."581 It is this view of the essence and coherence of the market as 
an independent entity, if and when the 'supply-demand price mechanism' operates in them, that 
prevents a Polanyian viewpoint from comprehending the specificity of that mechanism to the 
institutional context of a society's economic life. 
Here, a Northian contextualization in terms of institutions, beliefs, political structure, and 
even transaction costs allows for a broader acknowledgement of the presence and extent of 
profit-oriented market exchange than Polanyi would have allowed, without abandoning the 
substantivist premise. For this premise may still be maintained, if we abandon Polanyi’s extreme 
primitivist case about the price-making character of markets. Polanyi’s approach equally permits 
a more subtle interpretation of the problem, where considerable profit-oriented behaviour in 
premodern markets can be allowed, but where such behaviour remained a relatively insignificant 
part of the economy as a whole. Moreover, it never until modern times led to any systematic 
economic growth. As Ogilvie is also forced to acknowledge, Polanyi’s argument about market 
dependence is a considerably stronger case than the argument about the absence of a Weberian 
economic rationality she attributes to Chayanov and that Polanyi arguably shared.582 
With this in mind, let us return to where we began: North’s 1977 paper on Polanyi’s 
challenge. In North’s 1977 paper we can find how, once this problem with Polanyi’s perspective 
is acknowledged, the former’s NIEH approach has if anything converged over time with the 
Polanyian. Recall that initially, North is happy to accept the claim that markets were often 
substituted for by other allocation systems. But, as he notes, Polanyi’s definition of markets is 
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too restrictive, and ‘price-making’ is a matter of degree rather than all or nothing.583 Even so, 
much “non-price allocation” in premodern (and modern) societies can be accepted as a matter of 
fact.584 The core difference for him was that, according to North, such choices should be 
explained in terms of “economic forces”, most importantly transaction costs, rather than it being 
ascribed to economically “irrational” elements such as “custom, kinship arrangements” and other 
subjects of “social, cultural, and psychological” studies.585 The original gambit on North’s part 
was therefore that, in order to meet Polanyi’s challenge, his NIEH could accept the Polanyian 
case regarding the limited extent of markets and the need for institutional explanation; but that 
transaction cost analysis could provide a different kind of substantivist analysis, one rooted in 
economic choices rather than in “ad hoc” studies of these “social, cultural, and psychological” 
factors in each society in question. North explicitly also argued that such an approach would 
work just as well for modern economies (i.e. from the 19th century onward) as for premodern 
ones.  
Yet what we find, when considering the critical survey of North’s work I have undertaken 
here, is that far from substantiating such a case, North has become more and more Polanyian. 
From the efficiency approach to the medieval manor, with its straightforward neoinstitutionalist 
social contract model, North has moved to a deeper study of the variety of institutional orders, 
the importance of sui generis and stable belief systems, the relevance of cognitive theory for 
explaining persisting differences in worldviews, to fundamentally ‘social’ conceptions of 
rationality (at least some of the time), and to the essential role of political structures, especially 
states, in dealing with violence and disorder. All this time, transaction costs and the search for 
the ‘Smithian result’ – social benefit from the interaction of individual noncooperative 
behaviours – have been a guiding thread of his work. But equally, the more his work has 
developed, one can see that whether or not this harmonious result obtains, and whether or not 
transaction costs will become low enough to permit the kind of fully competitive and price-
making markets North idealizes, has come to depend precisely on the ‘given’ sociocultural 
factors Polanyi saw as central to the explanation. In this sense, every acknowledgement of the 
inescapable importance of such thick anthropological concerns as belief systems, informal social 
norms, coordinating punishment and reciprocity, kinship networks, signaling traits and group 
rationality as analytically prior to ultimate economic choices in terms of transaction costs – such 
as the ‘choice’ of institutions ‘at the margin’ - is a concession to Polanyi’s explanatory 
framework, and a defeat for a project to overcome ‘Polanyi’s challenge’ through New 
Institutional Economics.  
If my reading of North in this work is plausible, at least one inescapable conclusion is this: 
that for North’s project, and indeed any evolutionary-institutional approach seeking to overcome 
the weaknesses of Polanyi’s position in the primitivism-modernism debate, to be consistent and 
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successful, it will have to take anthropological foundations of economic life as central to the 
explanatory framework rather than departing from choice theory, precisely as Polanyi sought to 
demonstrate. This is not to say transaction cost analysis cannot be part of the theoretical toolbox, 
nor is this to rescue Polanyi’s dubious claims about premodern market structure. It is merely to 
say that once the step towards ‘successive endogenisation’ is taken, and the economic historian 
seeks to integrate social institutions into understanding markets and economic change in the 
premodern world, economic theory alone can no longer suffice as explanatory foundation. To 
stick to such microfoundations, even if they take the form of bounded rationality and NIE rather 
than neoclassical premises, makes one unable to resolve either the infinite regress of institutional 
economics – each institution presumes a previous one – or the problem that the institutions 
regulating economic behaviour have their origins in nonmarket-like social phenomena, as the 
problem of ‘markets versus hierarchies’ illustrates.  
One solution is the Williamsonian approach, to ignore it altogether and assume that “in the 
beginning there were markets”586; but if, like North, one does not accept this for the purposes of 
economic history (as opposed to economics), one must avoid the trap of internal inconsistency 
and indeterminacy North fell into. And while no theory can be complete and consistent, I would 
argue this discussion of the North-Polanyi encounter shows at least that the problems of North’s 
NIEH could be overcome in principle – not by accepting Polanyi’s empirical claims about the 
ancient world, but by accepting his argument for the necessity of an anthropologically based 
substantivism, one that does not fear the tools of economic analysis but does not take them, or 
the type of market exchange for which they were designed, as analytically primary in historical 
explanation.  
What role for economic anthropology? A sketch of background and potentials 
Such a discussion raises inevitably the question what such an anthropological approach to 
institutionalist and evolutionary economic history would look like. It is of course impossible to 
fully develop an alternative theory here, as such a task could easily require many book-length 
works in its own right. A more fully fleshed out discussion will have to be postponed to another 
occasion. But in order to not simply provide criticisms, but also offer some directions for future 
research, I will simply sketch what I see as promising theoretical resources here. These should be 
seen as complementary to, not in lieu of, the various more specific theoretical alternatives to 
North’s explanatory models suggested in the preceding chapters (i.e. on markets, rationality, and 
sociobiology). 
Attempts to reconcile anthropology and economic thought, or at least to find 
reformulations of economic thought by using anthropological insights and methods, have a long 
and complex history. The primitivism-modernism debate mentioned above is one domain in 
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which economic anthropology and economic history have interacted, sometimes fruitfully, 
sometimes mainly polemically. The analogous debate for economic theory (as opposed to 
history, though not independent from it) is the formalism-substantivism debate in which Polanyi 
played just as much a key role as in the other. That both have come to be associated so strongly 
with the work of Polanyi, and that both debates are primarily concerned with the possibilities and 
obstacles to reconciling economic thinking, including economics itself, and anthropological 
theory, is once more evidence of the centrality of that figure to any such attempt at future 
‘reconciliation’. 
But Polanyi is certainly not the only one who has been concerned with finding a synthesis 
between these disciplines. The idea proposed here, to reconsider such possibilities of synthesis in 
the light of developments in institutional economics, economic anthropology, and evolutionary 
theory (including evolutionary approaches to culture and the economy), has a considerable 
pedigree. Already in the 19th century, the investigations of the first social anthropologists like 
Lewis Henry Morgan, Edward Tylor and Sir John Lubbock had a major influence on the political 
economy of Marx and Engels in the later stages of their intellectual trajectory, and there has been 
a Marxist interdisciplinary tradition bridging economics and anthropology since that time.587 
Equally, the Wilhelmine participants in the debates of the German Historical School alluded to 
above can be seen as forerunners of economic anthropology, just as they can be seen as 
forerunners of institutional economics. The work of Weber, following on this tradition, is another 
example of a conscious synthesis between methods of economics – albeit without formalisation – 
and the subject matter of historians and anthropologists, such as the interrelationship between 
class, religion, and economic institutional change. The formalist-substantivist debate in 
economic anthropology is a direct inheritance from these traditions, and both the Marxist and the 
German Historical School approaches influenced Polanyi greatly.588  
In the 20th century, anthropologists have also in turn been influenced by the development 
of modern economic theory. Anthropologists like D.M. Goodfellow, Raymond Firth, and 
Melville Herskovits defended the rational choice and utility maximising approach of the 
economists of their day, in contrast to the disdain for instrumental rationality assumptions on the 
part of Malinowski and other founders of economic anthropology. For them, neoclassical 
economics was better than no economic theory at all, and all social institutional explanation 
needed to be explicable in terms of the behaviour and interests of individuals, something 
recognized by the economists.589 But these reconciliations did not engage much with the 
historical comparative approach in which different forms of rationality or economic motivation 
could be compared, rather than a single type assumed; the major exception here is perhaps 
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Polanyi’s most important forerunner, the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss. However, the 
latter’s work never founded an influential ‘school’ of its own.590 
Given the willingness to find a common ground on the part of early ‘formalist’ 
anthropologists such as Firth and Herskovits, one would perhaps expect a positive response from 
the economists’ side. But this was not forthcoming. In a rare engagement with the theoretical 
writings of anthropologists, Frank Knight wrote a damning review of Herskovits’ book. As 
Knight argued, no such reconciliation of disciplines between economics and the humanities was 
or would be possible: “…effectively uses inference from clear and abstract principles, and 
especially intuitive knowledge, as a method….[T]he conceptual ideal of economic behaviour is 
assumed to be, at least within limits, also a normative ideal, that men in general…wish to make 
their activities and organization more “efficient” and less wasteful…[T]he anthropologist, 
sociologist, or historian seeking to discover or validate economic laws by inductive investigation 
has embarked on a “wild goose chase”. Economic principles cannot be even approximately 
verified – as those of mathematics can be, by counting and measuring.”591 
The substantivist side of the debate has been sufficiently mentioned. That ‘formalist’ 
anthropology, that is essentially to say neoclassically inspired anthropology, has nonetheless had 
a thriving career since has been more owed to the willingness of anthropologists to take over 
wholesale the methodologies of neoclassical economics than to any particular hospitality or 
encouragement on the part of economists. As Keith Hart notes, “formalist anthropologists, whose 
knowledge of the history of economics does not appear to have been strong, sacrificed the 
sensitivity to institutional context shown by leading economists such as Marshall in order to 
promote a universalizing rhetoric of ‘maximizing individuals’. Eventually some of them found 
that a serious exposure to economics lent weight to their efforts; and formalism broke up into a 
number of specialist approaches drawing on information theory, game theory, cost-benefit 
analysis, rational choice, agricultural development and a host of other spin-offs from mainstream 
economics. By the 1980s many US universities were insisting that economic anthropologists 
should have a higher degree in economics rather than maintain the foolishness of the recent 
past.”592  
In recent years the institutional turn has nonetheless affected economic anthropology as 
well, and it has led some anthropologists to see the New Institutional Economics as a much 
better tool for achieving the dream of a more shared comparative research programme than the 
old neoclassical ‘formalism’ was.593 Here Williamson, North, and other such writers have been 
sources of inspiration for the anthropologists – but, as I have pointed out, the reverse has been 
very rarely the case, with North much preferring the work of paleoanthropology and cognitive 
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studies of hunter-gatherer societies to the kind of comparative social studies of economic 
anthropology, whether New Institutionalist in inspiration or not. Once again the effort seems to 
be foundering on the economists’ unwillingness to venture beyond the established disciplinary 
boundaries and literatures. 
Is a reconciliation therefore possible, even if desirable? I think so, but it can only be based 
on a thorough knowledge of both fields, including the historical comparative dimension that was 
the focus of Polanyi’s work. Insofar the New Institutionalist turn shows that the ‘new 
mainstream’ of economics is searching for a way to integrate ‘the social’ in Polanyi’s sense into 
its understanding of economic change, and insofar the aporias of even North’s approach – surely 
the most sophisticated of attempts at synthesis on this basis – show that the combination of NIE 
theory with bounded rationality and the evolution of cognition is still not sufficient to achieve 
this objective, the way should be free for a meeting of the minds between anthropological 
traditions and other traditions in economic thought. Behavioural economics already demonstrates 
that such attempts at unification can develop exciting new insights that take us far beyond what 
was taken for granted on either side of the disciplinary divide. In experimental economics, 
anthropology and economics are increasingly joining in a research programme to test the 
implications of game theoretical analysis in the field, with an emphasis on understanding the 
components of the ‘moral economy’ of agents in strategic situations and cross-cultural 
comparison. Both have been preoccupations of economic anthropology since its inception. It is 
therefore all the more disappointing that an author like North does relatively little with this 
material. 
If nothing else, social and economic anthropology since Mauss and Polanyi has been 
dedicated to the comparative exploration of the interaction between beliefs, social and economic 
institutions, and individual behaviour and self-representation. It seems wasteful and obtuse to 
sideline this wealth of insight altogether. The formalist-substantivist debate in anthropology can 
perhaps be bypassed now that the mainstream economic theory that inspired the ‘formalist’ side 
is itself convergent with the concerns and aims of the substantivists, be it in a preliminary and 
incomplete way, as the example of North shows. Equally, the ‘formalists’ were right to think that 
economic anthropology can learn much from the tools and methods of the economists, in 
particular now that the ‘new mainstream’ and the behavioural and evolutionary economic 
‘schools’ have been breaking new ground in understanding the formation of institutions, the 
possibilities of cooperation, and the interaction between beliefs, norms, and economic behaviour. 
Finally, the economic historians can and should have a fruitful exchange with these strands of 
economic thought, for they need theory to frame their observations and research questions, even 
as they in turn contribute essential empirical material and analysis of long-term trends to the 
comparative study of economic institutions that emerges from this synthesis. The time for 
reconciliation, therefore, is now. 
The anthropologist David Graeber's discussion of value versus values is perhaps helpful 
here. As he points out, one of the weaknesses of the substantivist perspective was precisely its 
188 
 
inability to study questions of value and commensurability as an integral part of their project. 
The substantivist approach remained at the level of empiricism and providing useful 
categorisations like the Polanyian trinity, but it did not theorise value: “it is one thing to say 
'societies' have different ways of distributing goods. It is another to explain what particular 
members of the society in question think they're doing when they give gifts, or demand 
bridewealth, or exchange saffron for ivory in a port of trade.”594 In order to make this clear, I will 
have to have recourse to some examples from the practice of economic anthropology. These 
examples concentrate on the various roles material goods and their allocation play in different 
societies, and the (in)commensurability between them, as an illustration of the relationship 
between the allocation systems themselves. The relationship between people appears, in the 
study of economics, as mediated by material goods and their distribution. As Arjun Appadurai 
has suggested, the valuation of goods in different allocation systems is what determines their 
commensurability or incommensurability. Drawing on Georg Simmel, another major exponent of 
the German Historical School, he suggests that goods (or commodities), the objects of material 
culture, can only be valuated according to the same norm or standard of value if they are 
exchanged according to that standard. In other allocation systems regarding these goods, the 
valuations may be different depending on the social system in question, and therefore 
commensurability is absent. This is to my mind one of the main tasks of economic history 
reconstructed along the lines suggested in this paper: “exploring the conditions under which 
economic objects circulate in different regimes of value in space and time”.595 
A similar important anthropological concept, too often missing in institutionalist 
discussions of economic history, is commensurability. What I mean by this term is the 
measurability or comparability of one good or aspect of economic and social life in terms of 
another. It is characteristic of modern society that almost anything should be seen as 
commensurable with anything else via the medium of money. Yet this is not so for much of 
premodern life, and indeed not for all of modern life. Economic anthropology can teach 
economic historians much, I think, about the importance of studying commensurability relations 
to understand the embeddedness of economic life in structures of meaning, belief, and function 
(willed or unintended). The very nature of the subjects of economic activity, such as goods or 
labour, depends on those structures within which they are made comparable with others. As 
Maurice Godelier said: "economic activity then appears as activity with many different meanings 
and functions, differing each time in accordance with the specific type of relations existing 
between the different structures of a given society. The economic domain is thus both external 
and internal to the other structures of social life, and this is the origin and basis of the different 
meanings assumed by exchanges, investments, money, consumption, etc., in different societies... 
The existence of a currency thus has not the same meaning in a primitive economy [sic] as in a 
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Western commodity economy. One and the same reality may take on different and unexpected 
significances through belonging to different social wholes."596 
This may move us beyond Polanyian embeddedness itself. As Godelier wrote on another 
occasion, reviewing Polanyi's theory of the embedded economy: “At no point does Polanyi really 
ask himself why it is that the economy occupies a particular position in a given society, and why 
it functions, 'embedded' or not, within kinship or political or religious relations... The notion of 
'embeddedness' itself gives rise to problems which deserve further discussion. For one cannot 
conceive of any form of economy being compatible with any form of kinship, religion or 
government, and vice versa”.597 The mental model of the world is, following Godelier, then to be 
seen as a property of the particular forms of economic activity – both production and allocation – 
in question. “Once one sets oneself the task of building a comparative theory of the shifting place 
of the economy in society, one is duty bound to pose the question... of the role of economic 
relations, of their effects upon societies' functioning and evolution. The fundamental problem is 
then to know up to what point and through what mechanisms the economic relations – the 
relations of human beings with each other in the production and redistribution of their material 
means of existence – determine the functioning of this evolution.”598 
Nor is it merely a matter of 'property rights'. An interesting example is the view of the 
classical scholar, Richard Seaford, who suggests that the need for the community as a whole, 
mediated by the temples, to pay for public works, and other common interests such as hiring 
mercenaries, required use of temple treasure. Although Seaford’s work is controversial, and I 
cannot here judge to what extent it will stand up to future scrutiny, it may serve at least as a 
practical illustration of how one might think about institutions and economic behaviour in an 
‘anthropological’ way. The distribution of sacrificial meat had coordinated and constituted the 
polis as a community hitherto, and established relations of commensurability between 
individuals in social 'exchange', something akin to citizenship (if not necessarily on an equal 
basis). But for these kind of payments, durability as well as commensurability, and the public 
faith in the payment that underpins this commensurability, is required. This in turn suggests the 
need for a more permanent and generalizable form of payment than such meats. So, for Seaford, 
as the polis developed more coherently, the iron spits – cheap, easily replaceable, durable, 
lightweight, and commonly possessed – that the meat had been roasted on substituted as payment 
for the meat itself, essentially forming the first money as a means of payment. It is for this reason 
that the word for such a spit, obolos, became the word for the cheap form of coin in ancient 
Athens (and indeed was so in modern Greece until it introduced the Euro). These spits, in turn, 
were replaced by coins of precious metal, such as the Athenian silver and the Ionian electrum.599  
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The advent of the silver obeloi (and drachmai) used as money in archaic Greece ultimately 
led to a commensurability between two different kinds of allocation systems and of two different 
kinds of mentality about the social function of economic activity that had pervaded Homeric 
times: “on the one hand the aristocratic circulation of prestige objects (treasure, sometimes of 
precious metal) – as interpersonal gifts or sometimes ransom or prizes – stored temporarily or 
permanently in private houses, and on the other hand the egalitarian sacrificial distribution of 
meat that integrates a group or community.”600 Money can only arise when this 
commensurability between goods or labour measured in it is already established or coming into 
being, and in turn expresses the commensurability between these economic spheres, for example 
as it increasingly came to exist in the archaic and classical periods of Greece.  
In other words, the commensurability of money in the market depends on the political 
structure of the society in question, and at an even deeper level, on the 'constitutive' language 
games - incorporated in habituation and institutions - of that society. The mental component of 
market activity, even in straightforward monetary exchange, must be traced back to its social, 
political, and religious roots. The particular interrelation of these that characterises a society and 
its economy is the embeddedness of that society, viewed anthropologically. Different media can 
be used for the different purposes of money in this sense whenever commensurability between 
different systems of value is not complete. Therefore in such societies, as the anthropological 
literature demonstrates, the economy is an essentially divided entity that nonetheless in its 
entirety reproduces the society in question. Indeed, the fungibility of money is perhaps never 
'total' at least until the advent of the modern market society, which could indeed be defined in 
part by the (seeming) completeness of this commensurability and thereby of this fungibility.601 
Such brief sketches can only indicate how the ways of seeing of economic anthropology, 
such as understanding the institutional and belief structure underlying exchange – so important 
for North’s approach – in terms of value and commensurability, could contribute to an 
institutional-evolutionary economic history. In the evolutionary dimension, besides the potentials 
of gene-culture coevolution approaches to institutional evolution mentioned in the previous 
chapter, one could take up another cue from evolutionary economics: One such avenue is 
proposed by Geoffrey Hodgson in his discussion of social formations and their structuration. He 
points to the possibility of identifying, similar but not identical to the Marxist 'mode of 
production' approach, the interaction between the dominant deep level socio-cultural habits and 
norms of thought and the prominent 'provisioning institutions' of that society. In this way, we can 
unite the evolution of institutions with differentiation in types of economies according to their 
dominant production and distribution relations.602 Combined, this seems to come close to the 
'reproduction perspective' proposed by Godelier, i.e. identifying the evolution of the inner 'logic' 
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of social relations and of the sphere of the economic within them, but enriched by contemporary 
insights in evolutionary theory.603  
Finally, as an integrative possibility one could consider the potentials of the ‘deep history’ 
(also called ‘big history’) that has become an exciting new way of presenting global history. 
Such an approach seeks to integrate the evolutionary scale of human history with the long-term 
institutional scale as well as the more everyday level of history of much more specific periods 
and places: a thoroughgoing institutional, evolutionary, and longue durée approach based on the 
interaction between different timescales and causal levels. As Andrew Shryock and Daniel Lord 
Smail write in their introduction to an interdisciplinary collection on this theme, human evolution 
has until relatively recently been something difficult for the social sciences to fully incorporate 
into the conception of history itself. It nonetheless gives us information not just about the 
development of hominin species at the phenotypical level, but is a constantly relevant factor in 
the very long-term patterns and changes in human social and cultural history.604 As they put it, 
"histories can be written from every type of trace, from the memoir to the bone fragment and the 
blood type... The ongoing merger of history and social science has produced an intellectual 
world in which most scholars realise that intentions are social products, and the grounds for their 
production are largely beyond the control of individuals and their desires. In this realisation, the 
methodological distinctions that once separated history from anthropology and archaeology all 
but disappear."605  
The promise of deep history, then, is to connect the very long term timescale of 
evolutionary change with the 'historical' level of the formation and change of social institutions, 
by the mediation of the physical human needs, produced goods, and not least the evolved mental 
life of humans as a zoon politikon. This allows us to dispense with "the unhelpful assumption 
that the deep past is best understood in relation to a fixed human nature or universal behavioural 
tendencies (such as 'economising', 'rational choice', or 'kin selection')" or "the belief that certain 
cultural forms, such as 'ethnicity', are quintessentially modern and that similar processes of group 
identification are not found in the past."606 
Such concerns may seem remote from the world of recorded history or the domain of 
economic theory. But I suspect that they are not, and that future research will show the 
convergence of this level of analysis with the concerns of historians, anthropologists, and 
economists. If at the lower level the anthropological approach to changing regimes of 
production, value, commensurability, and institutions unites economic history with institutions as 
emergent properties of human sociality; and if at the middle level of abstraction gene-culture 
coevolution forges an intimate connection between the socially determined and variable habits 
and institutions of social life and the pressures of Darwinian selection on humans in general; then 
                                                          
603 Cf. Godelier 1978, p. 98, 105, 107. 
604 Shryock and Smail (eds.) 2011, p. 12. 
605 Ibid., p. 13. 
606 Ibid., p. 13. 
192 
 
at the highest level of abstraction our very human needs and means of production, our foodstuffs 
and our clothing, our responses to climate and to the material environment, and our very 
sociality, need and regard for others are part of a unified evolutionary and socio-economic 
history stretching back into deep time. "We demonstrate", Shryock and Smail report, "how 
humans have used food and kinship to create worlds that, by comparison with other primate 
standards, are highly dependent on an awareness of past and present. As social projects, these 
shared substances are media of 'kinshipping', a tactic for moving through time and space that 
requires networks of relationships and exchange... Kinshipping is possible only if... a formative 
relation preexisted and continues to define the new and particular. It has no point of origin. 
Likewise, the coevolutionary spiral, which envisions two genealogies entwined and feeding off 
each other, displaces metaphors of genesis, revolution, and the biblical fall."607  
There is no denying that sketches of this kind are highly abstracted and operate on a 
theoretical level not immediately operationalisable in specific economic historical cases. To that 
extent, I do not seek – as has been fashionable for some time – to reject North’s NIEH approach 
as a grand narrative that must fail as all grand narratives do. I am on the contrary very 
appreciative of North’s efforts in constructing a grand narrative seeking to integrate institutional 
economics with a substantivist quest to answer Polanyi’s challenge, and insofar as I criticize his 
work and propose alternatives, it is to build a better and more plausible narrative, but not a less 
grand one. To some extent, this is the natural consequence of the philosophical and 
anthropological lens through which I have viewed North’s NIEH in this work, and with this 
historiographical focus in mind I have consciously avoided engaging in much empirical 
discussion on the merits of any particular claim about concrete historical events in North’s 
account, with only occasional exceptions. The task of applying these insights regarding the 
promises and pitfalls of North’s approach to more specific case studies falls onto further 
research, as does further exploration of the philosophical and historical context and implications 
of the main themes discussed in this work.  
  
                                                          




Allow me now, as is conventional, to reflect on the argument of this present work as a whole. I 
have begun this discussion of Douglass North’s NIEH by trying to locate it in the context of the 
primitivism-modernism debate. More specifically, I have tried to understand the differentia 
specifica of this approach, even as contrasted with other NIE approaches, by reading North 
through the lens of his engagement with the challenge of Karl Polanyi and what this has meant 
for the direction in which he has developed his theory. In some respects this reading has not 
differed so greatly from existing interpretations of the work as a whole, such as the observation 
that his work has gone through several stages: from a more rational choice contractarian 
‘efficiency approach’ to institutions to a much more thoroughgoing search for the preconditions 
of effective and growth-enhancing markets and the moral orders that sustain them. The latter 
stage has shown a tremendous expansion of the scope of his work, incorporating a number of 
subjects and problems normally left by economic historians to anthropologists, sociologists, or 
even cognitive scientists. This process of incorporation I have described as the ‘successive 
endogenisation’ of more and more elements of the social-institutional ‘background’ into North’s 
theory of the effect of institutions on economic behaviour and performance.  
For some, this process has been a general success, perhaps even the way forward for the 
reconciliation of old and new institutionalisms, or of economics and other social sciences: such 
commentators speak of a “fruitful attempt at integration” of different disciplinary approaches, or 
even “a powerful example of how persistent and well placed confidence and hard work can 
productively transform the status quo”.608 Others have seen in it a case of deceptive heterodoxy, 
an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable differences of mainstream economic theory and the 
domains of the other social sciences. In this perspective, North’s work represents a prime 
example of “economics imperialism” or an opportunistic attempt at reclaiming relevance for a 
‘neoclassical’ economic history to impress the colleagues in the economics departments.609  
I have sought to argue for neither of these positions, but rather to find a middle ground. For 
me, this has meant taking North seriously and at his word as a critic of neoclassical economics 
(in his own terms) and as searching for a way to provide, to paraphrase Sally Humphreys, a ‘new 
theory of comparative economic history’ that would do better than Polanyi’s.610 But it has also 
meant an opportunity to assess to what extent he has succeeded in doing so. It is not easy to 
make such a judgement, especially not about such a large, variable, and sweeping ‘grand 
narrative’ as that of North. For this reason, and to make my critical observations applicable, I 
have sought to understand what criteria for North distinguished his approach from Polanyi’s and 
what he expected they would contribute to improving on the latter’s theory. This I have found in 
the importance of the ‘economics approach’, which he so clearly contrasts with Polanyi’s 
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anthropological foundations in his 1977 paper. But this raises new questions: what is this 
approach, and how has North sought to make it work?  
By examining in his work three important themes, or methodological components – 
markets, rationality, and evolution – I have sought to clarify what this ‘economics approach’ has 
come to consist of over time in North’s NIEH. I say ‘over time’ because, as mentioned, it has by 
no means been a static model to apply straightforwardly, but has undergone many shifts of 
emphasis and structure. In the first chapter I have sought to present these in general terms, and 
then to examine them more closely in the subsequent thematic chapters. The real nature of this 
‘economics approach’ and how its superior explanatory value is to be demonstrated has proven 
remarkably elusive: North’s early confidence that his propositions would, by a straightforward 
application of transaction cost economics, prove to be more testable and therefore more scientific 
has not really been borne out in practice. Indeed, as North has sought to reveal more and more of 
the iceberg of beliefs, institutions, forms of cooperation and ‘irrational’ behaviour underlying the 
peak of behaviour in market exchange observable above the waterline, it has become less rather 
than more clear what work is really done for his theory by his recurrent appeals to the merits of 
choice theory and its supposed scientific foundations.  
Daniel Ankarloo has made the point in this context that North’s approach to markets 
rejects the universality of the market to emphasize the importance of an institutional approach, 
but then seeks to reintroduce this market-like nature of individual behaviour in economic and 
political institutional structures through the back door. I agree with Ankarloo that North has a 
tendency to do this, but rather than simply critiquing North in this way, I have used this as 
another stepping stone for understanding North’s NIEH. I have sought to understand why this 
strange ambiguity, not to say inconsistency, should appear. Partially, its origins seem to me 
ideological: North’s commitment to the ‘economics approach’ seems as much a commitment to a 
contractarian liberalism, inspired by Hayek and a certain (mis-)reading of Adam Smith, as a 
claim about methodology. Central for North is to safeguard the claim that markets, when 
provided with the correct institutional supports in norms and political structures, have a dual 
benefit: enabling peaceful cooperation, where otherwise violence would prevail, and enabling 
economic performance or economic growth, where otherwise there is stagnation and rent-
seeking. This premise recurs throughout as a quod erat demonstrandum as well as as a point of 
reference, which I have referred to – using North’s own terminology – as the ‘Smithian result’ 
(though one may doubt its relevance to Adam Smith’s work).  
One must keep in mind in this regard that North not only seeks to answer the challenge of 
Polanyi’s primitivist substantivism, but – more in the background – sought to provide an 
alternative to the Marxist explanatory framework as well. Before even becoming a neoclassical 
economic historian, North was (briefly) a Marxist, and he has argued that this continued to shape 
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his concerns for explanations over the longue durée.611 His ideological relationship to the liberal 
institutionalism of Max Weber is less easily defined. Although North’s work bears similarities to 
that of Weber in terms of his search for a middle ground between ‘oversocialized’ and 
‘undersocialized’ views, Weber’s influence is more directly felt within the ‘new economic 
sociology’ of Granovetter (from whom this dichotomy is after all derived) than directly in 
North’s work.612 In North’s NIEH works Weber is mainly cited in the context of his claims about 
the origins of the spirit of capitalism and his equally famous definition of the state as the holder 
of the monopoly of violence.613 Even so, more research is needed on the comparison between 
Weber and North in light of their shared concerns with contextual rule-following behaviour and 
the importance of beliefs for constraining such behaviour. 
In any case a purely ideological or political explanation is not sufficient: one must also 
explain the work in terms of its own scientific content, and one cannot simply dismiss North on 
political grounds alone. Proceeding to analyse North’s discussions of rationality, game theory, 
and individual choice, I found a recurring similar ambiguity. On the one hand there is a clear 
desire to found his work on the (allegedly) solid foundations of conventional choice theory, be it 
in a more boundedly rational form, expressed for example in his frequent use of terms derived 
from game theory; and simultaneously he insists on the fundamental sociality of preferences, the 
independent causality of beliefs, and rejects rational choice explanations as inadequate. I have 
sought to explain his turn to evolution as one attempt to deal with this ambiguity, by recasting 
the ‘efficiency’ of competitive markets in correct institutional orders as a case of evolutionary 
adaptiveness rather than an unexamined causal relationship between a classical liberal order and 
economic prosperity.  
The latter relationship, I think, is difficult to maintain without accepting a rather simple 
version of a Panglossian neoclassical view of the market, precisely the sort of model that North 
had set out to reject. One can add to this utility of evolutionary theory the importance of 
evolutionary (and anthropological) analysis to his deeper examination of the origins of 
institutions – a stage even beyond seeing institutions as the origins of market performance. Even 
so, North sought once more to apply this evolutionary perspective in an ambiguous way, 
distancing himself from ‘Darwinian’ approaches and seeking a rather more ‘Lamarckian’ 
approach instead by insisting on the difference made by intentionality. As I have argued, this 
distinction is not as plausible conceptually as he seems to suggest. Moreover, in any case he 
succeeded neither in substantiating his claim about open access orders in history nor in doing 
justice to evolutionary theory, anthropology, or experimental economics: all fields I think it is of 
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essential importance to integrate into the process of ‘successive endogenisation’ if a Northian 
type analysis is to accomplish its aims. 
This then brings me back to the larger framework of primitivism versus modernism. As an 
overarching explanation of the ambiguities and problems of North’s work, I propose not just the 
political-ideological commitment to an ‘ordoliberal’ society. More importantly, I suggest that 
North has sought to find a middle ground within this debate that would, in a sense, allow him to 
have it both ways: to have the scientific prestige and welfare economic implications of 
conventional microeconomics and its view of the market, but also the substantivist claim about 
the dependence of the functioning of markets on a particular institutional order. He would apply, 
as the modernists would do, the premise that economic theory – in this case New Institutional 
Economics – is capable of explaining economic behaviour and institutions in all periods of 
history, but he would also allow – with the primitivists – that often market exchange was not the 
main allocation system in the past and that the choice between market exchange and other forms 
of social integration depended on sociocultural and ideological motivations rather than on an 
assumed individual orientation towards gain or profit. But in both of these cases, he has veered 
back and forth as has suited his argument or his leanings at a given time, and the result is a 
powerful and intriguing, but ultimately internally inconsistent and methodologically conflicted 
grand narrative.  
Ultimately, I believe that for a Northian project to succeed, North’s own attachment to a 
more conventional microeconomics of markets and a view of political-institutional orders as 
market-like cannot be maintained. North has from the beginning sought to demonstrate that a 
well-ordered market can do what the more liberal wing of neoclassical economics has claimed it 
can do, but for different reasons than those economists argued: in this he is not so different from 
his immediate inspirations, Hayek and Coase. However, in giving up the conventional reasons in 
defence of the efficacy of markets and the applicability of neoclassical economics to the study of 
markets (and other allocation systems) in history, he gave up the standard ways of defending 
these claims about well-ordered markets. Moreover, at the level of scientific analysis – rather 
than normativity – his rejection of neoclassical views of economic behaviour and rationality 
combined with this contractarian, classical liberal view of the emergence of order and 
cooperation in historical societies threatened to leave him stranded in a methodological 
quicksand, with little solid ground to base an argument on. North’s greatest strengths, his 
innovative and at times brilliant application of a wide range of tools from institutional 
economics, cognitive science, public choice theory, game theory, and so forth, derive on my 
reading from his search for a new foundation. But as I have tried to show, while he has come far, 
he has not (yet) found it. 
As a ‘third position’ between primitivism and modernism in economic history, overcoming 
the challenge of Karl Polanyi, Douglass North’s NIEH does not, on my account, succeed just yet. 
But this does not mean North’s toolset should be cast aside: for example, the usefulness of 
thinking in terms of institutions as rules, transaction costs, uncertainty, or the problem of 
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cooperation in the face of perennially potential violence, does not depend on the specific 
explanatory frame North’s NIEH provides. And on the whole, the larger ambition expressed in 
the ‘challenge of Karl Polanyi’ remains an important advance in economic historical theory. By 
this formulation, and his attempt at answering it by means of his NIEH theory, North has made 
the primitivism-modernism debate and the inadequacy of conventional economic theory for 
overcoming it central to the discussion in economic history. His progressive insight into the need 
for a ‘sociologically holist’ explanatory approach to produce a plausible alternative, and the 
realization that this entails incorporating a great deal of analysis on topics like norms, beliefs, 
power, identity, and cultural markers, not coincidentally precisely those dimensions generally 
disfavoured by conventional ‘economistic’ (in Polanyi’s terms) or ‘formalist’ (in Amemiya’s) 
explanations in economic history, constitutes a tremendous step forward for convergence in the 
historical social sciences.  
Of course, North’s functionalist gambit has its own risks, such as just-so stories, teleology, 
and dubious appeals to evolutionary mechanisms. Some examples of these we have already seen 
in chapter 4. Moreover, if my argument in this work is correct, North himself has not been able 
to fully develop this project beyond the attachment to the microfoundations of economic theory 
and the liberal contractarian ‘pessimistic anthropology’ that have been persistent features of his 
theoretical career. A different approach might draw on the resources I have identified, such as 
heterodox microeconomics, gene-culture coevolution, theory in economic anthropology, and a 
different view of markets. It could do this without giving up on the contributions of North in 
terms of the NIEH’s toolkit, as described above. It could do so without abandoning the Northian 
insights about the importance of institutions, beliefs, and the evolution of cooperation. But most 
importantly, it could do so without giving up on answering the challenge of Karl Polanyi – and 
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